Eternal Life Here and Hereafter

Mellone

Colin Gibson,
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to
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ETERNAL LIFE
HERE AND HEREAFTER

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ETERNAL LIFE
HERE AND HEREAFTER

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PREFACE

THE conviction underlying this book is that the relationship of man to God finds in the Christian conception of Eternal Sonship a symbolic expression which is intellectually the truest and practically the most helpful that we can give.

In human generation or sonship three things are present: bodily form and feeling; priority of the parent in time; and unity and continuity of nature—in a sense the parent exists in the child. This third element is the essential one; and it is this, apart from the others, that makes possible the use of the term to express the central thought of vital religion.

The sonship of every human soul to God is an eternal fact. It is as eternal as the very being of God, of whose nature man is made. Nothing that can come to pass in time can destroy it. But men may and do incur, and may and do inflict on themselves,

prolonged and multitudinous miseries through striving to live a life that is not their true life. Being for ever sons of God, they would live as though they were mere creatures of time. The very sense of sonship is almost lost. And on our human world is laid the weariness of an age-long burden of ignorance, suffering, and sin. The great thing needful for our deliverance is that our divine sonship shall be to us not only a truth to be acknowledged, but a reality to be enjoyed. This is eternal life. This is the heart of vital religion.

The business of organized religion is to restore the sense of sonship which the modern world has practically lost. To know the means of attaining to it—so far as in our present state we can know them—we must be willing to learn the lessons of human experience as they come down to us through the voices of the ages. And above all, we must be willing to learn the lessons of Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian experience, both in themselves and in the relations to the actual condition of what is sometimes called 'the civilization of Christendom' to-day. Some of the leading principles are briefly indicated in chapters ii., iii., iv., and v. of this book.

The tragedy of the conflict between man's true life and his actual state brings before us the hope of immortality, grounded in man's divinity which is beyond the power of time. Eternal life 'here' carries with it eternal life 'hereafter.' It is not a mere endless existence; but it implies all that is of ethical and spiritual value in the hope of personal immortality. To say that 'good is good, however short its existence' is a truth so partial as to be practically false. The quality of life is not indifferent to its duration. The worth of eternal life is not in its duration, but its duration is a consequence and completion of its worth. In this light the problem of immortality is considered in these pages. A few years ago, in a little book entitled *The Immortal Hope* (London and Edinburgh, 1910), the author discussed this problem specially in the light of the distinctive ideals of human nature and their demand for a larger realization than this life can give. More recently, in the article 'Immortality' in the seventh volume of Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (London and Edinburgh, 1914), he dealt with the same line of thought in another setting, leading to the conclusion that all

arguments relevant to the problem of immortality turn on the view taken of the place and worth of human personality, as such, in the nature of things: this was discussed with special reference to the history of scientific and philosophical speculation. In both these investigations, it was implied that the validity of human ideals and the worth of human personality are grounded in God alone. This aspect of the question is specially emphasized in the following pages. The riddle of man's destiny must be read in the light of his relationship to God.

The concluding chapter of the book seeks to show that the meaning of eternity, as beyond and above time, is not the inexplicable mystery which it is sometimes represented as being; that the beginning of an insight into what eternity may be and even must be for God himself, is not wholly beyond our powers; and that the quest for it brings us into vital touch with some of the most significant aspects of our own experience.

The author acknowledges indebtedness to the writings of Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard; Dr. R. H. Charles, of Oxford; and Baron F. von Hügel, of London. He

must also make mention of a valuable and suggestive essay on 'The Religion of Time and the Religion of Eternity,' the Essex Hall Lecture (London, 1899) by Dr. P. H. Wicksteed.

S. H. M.

Manchester,
September, 1916.

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The Word of the Lord came unto me again, saying . . . Behold, all souls are Mine.—*Ezekiel.*

Ye have your own selves for a better possession and an abiding one.—*The Epistle to the Hebrews.*

He that heareth my word, and believeth on Him that sent me, hath Eternal Life.—*The Gospel according to John.*

What, then, is man! What, then, is man! He endures but for an hour, and is crushed before the moth. Yet in the being and in the working of a faithful man is there already (as all faith, from the beginning, gives assurance) a something that pertains not to this wild death-element of Time; that triumphs over Time, and *is*, and will be, when Time shall be no more.—*Carlyle.*

Chapter I

THE POWER OF TIME

SOMETIMES, at sunset, you see the whole western heavens glowing with roseate hues, and you are aware that within a short time all these glorious tints will have faded away. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion that your reason draws,—that you never, even for the shortest time that can be conceived, see any colour which really lasts. One shade passes into another with a rapidity which defies all measurement. If the eye seems to arrest the fleeting pageant, and confer permanence on some elements in it, that is only due to the imperfection of sense. It is a series of fleeting colours, each one of which is continually vanishing into another. Even so, in the growth of a living thing there is no point at which you can say—

now the plant or animal has ceased to become. The oak may take a thousand years in growing from the acorn to maturity and then to uttermost decay; but the process is one of constant change, just as much as if it all took place in a few minutes.

Twenty-four centuries ago the Greek philosopher Heracleitus declared that such facts indicate the fundamental structure of the universe. This absolutely continuous change, in which nothing is ever the same for the smallest moment, he affirmed (without qualification) to belong to the essential nature of things, from which there is no escape.

Our whole purpose in this book is to point to the significance of those human experiences which forbid us to believe that there is nothing but this continuous and constant change. Absolute impermanence, the process of change which exhausts itself in an everlasting 'coming to be, and passing away,' is not the last word nor the final truth. None the less, all things have an aspect of continuous impermanence as one of their real and fundamental characteristics. And when Heracleitus said that the appearance of relative permanence, in visible and tangible things, is due to the imperfection of our

senses, he was simply anticipating what we know to be scientifically established fact.

This principle that the present is ever from the past and to the future has always been a floating idea in the disturbed sea of human speculation and inquiry. But during the nineteenth century it found a firm empirical foundation, in physical, biological, and historical knowledge. Physics, once supposed to be the stronghold of the unchanging atom, has found that the atom is more like a miniature universe in itself than a solid, indestructible thing; it is a miniature solar system, which is not only a vast store of energy, but is ever giving forth of its own substance, and perhaps slowly transmuting itself. In biology, Darwin took up the idea of universal change, in its reference to living things, that all forms of life in the beginning were alike, and that they gradually diverged until they attained the boundless variety we now find; and he gave a new interpretation to the idea, which made it one of the most powerful tools of investigation that we possess—that only those qualities can be developed which have a value for survival in the struggle for life. And in historical inquiries, under the influence of Hegel and

other thinkers, the principle of change has given us 'the historical method,' which regards the multitudinous events of history as the pulsations of a continuous life passing through time and gaining greater fulness as it goes.

There is a fundamental idea which all these investigations have brought to light. We may state it thus. This process of continuous constant change is a process of energy on the part of every being embraced within the expanse of reality. The meaning of this is best seen when we take it, not in the wide cosmic reference, but in its reference to humanity. It has been applied to human nature by many of the greatest thinkers. Some of them have taken it up as though experience compelled them to,—and they have affirmed it in unconscious defiance of other principles of their own. In illustration of this statement, I select a few great names. In *Augustine*—notwithstanding his assumption that God is above and beyond Time, and his conviction that the best man can only will the acceptance of the Divine aid, and that since the Fall man can will nothing good—we find human nature treated as before all else an active thing. Will is

taken to be essential to every form of consciousness, mental life being a continuous process of attention under the guidance of Will. In *Spinoza* the same principle is affirmed. For him—whatever may be thought of its consistency with his extreme Pantheism—it means that every individual is ever striving not only to maintain its own existence but to increase the fulness of its own being. This ceaseless striving or endeavour gives rise in consciousness to desire and will, and is the mainspring of the whole ethical life, for it gives rise also to that *active thinking* which according to Spinoza is the sole promise and potency of the deliverance of our will from sordid and selfish aims. By Spinoza's great contemporary, *Leibnitz*, the principle is carried further. The Leibnizian system provides congenial atmosphere for it. In his hands, Spinoza's conception becomes that of a purposeful vocation or destiny, which belongs to every being, and which every being by nature strives to work out. The universe is regarded as a vast system of living beings whose restless activity consists in unfolding and realizing their possibilities —a vast scale or hierarchy, from the lowest forms of energy which appeal to us as

material, to the highest form, the purely creative energy of God. It is however in *Schopenhauer* that the principle is most thoroughly applied. All existence springs from the Will to Live, which works at the centre of every individual being. It shows itself in various stages in nature, as physical, chemical, magnetic, and vital force; but pre-eminently in the animal kingdom, in the tendency of individuals to assert themselves in the struggle for existence and the reproduction of their kind. We know the Will to Live because we experience in ourselves, in all our volitional endeavours, the restless urge of life; and so we become part of the Will to Live. Among contemporary thinkers we find that *William James* in America, *Wundt* in Germany, and *Bergson* in France, though they differ in many other ways, are at one in affirming, as the central fact in all existence, that all living things are inwardly urged to a search after life, and more life. For Bergson, every moment of conscious life brings with it something that is not apparently but really new,—a positive increase of existence as compared with previous moments, and therefore incalculable from the previous moments.

I have referred to statements of this principle put forward by eminent thinkers who have full consciousness of its meaning. But it is also entering into the general mind of the age; although in its emotional bearings and its half-comprehended relations it is more like an emerging instinct than a distinct conception:—

> 'Tis life whereof our nerves are scant,
> Oh life, not death, for which we pant,
> More life, and fuller, that we want.

The consequences of this conception are momentous and in some ways valuable and helpful. It does away with the conception of the world as something created, made, and finished long ago. The world is in the making. Thus the 'problem of evil' is put in a new light. We see that while much needs to be said on that problem from the point of view of thought, it can be solved only in life, only by creating good; and it will not be completely solved until the utmost possibilities of all good are made real in finite lives.

Equally with the theory of a finished world, this view of existence does away with the theory of the soul as a permanent 'sub-

stance' with an outfit of faculties and intuitions. Surely history and experience indicate nothing more clearly than that the 'soul' is unspeakably complex. Look at what we call 'consciousness,' for instance. It is not a steady light but a flicker—in its irregularity and its narrowness palpably inadequate to the mind as a whole. Stores of our intellectual and emotional possessions exist beyond the range of consciousness for long stretches of time. Yet they do exist; and when called upon readily manifest themselves directly in consciousness and indirectly by guiding our actions. If there were nothing in us but what we are conscious of at any particular moment, we should be poor creatures indeed.

Hence, when we say that the whole process of mental life is a process not only of activity but of creative activity, we do not mean that the consciousness at one stage creates or manufactures the consciousness at the later stage, as if, for instance, the whole of mind could be manufactured out of primitive bodily feelings. There certainly is a definite order of development in every one's life from a state where consciousness consists of comparatively simple bodily

feelings (as in early infancy) on to the complexities of the mature mind. But the very word 'evolution' simply means the perpetual appearance of *new* facts,—as we are now using it, of new facts in the developing mind; and *if there is nothing more in the new fact than went before, then there has been no real evolution at all.* Naturalistic evolutionists like Spencer seem really to be engaged in a desperate attempt to answer the conundrum, 'When is a new thing not new?'

How far is the conception of creative evolution recognized in that immense development of biological science which has taken place through the influence of Darwin's work? We should not expect it to be fully recognized; its full meaning goes beyond the scope of biology. Yet we should expect also that biology would not lose sight of it. Why? Darwin's great contribution to the theory of evolution was to insist on the supreme importance of variations which have survival value in the struggle for life, which he called 'natural selection.' Hence mental life must have a value in the 'struggle,' i.e., must be a real cause working in the evolution. When living beings began to feel,

it made a difference to their actions, and made survival less difficult; still more was this the case when they began not only to feel but to remember. Otherwise mental life would never have been developed, and we should all be something like clockwork figures.

In the light of recent investigation, the 'factors of evolution'—the real causes which have been at work in the evolutionary specification of living beings—constitute a formidable list, about which there is much difference of opinion even among the ablest special students.

Broadly speaking, the factors which are being investigated fall into two groups, which have been distinguished as 'originative' and 'directive' forces respectively. The former are motive principles (so to speak) which belong distinctively to *life*, and some of which point unmistakably to *mental* life. Thus reproduction, heredity, variation, are essential facts of *life*; and the struggle for food and safety, the power of the living being to adapt itself to circumstances and form habits, and similar facts, imply not only life, but mental life—they imply action guided by feeling and memory.

The other group of forces, the 'directive' principles—of which natural selection is by far the most important—can only restrict, control, or interfere with the 'originative' forces. Thus, natural selection, which means the death of all that cannot adapt themselves to the actual circumstances, is like a mechanical agency which just keeps alive the sacred fire of life; it neither lights it nor improves its radiance.

If, then, we want to know why any kind of creature becomes better adapted to circumstances, or becomes able to exist more fully or copiously or easily, we turn to the originative forces, and above all to the facts which constitute the two polar problems in the sphere of evolutionary science—'heredity' and 'environment'—sameness and difference between parents and offspring. Darwin assumed a general tendency to vary *slightly* in all directions, and regarded the survival and accumulation of many slight variations, through successive generations, as the main clue to the origin of new species. This assumption is now giving rise to more problems, and harder ones, than any which 3
it has solved.

It is difficult to resist the impression that

evolutionists are approaching the conception of a central source of energy in every living thing, which is not mere adaptation to the surroundings, but which goes in advance of the surroundings, and is in effect a striving after fuller life. They are being led to this conception by probing the 'originative' factors of evolution. The suggestion made by the present developments of science is that the whole story of evolution is summed up in Abraham, the father of the faithful, who 'went out, not knowing whither he went.' Evolution is possible only because what we almost may call a spirit of hopeful endeavour possesses everything. There is something working through every being, organism or animal, such that its action is in advance of its experience at every stage of its growth. It is known that the earliest forms of life existed only in the water. But the water-creatures did not *first* acquire lungs and *then* proceed to live on land. Lungs came to be 'evolved' because they were needed, and they were needed because of the restless inner urgency of life. There were countless failures; but those that failed implanted in their descendants the power to succeed. They did succeed; the

'fittest' survived, and at length the breathing-organs of their bodies were perfected. This is just one instance of the universal story. Just so it was that from the reptiles, the creeping things of the earth, came the lark and the eagle. *Why were the first trials made?*

We see then that biological science has made an important contribution to that characteristic product of modern thought which we have been discussing—the interpretation of every department of existence in the light of the idea of creative change. This is not merely an affirmation of the illimitable extension of the universe in time. It involves that, but it is more than that. It is a new interpretation of time. Time becomes a process of real and ever-changing activity. The result is that the expression of our deepest life has been gathered into the one word 'progress'—progress moulded and made by human effort. In its philosophical bearings this conception affirms the actual 'plasticity' of the universe as subjected to man's creative agency.

We have here a group of connected conceptions which have become more than a 'floating idea' in modern thought. They

have become as it were a gospel of life, half-consciously or even unconsciously held by many, but none the less profoundly influencing current thought and feeling. Every appeal from this point of view comes home to the modern mind. Robert Browning tells us of a soul that had lived in a world where things were ordered otherwise, a world where the ceaseless round of unavoidable energy and strife that meets us here was unknown; the star Rephan, a 'perfect world.' No want was there; whatever ought to be, was there already. No growth was there; for growth is change, and how shall change come, where everything is as it ought to be? Nothing began there, and nothing ended. Where should it fall short at first? It extended, ever the same. There the spirit lived. There were no fallen roses, no decaying leaves, and no opening roses, no fresh green buds. There, since perfection does not need service, there was no work to do, neither hope nor fear, neither advance nor retreat. Yet that perfection wearied the spirit. He began to long for a difference in thing and thing, so that one might be better than another; for a life where there was something to struggle against and something better to

obtain; for something that should shock him with the sense of a want of worth in things, and startle him up by an Infinite discovered above and below. Then a Voice came from the Unknown to that soul:—

> So, wouldst thou strive, not rest,
> Burn and not smoulder, win by worth,
> Not rest content with a wealth that's dearth?
> Thou art past Elphan, thy place be Earth!

Get the fighting spirit into a man, and you often find that it is the moral salvation of him, if only he knows how to use it. Why? Because his own inner life is the battlefield. For one battle you need to fight with other people, there are a hundred you need to fight within yourself. Hence Browning makes his half-cynical but keen-sighted Bishop Blougram say:—

> When the fight begins within himself
> A man's worth something. God stoops o'er his head,
> Satan looks up between his feet,
> He's left, himself, in the middle: the soul wakes
> And grows. Prolong that battle through his life.

The old Jewish Rabbi, Ben Ezra, bowed down with his ninety years, tells the secret of life as he has known it, to the young men around him:—

Then, welcome each rebuff
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand, but go!
Be our joy three parts pain!
Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe.

Browning has here illustrated the specially ethical aspects of the same principle whose bearings on life we have been endeavouring to describe.

Our whole treatment of this attitude of mind implies, and was intended to imply, that its prevalence represents a vital gain to humanity. We must now, however, frankly face the question: can we be satisfied with it as an ultimate or final conception of life? If we can, ought we so to be satisfied with it? I answer in the words of Dr. P. H. Wicksteed, 'The inspiring conception of progress, the sense of unknown and unimagined things which the future holds in store for us, the feeling that all we know and love awaits its interpretation from things as yet not seen even by the eye of faith, has not only given a certain vagueness to our higher life, but has even reduced it to a kind of inherent self-contradiction. Like the apostle, we do not count that we have

attained, and we cannot accept as adequate anything that lies within even the furthest stretch of definite anticipation; and so the very idea of attainment has become cramping and repellent to us. And thus we are in danger of losing the very sense of a truth which is worth enjoying as well as worth seeking, of a life that is worth living as well as worth gaining. In our intellectual and, in a certain sense, in our moral life, we are in danger of degenerating into sportsmen who hunt for the sake of hunting. . . . The contradiction becomes more glaring when we turn to the moral life, and the efforts for social amelioration which happily form so large a part of our conception of the moral life to-day. We are told on the one hand that moral effort is the noblest element in our personal life, and that self-sacrifice is the most beautiful of all things; and on the other hand, that we must never be content so long as there are evil or selfish impulses in our hearts, or social wrongs to right. . . . But if so, then from both sides, by the quenching of the cravings of selfishness, and by removing the occasions for self-sacrifice, we are striving to do away with every need for the moral effort and self-sacrifice which

we say are our highest life. . . . We may believe that complete success in the moral warfare cannot be thought of as even an abstract possibility for indefinite generations or centuries to come; but, none the less, the man who fights to win, however far off the victory may be, must have in his mind a conception of something to be won that is worth having, or he fights for he knows not what, and obeys, after all, a mere blind impulse.'

The view of life which makes it consist in nothing more than creative change, 'the continual appearance of something new,' may be full of suggestiveness, as we have seen it to be; and it may be made the basis of an inspiring ethical gospel. It is part of the truth; but it cannot be the whole truth. Perfection cannot be anything limited and unsatisfactory (as in Browning's *Rephan*); nor can it be something for ever beyond us, which recedes from us as we approach it. Endless progress to perfection must mean something more than the endless deferring of perfection. The process must involve a genuine attainment of something which may be an abiding possession; an attainment which is *eternal* because nothing that happens

through time can weaken it or destroy it; an attainment which does not go on simply to change into something else; an attainment which is not a mere *becoming* but a *being*.

And when beyond these demands of our finite experience we look to God as source of all, we seem to perceive that this exaltation of *becoming* as the supreme factor in the nature of things, has consequences even more sinister than those to which we have alluded. A being who is subject to time is undergoing a process of change, or is becoming 'something new.' A God subject to time is therefore no God. He would be a growing being, to whom things might 'happen' as they 'happen' to us. He would have to wait for the vicissitudes of experience which the stream of temporal events brought to him. Surely the deification of progress through effort reduces itself to impossibility in the demand for a progressive Deity,—a Deity who has his own struggles to carry through, and who, though he is winning, has not yet won, and needs our help if he is to win at all.

Even then, as Dr. Wicksteed reminds us, eternity is not so easily exorcised. 'If we banish it from our conception of God, it

takes its awful stand behind him. God himself we have entangled in the flux and succession of time, but above him now stands an iron fate which holds both him and us in his grip, dictating the conditions under which he shall strive to gain his ends, holding him to laws and to necessities, which are not modes of his being nor forms of his self-utterance, but necessities to which he must submit. And this awful background of Fate, not God, is then the Eternal.'

The reader will see, I hope, that these are no artificial difficulties. They all spring from an assumption which we have made for the sake of showing its consequences when it is taken seriously. It is often unconsciously made, or half consciously, with no perception of its real import. The assumption is, that the whole realm of being, including the being of God himself, is 'in time'; in other words, is exhaustively expressed in never-ending processes of change. We say, 'in other words'; for time *is* change, time *means* change, and apart from a series of
8 changing events time is inconceivable. We may call the processes of change 'creative,' because they consist in the constant occurrence of new things, the constant emergence

of new qualities and relations; and from this point of view, as we have seen, it is most important to realize the part that human effort plays in the process. But to assume that there is nothing more than this, is to open up a series of difficulties which in the end become intolerable. Such a conclusion leaves us with an insoluble contradiction between attainment and progress; it makes perfection, as an aspect of our highest ideals, or even as a transcendent possibility, inconceivable; and it leaves us with a God who is only less finite than we ourselves are.

In the following pages we shall see whether human experience does not involve intimations of a conception of Eternity which, while free from these difficulties, does justice to the claims of Time.

CHAPTER II

ETERNAL LIFE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

I

EARLY Hebrew belief made of Jehovah a national war-god. The people were struggling for 'a place in the sun'; many times the alternative of life or death for the nation had to be decided on the battlefield. These wars were the wars of Jehovah himself, for Israel's enemies were Jehovah's enemies. Centuries before the earliest literary memorials of Hebrew prophecy, we find the first beginnings of this most characteristic of Israel's religious achievements, closely associated with war propaganda. Deborah's rallying of the tribes is part of her function as prophetess. The Song is given in the fifth chapter of the Book of Judges. 'Destitute of form, and in part unintelligible, it is a matchless and imperishable poem, sublime

in the manner of its depiction of a supreme moment when all hearts were thrilled with the realization of superhuman power; its triumph-notes proclaim the exultant confidence of a young people as, in a great but scarcely apprehended crisis, they conceive of Deity as marching in the van, and hear sounds betokening a divine presence reverberating in their ranks.' Not only in war but in all the concerns of human existence, the life of the Deity is closely interwoven with the lives of men. But the religion at this stage is pure secularism. It is concerned with the material present. The most typical forms of worship are the great agricultural festivals held at one or other of the more famous sacred places where Jehovah is believed to present himself.

The 'Book of the Covenant,' given in our Book of Exodus (xx. 22–xxiii. 33)—probably written out in its present form subsequently to the time of Solomon, but containing elements of great antiquity—represents the earlier national religion as it was in operation during a prolonged period. The gods of other nations are real gods; but Jehovah is Israel's God; his life is bound up with the life of his people, and he requires

their absolute obedience. The rewards are material prosperity, health, and long life. The closing section—promising a successful conquest of Canaan as a reward for obedience and implying that the conquest was only slowly and gradually achieved—is suggestive of a very early date. Looking at the religious attitude implied in this code as a whole, we see that there is no conception of a human world as such, no outlook on any ideal future, and no expectation of recompense for this life in the hereafter. The Hebrew peasant hoped that he would not die until his measure of life was full, and that then he would be buried in his own ground where his fathers had been laid, and that his sons would guard and honour the grave. There are traces in the Hebrew scriptures of a primitive worship of the dead, who were believed to haunt the family grave as spirits or 'shades,' unsubstantial as breath or wind, yet dependent on the regard and respect of the survivors. But at a very early date, Hebrew ideas about the state of the dead assumed—under what influences, is an unsettled question—their characteristic form, of belief in *Sheol*, the under-world, the world of 'shades,' the abode of the departed spirits.

It is extremely important to grasp the significance of this belief.

It was a belief in a future 'life' which is not really life, in any moral or religious or even human sense of the word: a common destiny awaiting all the departed, whatever their characters or deeds in this life, an existence without moral distinctions, cut off from communion with Jehovah and in fact from all relation of any kind to him. His rule is limited to the upper world, and there especially to his own people. The moral consciousness of the nation advanced beyond the elementary stage represented by the Book of the Covenant; the conception of 'righteousness,' as summing up the moral demands which Jehovah made on his people, was deepened; but the belief persisted that the dead pass altogether out of his jurisdiction. Now monotheism, in its genuine form, ethical theism, implies that the entire existence of man, here and hereafter, is under the jurisdiction of God—that God's Providence controls man's future life no less than his present life. *This conclusion was not grasped by the religious consciousness of Israel until some centuries after the monotheism of Israel had reached an advanced stage of*

development. The result is that for all these centuries, the emphasis and the detail of religious experience and teaching are ever upon God, not upon man, and nevertheless
2 *upon this life not upon the next.* What may we learn from this remarkable fact?

II

As long as Israel's armies were on the whole victorious in their frequent conflicts with warlike and troublesome neighbours, Jehovah could still be believed to be the tribal Deity who identified himself with the fortunes of his people, both in war and peace: though this belief was shaken by the disruption of the nation into two independent kingdoms, in whose struggles victory inclined sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other. But when mightier enemies, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, entered the field in succession, and Israel's local victories gave way to a stream of disasters and defeats culminating in the crowning calamity of deportation and exile, then the traditional theory fell to pieces. The Power that permitted or controlled these events was no tribal god whose business was to lead his people to victory in war. The deepest problems of faith were

opened up. If faith was to stand, a far more penetrating explanation must be sought for. This was the challenge that the great prophets came forth to meet.

Looked at from the outside, the whole story of the Hebrew prophets' work is a story of failure. It was labour in vain. What is marvellous in these men is, that the more evident their failure seemed to be, the stronger their confidence and courage became. When they realized, as they alone could, the low level of the national religious and social life, they replied by deepening the intensity of their faith. When the dreadful tale of defeat and disaster was giving the last death-blow to the old belief in a tribal god of Israel, they were rising to the conviction that the God of Israel is the God of the whole world, whose vast design embraces all the kingdoms of men. When the nation, helpless as judged by any standard of earthly or material force, stood facing the great powers of this world, then the prophetic conviction was kindled into its fiercest glow—that Israel's destiny on this earth must be only more lasting and more glorious than all the dreams which had fled. 'Monotheism was beaten into Israel by the hammer of

war.' The tragedies which war brought with it made the religion of the Hebrews concern itself with inner and fundamental realities, and deepened its ethical and spiritual power.

Internally the need was met by the elaboration of the Law as the divinely appointed guide and guardian of national and individual life; while externally the outlook darkened and the solid grounds for confidence in the future dwindled with the passing of the generations. But the prophetic hope only grew in intensity. It responded to the logic of fact by changing its form. The old belief had never been surrendered. 'The Lord is a man of war' remained the watchword to the end. The Almighty had his enemies; he waged war, but not merely as a tribal Deity defending his own. The old belief was expanded and deepened. The divine standard of right and wrong was not bounded by the hills of Judea, but is the same for all the world. A nation's place in the world depends on the worth of the contribution it makes to the kingdom of God.

We must look more closely at some of the leading features of this great change of outlook.

Prophetic monotheism was attained in the course of the eighth century before Christ; its full meaning is seen in the teachings of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, whose work is embraced in the period 750–675 B.C., the prophecies of Amos being the earliest and those contained in the sixth and seventh chapters of Micah the latest.

Few events in the religious history of mankind are more striking and significant than the appearance of Amos, the herdsman of Tekoah, at the royal sanctuary at Bethel when crowds were assembled there for one of the great festivals. These people were convinced that they were Jehovah's people, and that they were quite safe. He might be offended for a while, but his favour could be reconciled by abundant sacrifices and formal prayers. They were a privileged people, and privilege to them meant freedom from responsibility. The message of Amos is directly contradictory of all these popular beliefs. To him, Israel's special privileges are the ground of special responsibilities. 'You only have I known of all the families of the earth; *therefore will I visit upon you all your iniquities*' (iii. 2). 'Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live' (v. 14). 'Though

ye offer me burnt offerings and meal offerings, I will not accept them. . . . Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs. . . . But let judgment roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream' (v. 22-24). The profoundly ethical character of the prophet's theism is manifest. The intensity of this moral consciousness, and the clearness of his perception of the actual condition of his country, reacted on his outlook on the
3 future, which was almost devoid of hope. He is convinced that Jehovah has spoken in his own soul, and that Jehovah's absolute power and righteousness will be vindicated. And though he speaks of judgments which sift and preserve the good grain, he sees no vindication of righteousness but in the irrevocable doom of the guilty nations, including Israel itself.

Hosea, too, regards the nearer future as one of unrelieved darkness; but, taught by the tragedy of his own life, he clings in the darkness to the unwearied love of God. 'I will heal their backsliding; I will love them freely; for mine anger is turned away' (xiv. 4). But Hosea does not, any more than Amos, venture on any suggestion of *how* the salvation will be brought about.

It was reserved for Isaiah of Jerusalem to perceive not only the human means by which Jehovah had ordained the destruction of the Jewish nationality, but also the means by which restoration was to be effected. Like the 'seven thousand in Israel,' of whom Elijah heard, there are in Judah, 'a very small remnant,' human souls strong in unfaltering faith, and from these a new and better nation will come to be. On this he dwells repeatedly and with emphasis. 'And it shall come to pass in that day, that the remnant of Israel . . . shall no more stay upon him that smote them, but shall stay upon the Lord, the Holy One of Israel, in truth. A remnant shall return . . . unto the mighty God. For though thy people, O Israel, be as the sand of the sea, only a remnant of them shall return' (x. 20-22). In the building of the new Israel, the remnant will be a 'stone, a tried stone, a precious cornerstone, of sure foundation.' The new Israel will be the kingdom of Righteousness, the kingdom of God; and from it, light and guidance will go forth to the nations of the world. Then there rises in the prophet's vision the form, purely human in its majestic lineaments, of an ideal prince—not an im-

mortal God-man—a ruler of the lineage of David, who will 'reign in righteousness.' And then 'they shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea' (xi. 9). If Isaiah set forth with the greatest definiteness the calamities impending on the country, he also did most to encourage confidence in a new be-
4 ginning. As we read his writings, the feeling comes over us that the prophet counted himself as one set in the twilight of the evening, which the night is sure to follow; but that nevertheless he sees a few stars, and has a premonition of a new 'great rose of dawn.'

There followed, for a generation, a reaction against all the ideals which the prophets had at heart. The predictions of national ruin were fulfilled one by one; and for more than forty years of storm and stress (629–586 B.C.) Jeremiah was compelled to watch the downfall of his country, while he laboured to convince his people of the things that belonged to their peace. As others saw him, he was a contemptible or a sinister figure, yet, to himself, he seemed to spend his very soul on a fruitless and hopeless task: moved by an insight which pierced through the political

delusions and religious superficialities of the time, yet only to see a vision of doom: ready to curse the day of his birth, yet able to rise to triumphant trust in the everlasting love of God, and in the end to reaffirm the old prophetic hope of the return and restoration of a people that 'know the Lord.' But 5
he reaffirmed the prophetic hope with an addition which is of inestimable value: the possibility of personal fellowship and communion between each individual soul and God. This expression of a sense of the worth of individual personality marks a new departure in Hebrew prophecy.

Jeremiah had not laboured in vain. That his people preserved their religious life through the calamity of the exile is largely due to him, and to his contemporary Ezekiel, the prophet-priest, deported with the first body of captives in 599 B.C., and continuing his prophetic activity among the exiles for at least twenty-seven years.

Ezekiel surveys the course of events with an equally penetrating eye; but he is none the less convinced that the future of his people lies with those who, though delivered into the hands of strangers, are able to realize the truth of the divine word, 'I will be to

them a sanctuary for a little while in the countries where they are come' (xi. 16). But his outlook does not go beyond the restoration, peace, and prosperity of a reunited people in the land once more their own. Political and social questions interest him little; his ideal is a 'theocracy' in which the Church has absorbed the State. For our present purpose it is very important to notice the strong *ethical individualism* which pervades the teaching of Ezekiel. It does not follow that he developed it from Jeremiah's doctrine of personal religion; he may have arrived at it independently. One of his strongest statements of it is in the eighteenth chapter. Every one receives in this life the exact reward of his deeds.

The great prophet of consolation, the prophet of the Return, now comes before us —the 'Second Isaiah,' whose teaching is contained in chapters forty to fifty-five of our Book of Isaiah. He surpasses even the First Isaiah in the splendour of his visions of the Holy City, long desolate, destined to be more than restored, and in her magnificence to wield a mighty influence which the nations of the world shall feel and to which they shall willingly yield. But the true meaning of his

ideal appears in the famous 'Songs of the Servant of Jehovah.' The Servant is, we must maintain, the Jewish people, regarded from the point of view of their divine calling. They are not the sole object of divine providence; they are the instrument employed by God for the accomplishment of a wider aim. Israel's destinies shall guide mankind to God. The *Torah*, the Word of God inscribed on her heart, is given in order that all nations may be blessed. Israel, stricken and afflicted in the eyes of men, passes through suffering to death, to receive the world as a reward—the world which through Israel will then be the kingdom of God.

Of all this line of great heroic souls, visited and stirred as they were by the very spirit of God, there is not one whose gaze penetrates anywhere beyond the limits of this earth. Only those faithful and righteous men, who lived at the time of its advent, could share in the privileges of the ideal kingdom.

III

Thus do the hopes and dreams of Hebrew prophecy raise one of the great problems of the ages—a problem of faith and of specula-

tion alike. A modern thinker has thus re-
6 ferred to it: 'Even if the enormous spiral of human history is destined to wind itself at last to a point which may be called achievement, what, I ask, of the multitudes that perish by the way? "These all died, not having received the promises." What if there are no promises *to them*?'

This problem presented itself to the mind of Israel in a direct and—we may say—a simple and practical form: to explain the undeserved sufferings of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked. And it was not possible even to ask this question until a certain stage of religious development had been reached. The question could not arise until tribal theism had become monotheism. Jehovah, while a tribal god, might be believed to be righteous; but, as a tribal god, he could not be almighty, and therefore he was not wholly responsible for the fate of the righteous. And, further, the full meaning of the question could not be manifest until ethical individualism had aroused a feeling for the value and destiny of the individual as such. It is well known that until a comparatively late period—the beginnings of which are marked by the religious individual-

ism of Jeremiah and Ezekiel—the 'religious unit' was not the individual but the family, the tribe, the nation—ultimately always the nation.

National solidarity—as understood in theory and practice, at least to the time of the exile—meant that the individual is related to Jehovah *only as a member of the nation*. As an individual, he had no worth. Whatever his nature or character, he shared in the national judgments. The popular view was sometimes expressed in the epigram, 'The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge,' quoted and criticized by Jeremiah (xxxi. 29, 30) and Ezekiel (xviii. 2, 3). The fathers have sinned and the children are involved in the consequences of the guilt. The historical meaning of Ezekiel's protest—'Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal!' (xviii. 25)—is that ethical reflection was beginning to question the justice of this state of things. Men were beginning to deny their personal responsibility for the national ruin which was the consequence of their fathers' misdeeds.

The truth is that national solidarity, so understood, was a kind of fatalism which

destroyed all moral initiative. What was the use of a man's personal efforts after righteousness? They contributed nothing either to save the nation from its impending doom or to save himself from sharing in it. Such a view tended to paralyse personal effort and make men the victims of despair. Nevertheless such an explanation of history presented no difficulty to the prophets of the eighth century. They think only of the nation collectively, and to it all their messages are addressed. Such an interpretation of suffering could not stand in the face of the logic of facts. In the coming exile, when the *nation* as such would cease to exist, a purely national interpretation of the individual's lot ceased to be possible. The first result of reflection was the postulate that the righteous must personally prosper and the unrighteous personally suffer.

Allowing for a deeper meaning for 'righteousness,' 'unrighteousness,' 'prosperity,' 'suffering,' the truth of this postulate, in its
8 general form, must be admitted if we admit the rationality and righteousness of the universe. In the language of theism: 'If the world is created and ruled by a righteous God, it must sooner or later be well with the

righteous.' But as long as the after-life was conceived as 'life' in *Sheol*, the postulate could be applied only to the present life. So applied, it created the assumption—we may almost say the fixed idea—that personal righteousness received its adequate and fitting recompense, and personal unrighteousness its adequate and fitting retribution, in the outward and visible circumstances of this life.

The position of Jeremiah in this connexion is most remarkable. 'To him,' says 9
Dr. Charles, 'the law is not an external commandment provoking opposition, but the word of God written in his heart, renewed from day to day, and evoking within him a passionate loyalty and obedience. His life is fed through constant communion with God. If then God so entered into communion with him, He will likewise in the coming time redeem the nation by writing His law in their hearts (xxxi. 31–34), that is, by establishing an immediate relation with each individual, such as God has already established with the prophet.' In this experience he was actually in possession of the ultimate ground for belief in an after-life which shall be at once a development and explanation

of this life and a renewal of communion with God. But he did not realize this. Retaining the old belief in *Sheol*, he maintained the postulate of personal earthly recompense or retribution (vii. 5–7, xvii. 5–8, 19–27, xxxi. 30), although he was aware that sometimes this postulate was in direct conflict with experience (xii. 1–2).

Ezekiel states the postulate most explicitly and definitely. With him, it becomes a doctrinaire theory that *a man's outward lot is an index to his character and condition before God*. His 'first principle' is the immediate relation of every single soul to God: 'All souls are mine' (xviii. 4). His theory of the certainty of personal earthly recompense or retribution is laid down in precise and detailed statements (ch. xviii. and elsewhere). The theory involves a denial of any real connexion between the present and the past. At any moment—irrespective of ancestral heredity and past personal habits and present environment—the individual man may make an absolutely new beginning in his conduct. As Ezekiel states this view, it is more than ethical individualism. It is ethical atomism. Not only is society ethically a mere aggregate

of separate units, but each man's ethical life is resolved into a mere series of separate acts, each act having its own distinctive moral quality and being recompensed accordingly. Collectively, then, the circumstances of each man's earthly lot are the exact equivalent of his moral desert.

Many passages from the Psalms and the Wisdom literature show that a doctrine, substantially the same as that of Ezekiel, rooted itself in the national consciousness. Modifications were made not in principle but in detail, in order to remove the more obvious discrepancies with experience. For example, it was seen that suffering is sometimes not retributive but disciplinary, and is followed by a renewal of outward blessings (Psalm xxxiv. 19–22). The prosperity of the unrighteous is only for a time and serves, by contrast, to make his ultimate fate more impressive (Psalm xxxvii. 20, 25, 36). And by whatever ways of trouble it may be reached, the *end* of the righteous is always peace (Psalm xxxvii. 25, 37; Proverbs xxiii. 18; Job viii. 6, 7, xlii. 12).

IV

The author of Ecclesiastes, writing about 200 B.C., confronts this time-honoured theory with the facts of life as he saw them. He speaks as a pure secularist; the few references to divine judgment and providence are so contrary to his main thought that we can only regard them as additions from a later hand. He finds no trace of any rational order in human experience, and in the end is led to deny the possibility of any recompense or retribution here or hereafter. He sees that evil may even prolong a man's days and righteousness curtail them (vii. 15, 16; ii. 14; ix. 2). As far as the theory of personal earthly retribution is concerned, he is in closer contact with the relevant facts than Ezekiel was; it is in his interpretation of the facts that he goes astray. All the truth that he perceived, and a great deal more, is set forth in the immortal story of Job, the greatest contribution which Hebrew ethical and spiritual genius has made to the ultimate problem of human life. Realizing what the problem is which it discusses, we may assign it to the fifth century before Christ.

The doctrine of a man's individual and personal worth, and that of a strictly individual and personal retribution in this life, cannot be reconciled. This is enforced in the dramatic contrast between the nobility of Job's life and character, and the wretchedness of his condition. The theory maintained by Job's three friends cannot stand in face of the logic of facts to which Job recurs with increasing emphasis. Dr. Charles has thus 11
stated the central problem of the book: 'Human faith, in order to assure itself of its own reality, claims an outward attestation at the hands of God, which is not given (xvii. 3, 4). The righteousness of God cannot be discovered in the outer world as ruled by God; this world is a moral chaos. Hence from the God of such a world, the God of outer providence, the God of circumstance, he appealed to the God of faith, though to this appeal he looked for an answer not in this world but in the next.' A sound critical reading of the crucial passage (xix. 25–27) leaves us no alternative but to recognize in it an expression of the conviction that the soul is capable of an experience and vision of God beyond the grave. This conviction owes nothing to the current ideas of *Sheol*, the full

darkness of which is reflected in the book (ch. iii., viii., xxv.). Job's vision of God after death involves his vindication from the false charges of his friends: 'I know that my vindicator liveth, and that at the last he will appear above my grave; . . . without my body shall I see God, whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another.' We may fully admit that this is a *momentary* conviction, that it does not recur; but it is a *real* conviction, of the actual possibility of an after-life which shall be not only a development of this life and an explanation of its mysteries, but a renewal of communion with its divine source.

The writer seems to be feeling his way in the same direction in some other passages. Even in the apparent hopelessness of the fourteenth chapter, through the negations we seem to trace a wistful question. May not man revive as a tree that has been cut down? May not God, who once had communion with man, summon him back to its renewal?

Dr. Cheyne, in his Bampton Lectures on *The Origin of the Psalter*, maintained that belief in a real future life (apart from *Sheol*) is actually implied in four Psalms (xvi. 9, 10;

xvii. 15, xlix. 15, lxxiii. 26). Afterwards, partly on the basis of some rather arbitrary 'emendations' of the texts, he abandoned this interpretation of the verses in question. Dr. Charles maintains that—apart from all emendations—the general drift of Psalms xvi. and xvii. does not admit of any reference to the future life, but that the contrary is the case in Psalms xlix. and lxxiii. Decision depends on the question whether the 'I' of the Psalmist means himself individually—as a *representative* individual, but none the less himself personally—or the righteous *community* as such. There can be no doubt that the latter view is true, in the main, of the Psalter as a whole. Is it true in the passages now before us?

'Thou wilt not leave my soul in *Sheol*; neither wilt thou suffer thy godly one [or, thy beloved] to see the pit' (xvi. 10). We must maintain that there is nothing in the poem to forbid the natural inference that the Psalmist speaks for himself as an individual. On the other hand, the context does seem to suggest that what he has in mind is not a deliverance from *Sheol* at some time after death, but a deliverance from death altogether, as in the case of Enoch. It is a

strange claim to make; but it is made on the basis of an experience of God springing from willing obedience. If this is the true view, we must admit that this aspiration after an embodied immortality on earth is a lame and impotent conclusion from the religious experience which the author shares with Jeremiah and Job: a fellowship with God which desires and implies personal superiority to death.

'As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness' (xvii. 15). Here the expressions are so figurative, that no inference can be drawn with security from the words. For example, it has been maintained that nothing more may be meant than 'the awakening next morning, when the Psalmist will join afresh in the Temple worship.'

'God will redeem my soul from the power of *Sheol*: for he shall receive me' (xlix. 15). The whole drift of the Psalm supports Dr. Charles' view. The author has at heart the problem of Job—the relation of personal character and worth to earthly prosperity.[1] Death is the fate of all. But after death,

[1] In the Psalms the words 'wise' and 'unwise' are almost always used in an ethical and religious sense.

the destiny of the righteous and of the unrighteous is not the same. God will take the souls of the righteous to himself.

'I am continually with thee; thou hast holden my right hand. Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. . . . My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever' (lxxiii. 23, 24, 26). It is impossible to doubt that the poem is throughout the individual utterance of personal faith. The prosperity of the wicked is keenly felt. Faith was breaking under the strain, until the Psalmist entered into the secret things of God (v. 17). Then he perceived that even now the wicked are given over to 'ruins'—the metaphor suggests *self-delusion*—and the righteous even now enjoy a divine guidance and a communion with God which death cannot break off. In the end God will take them to himself.

V

Our survey of Hebrew prophecy, and of the reactions of the national consciousness upon it, has brought us into contact with the following essential facts:—

(*a*) An experience which in the end created a sense of personality or individuality not simply merged in or indistinguishable from that of the nation.

(*b*) This sense of individuality expressed itself first in an aspiration after a personally direct access to God.

(*c*) The aspiration after communion with God created a desire for a future life where this communion might be renewed. Such a future life would not be a mere continuance of this life but an explanation of the mysteries of retribution, which are inexplicable from the point of view of this life alone.

In Israel's monotheistic period, it was long before any individual access to God, or any individual future life worthy of the name, was recognized as possible. But through all that time, the moral consciousness of the people was being deepened and strengthened, and the meaning of social righteousness as the true service of God was being opened up. From this we may learn that there is no moral or spiritual profit in meditation on the conditions of the future life until we have begun to realize the divine possibilities of the present life. In Jeremiah, in Job, and in some of the Psalms we see men approaching to the

realization of what is meant by direct access to God, and by the want of it. When we learn, through such personal communion with God, to deal with the problems of the present life, we shall be in a position to deal to some purpose with the problems of the future.

Chapter III

ETERNAL LIFE IN THE APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE

WE have followed first the national hope and then the individual hope in Israel. We have discussed them separately, and it has appeared that to a certain extent the two hopes were historically antagonistic to one another. The literature which now opens before us, belongs to a stage of Jewish experience which led to a combination of the national and individual hopes by means of the idea of the *resurrection of the dead*. The righteous man and the righteous nation are blessed together; the righteous man is rewarded, not with any solitary immortality, but with a blessed resurrection life with his brethren in the coming kingdom of God. Before this result was reached, the national hope had to undergo further transformation.

1

The return of the exiles began in 538 B.C.; and the century which followed has been well described as 'a century of disillusion.' There are few more pathetic contrasts in history than that between the glowing pictures of the restoration, on which the prophets had dwelt, and the reality, as it was for example when Nehemiah visited the remains of the city. But men arose to bear witness that the soul of the prophets' work was living still. Haggai, Zechariah, the 'Third Isaiah' (ch. lvi.–lxvi.), Joel, Malachi, repeated and amplified the essential message of the old faith. Joel exults in his picture of the outpouring of the spirit upon a nation born again. But the bitterness of the contrast between the real and the ideal penetrates the work of these men; and we find a significant change of outlook.

The prophets had wrought the essence of the national hope into a living conviction: 'We are unfit for our divine destiny; God will make us fit for it, at whatever cost. We are helpless under the heel of our enemies; God will destroy their power, and set us free to be what he means us to be.' This conviction became a faith in one final and conclu-

sive act of divine intervention, an act making itself felt not only in the realm of the spiritual but in that of the physical and material. God will make visible war upon the old evil world, 'unmaking to remake'; the new world, a world of peace, will be a gift from heaven, not a product of earth or of human things. For the war against evil is taken out of the hands of men. Its leader is no idealized earthly king; its vanguard is a supernatural heavenly host, coming from on high to destroy the enemies of God. This is the
1 theme of the literature of *Apocalyptic* with its characteristic *Eschatology*.

The difference between Apocalyptic and Old Testament prophetic literature is one of degree rather than of kind, especially in the case of the post-exilic prophets. Still, the books classed together under the head of Apocalyptic, have a strongly marked common purpose and method of their own.

The *purpose* is to revive the failing hearts of the people, by revealing a near future when after a last dreadful onset of a hostile world, Jehovah or his Messiah would appear to subdue the nations of the earth and establish Israel as the centre of a glorious kingdom. Whenever the political situation culminates

in a crisis for the chosen people, these writings appear. They have been described as 'political manifestoes' or as 'tracts for bad times.' The writer foretells the calamities of his own day, and proceeds to foretell more terrible events with darker shadows, leading up to a conclusive divine intervention when the miseries of the people are at their worst.

The *method* is on the whole the same in all these books. Everything is expressed symbolically. All kind of images pass across the scene—monstrous animal forms, physical prodigies, terrific battles; persons and events are obscurely indicated, as for instance by mystic numbers. The mysterious often appears to be specially significant and even divine. Moreover, in a time of national oppression and misery, it was dangerous to be too explicit; the message must be suggested merely. The writer gives a dramatic statement of the history of mankind, and especially of Israel, down to his own day; but the history is put in the form of prophecy attributed to some famous character of ancient times, often one of the patriarchs. The hero is represented as speaking in the first person, urging his hearers to endure with patience until the coming of God's

kingdom. Up to a certain point we have history expressed symbolically as prophecy; beyond that point we have prophecy merely —the writer is looking forward beyond his own time. Some of the imagery can be traced to Babylonian and Persian sources; for some of it we need not look beyond the Old Testament prophets from whom the writers borrowed. But they spread out the imagery, so to speak, on a vaster scale, as the theatrical scene-painter 'splashes' the colours on to his huge canvas.

The artificiality of the method, the frequently fantastic character of the imagery, the obscurity of the symbolism, often produce in the Western mind a strong feeling of repulsion. It is not strange that the late James Martineau described Apocalyptic as a 'monstrous mythology.' None the less this literature remains a splendid and pathetic example of a passionate faith, laid low at length by the inexorable logic of history and fact, but containing within it something which humanity will not willingly surrender.

Careless seems the great Avenger; history's pages but record
One death-grapple in the darkness twixt old Systems and the Word;

Truth for ever on the scaffold, wrong for ever on the throne:
Yet that scaffold sways the future, and behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above His own.

Our book of Daniel not only illustrates the essential features of Apocalyptic, as we have described them, but also is in itself the finest example of such literature from purely Jewish sources. Next in order of merit is probably the second of the two Esdras books in our Apocrypha. The Christian Apocalypses of the first century are modelled on the Jewish ones. The Revelation of John, in our New Testament, is from every point of view—religious, literary, dramatic—the best of all these books, Jewish and Christian alike. They vary greatly in quality. The series may be compared to a mountain chain in which there are two or three rising peaks that catch the light.

We may fairly say that the first beginnings of Apocalyptic are found in the canonical prophets who date after the Exile, especially in the prophecies contained in the latter part of our book of Zechariah; in Joel; and in the eschatological fragment

interpolated in our book of Isaiah (ch. xxiv.–xxvii.). But Apocalyptic, in the strict sense, begins when there is no longer any prophet of the older type—speaking in the name of God straight to the needs of the time—and no hope of any; when the nation appeared, as a nation, to be crumbling to utter decay; when therefore the very meaning of the ancient promises became a problem of tenfold urgency, and the one cry in which many voices united was 'How long?'

II

3 For our purpose we select the book of Daniel for our first illustrative example. The historic facts which led to its composition were briefly these. In 333 B.C. the whole of Asia Minor fell into the hands of Alexander the Great, and he immediately proceeded to the conquest of Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, which thus became part of Alexander's empire. After his death in 323, there was a long period of struggle for the fragments of his empire; and by about 300, several independent divisions emerge, including a kingdom of Syria and a kingdom of Egypt. In this way the Jews were politic-

ally attached to Egypt, and were contented to remain so for a century. Then war broke out between Syria and Egypt; and Egypt was subdued and incorporated into Syria by Antiochus III in 198. This soon involved the Jews in serious trouble. Syria was thoroughly 'hellenized'; its rulers desired that Hellenism should permeate the whole of their kingdom. Violent measures were taken by Antiochus IV (Epiphanes) to force Greek customs and beliefs on the Jews, and a fierce persecution began in 168. The persecution was a complete failure. It stirred up the spirit of the nation, forced half-hearted Jews to stand firm, roused the indifferent, and in a word promoted and strengthened the thing that Antiochus wished to destroy. The Jews faced their dangers with the frenzied courage of despair; and in the end they shook off heathen rule and once more founded a national State. It is beyond doubt that the Book of Daniel arose in the fiercest period of this struggle—i.e., 168–165 B.C. It is in the light of these events that we must read the meaning of the book.

The first part presents a series of examples of steadfastness and fidelity in a Jew confronted with dangers like these. The writer

goes back to the period of the Babylonian exile and makes a certain Daniel, of whose heroism and goodness there was a vague tradition, the centre of his prophecy. Daniel is chosen as a fitting type to encourage men now. In the narrative, the 'king of Babylon' represents Antiochus; the royal pride, sacrilege, and intolerance which are denounced and even ridiculed, are the pride, sacrilege, and intolerance of Antiochus. It is he who is so amply punished and his victims who are delivered.

The second part of the book professes to be a revelation of the future. The standpoint is still that of the Babylonian exile, so that part of what is given as prophecy is history in symbolic form. The readers were intended to recognize its fulfilment in the history of the world up to the time of Antiochus. The concluding vision (x.–xii.) reveals the wars of Antiochus, including the conquest of Egypt by Syria ('the south by the north'), and the fate of Antiochus himself (xi. 21–45). The writer describes the malignant persecution of the Jews, and indicates that Antiochus shall be called away from his victorious Egyptian campaign by tidings of trouble elsewhere, and shall come to his end

'without hand,' that is, by divine intervention. On his downfall the new age begins (xii.). Here we have, not history in the form of prophecy, but genuine conscious prophecy. The great archangel Michael descends to inaugurate the kingdom of God. Those actually living, whose names are written in the book of life, share in the glories of that everlasting kingdom. In an earlier vision, the faithful remnant of Israel, purified and glorified, are symbolized by a supernatural human figure coming in the clouds of heaven. In apocalyptic visions, where men and nations are symbolized by beasts, supernatural beings are symbolized by men. Here the contrast is mainly ethical. The 'people of the saints of the Most High' are represented by a human form, in contrast with the monstrous animal forms which represent the militarist empires of this world.

What, then, of the faithful dead? They are not lost to the kingdom: 'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt; and they that be wise [or, the teachers] shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they

that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever' (xii. 2, 3).

The idea of a resurrection *of the nation* was not unknown to the older prophets. It is implied in Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones (xxxvii.). But this is a national, not an individual resurrection. The resurrection of *individual Israelites* is first distinctly contemplated in the apocalyptic fragment which found its way into our book of Isaiah (xxiv.–xxvii.). Here (xxvi. 19) the dwindled and suffering nation is represented as replenished and strengthened by the resurrection of its deceased members; this is *denied* of Israel's foes (xxvi. 14). The last passage in the Old Testament in which the idea is expressed is the passage from Daniel now before us, which speaks of a resurrection both of the righteous and of the unrighteous, and of different treatment reserved for each. On the other hand, once more the resurrection is limited to Israelites, and does not embrace all even of these. Dr. Driver and Dr. Charles are of opinion that the two kinds of men who
4 rise again, each to an everlasting fate, are those who definitely helped and those who definitely hindered the coming of God's king-

dom. The others—the indifferentists, who did nothing that really helped or hindered—the merely prudent, who were neither 'righteous over-much' nor 'over-much wicked' (Ecclesiastes vii. 16, 17)—these remain in 'the land of dust' (*Sheol*).

III

Daniel's account of the resurrection life does not lose impressiveness from its extreme restraint. In subsequent books of this kind we find a profusion of detail, sometimes due merely to exuberance of imagination, sometimes definitely *mythological* in character—in other words, capable of explanation as a primitive mode of expressing *ideas* about events, forces, and influences which were beyond man's control. The *imagery* employed by the Apocalyptists raises many interesting questions which can be discussed as part of the historical and comparative study of religions; but to see nothing more than this, is to miss the significance of this literature altogether. We find that what these writers have at heart is the relation of the national to the individual destiny. They contend for *the continuance of the individual*

life, whether in a fleshly or a spiritual body, whether for all mankind or a portion thereof. Underlying their contention we find the great human problem of the fate of the righteous or the innocent who perish by the way. The agelong movement of destiny rolls on but leaves countless hosts behind. What is their fate to be? The Apocalyptists feel the full force of that problem.

Their detailed solutions are of course profoundly affected by their moral and spiritual 'heredity and environment.' We find in the *Enoch Literature* a series of instructive illustrations. A literature grew up round the name of Enoch, owing to the tradition that he 'walked with God, and was not, for God took him' (Genesis v. 24). His relation to Jehovah was believed to be in all respects one of supernatural privilege and insight. A group of apocalyptic tracts under his name has come down to us as 'The Book of Enoch.' We follow Dr. Charles in his analysis of the component parts of the collection. And we shall refer only to those parts of it which are relevant to our present subject.

The *first* tract, in chronological order, occupies sections i. to xxxvi. of the whole,

and dates from shortly before 170 B.C. (before the troubles under Antiochus Epiphanes). The writer's problem is the origin of evil. He bases his explanation, not on the Paradise story, but on a story of the intercourse of certain rebellious angels with the daughters of men (Genesis vi. 1–4). Thus was produced a race from which all human evils have sprung. This race perished by a series of judgments culminating in the Deluge; but their disembodied spirits survived to lead mankind into ever new ways of error and sin, until the last world-judgment. The writer makes a great advance on the primitive Hebrew conception in his view of the state of the dead. He regards *Sheol* as an *intermediate state* where, until the last judgment, the souls of men are confined. It is a state of vigorous conscious existence, and its conditions are determined on moral grounds alone. On the other hand, he looks for no progress or change beyond death; when this life ends, the destiny of each soul is irrevocably accomplished.

In the intermediate state, the spirits of the dead are confined in four deep valleys. The first of these is the abode of those who, like Abel, have been slain, perishing untimely by

an undeserved death—who, therefore, even though righteous as Abel, cannot rest, but complain continually until the judgment day. The second valley, bright and with a spring of water, is the resting place of the spirits of the just and righteous. In the third valley, suffering 'great pain,' are confined sinners who died without receiving due retribution for their crimes; in the fourth, those who before death received such retribution as they deserved. These are never released from *Sheol*: there is no final heaven or hell for them. The description is not entirely clear. Dr. F. C. Burkitt suggests that the writer thinks of the fourth valley as reserved for those who are neither righteous nor definitely wicked, like Kipling's 'Tomlinson,' and like Tomlinson they fail to attain either to heaven or to hell. In any case, it is clear that resurrection is limited to the other three groups. The evil-doers are com-
6 mitted to 'the accursed valley,' there to suffer everlastingly. The righteous dead return to an embodied life on earth and enter into the ideal kingdom. There is no resurrection of the Gentile dead; but the surviving Gentiles acknowledge and obey the true God Jehovah and so enter into the inheritance of the right-

eous: 'All the children of men shall become righteous, and all nations shall offer me adoration and praise.'

The picture is compared by Dr. Charles with that drawn in Isaiah lxv., lxvi. The scene of the kingdom is to be the earth, purged from all violence and sin. Peace, happiness, and prosperity are to prevail everywhere. Sin shall never again appear on the earth; and, after a life crowned with all good things, and blessed with patriarchal years and numberless offspring, the righteous were at length to die in peace. There is no Messiah; Jehovah himself descends to bless the earth from Jerusalem. The ideal condition of the earth is sometimes described in grotesque details of material felicity; but the writer's interest is in something more and better than 'peace and plenty': 'Then, too, will wisdom be bestowed on the elect, and they will all live and never again sin, either through heedlessness or through pride. . . . And in those days I will open the store-chambers of blessing that are in the heavens, so as to send them down upon the earth over the work and labour of the children of men. Peace and justice will be wedded throughout all generations.'

The *second* tract is contained in chapters lxxxiii.–xc., and is almost contemporary with Daniel; it was written while Judas Maccabeus was warring against Antiochus. This writer accepts the view that rebellious angels corrupted the earth and led to the first world-judgment. But he proceeds to deal, in highly symbolic language, with the problem of evil as illustrated in the disastrous history of Israel since the Exile. Although the sins of the nation were great, they were not so great as to justify the infliction of such terrible calamities. But these calamities were not inflicted by Jehovah. He had entrusted Israel to the care of seventy angels, who had betrayed their trust, and instead of protecting and educating the people had given them over to destruction at the hand of foreign foes. Divine vengeance awaits these false guides, but until the last day their evil work proceeds unhindered. When oppression is at its worst, a righteous league or fraternity will be established in Israel, and from this league the deliverer will come forth. This is Judas Maccabeus. When all the nations of the earth have assembled themselves against him, there is the beginning of the end.

By direct divine intervention the enemies of the faithful Jews are destroyed. The false angels are committed to an abyss of fire. The surviving apostate Jews are cast into a second abyss, equivalent to the 'accursed valley' spoken of by the previous writer. Jehovah himself creates a new Jerusalem: the earthly Jerusalem is not a fit dwelling-place for God among men. The surviving Gentiles acknowledge him and submit; and the righteous Israelites are raised to share with their loving brethren in his kingdom. From the heart of the redeemed community emerges the Messiah—a man, but a glorified man: and the whole community is transformed into his likeness. Dr. Charles rightly infers that the existence thus attained is everlasting.

The *third* of the tracts is contained in chapters xci.–civ., and dates from the beginning of the first century B.C. It is evidently the work of a thinker, and gives an eschatology with some entirely new features. The great expectations based on the victories of Judas Maccabeus—as we have seen them illustrated for instance in the *second* tract—proved empty dreams, so far as the outward course of events was concerned.

The later rulers, sprung from the great Maccabean line, were worldly and time-serving. It would seem also that the writer was facing a revival of the old doctrine—as we find it in Ezekiel—that the righteous and the unrighteous alike receive in this life the recompense and retribution which they deserve. This he repudiates almost as passionately as Job had done. Here is his description of the condition of the righteous in this world: 'In the days of their life they are worn out with their troublous toil, and have experienced every trouble, and met with much evil and suffered from disease, and have been minished and become small in spirit. And they have been destroyed, and there has been none to help them even in word. . . . And they that hated them and smote them have had dominion over them; and they have bowed their necks to those that hated them, and they have had no compassion on them. . . . And they helped those who robbed and devoured them and made them few; and they concealed their oppression, and they did not remove from them the yoke of those who devoured and dispersed and murdered them; and they concealed the murder, and thought not of the fact that

they had lifted up their hands against them.' On the other hand, he perceives that prosperity and ease itself may be a spiritual danger. The very personality of a man may lose itself in those externals: 'In grandeur and in power, in silver, in gold, and in purple, and in splendour, and in food, they will be poured out as water; therefore they will be wanting in knowledge and in wisdom, and they will perish thereby, together with their possessions and with all their glory and their splendour.'

For the solution of the problem he looks not to any possible ideal kingdom on this earth, but to a world wholly beyond this world. In working out this idea he takes the significant step of assigning a temporary duration to the earthly kingdom, which was to realize the ancient national hope. The form it took in his mind was that of a long but victorious struggle of the righteous against their oppressors, in which they are directly aided by God. At its close, 'they will acquire mansions through their righteousness, and the mansion of the great king will be built in righteousness.' Not until the end of this period will the resurrection and the final world-judgment take place. And then

'the world will be written down for destruction . . . and the first heaven will depart and pass away, and a new heaven will appear; and after that there will be ages without number in goodness and righteousness, and sin will be no more mentioned for ever.' The unrighteous enter into *Sheol*, which now becomes a place of everlasting punishment; but the righteous rise to enter into a new *spiritual* creation: 'And the spirits of you who die in righteousness will live and rejoice and be glad. . . . Aforetime ye were put to shame through ills and affliction; but soon ye will shine as the stars of heaven, ye will shine and ye will be seen, and the portals of heaven will be opened to you. . . . Ye will
9 have great joy as the angels of heaven, and ye will become companions of the heavenly host.'

The *fourth* tract is contained in chapters xxxvii.–lxx., and probably dates from a few years before 64 B.C., when the Roman Government intervened in the affairs of Palestine. At this time the worst enemies of the faithful Jews were the rulers of the Jewish State, the degenerate descendants of the Maccabean line. In this writer's view of the future, the Messiah holds a central place, and the whole

work is of great importance for the development of the Messianic idea as such. With this we are not now concerned. We have seen that Daniel conceived idealized Israel through the symbol of a human form, a 'Son of Man,' coming in the clouds. Our present writer conceives the Messiah as a supernatural pre-existent being, coming from the heavenly abodes to destroy the wicked and justify the righteous, and *transform* heaven and earth for their habitation.

The writer's problem is, as we have found it to be in every case, in one form or another —' Truth for ever on the scaffold, wrong for ever on the throne.' He seeks to trace evil to its source and pursue the world's history to its final issues. The first authors of sin were the Satans—not one, but many—the constant adversaries of man from the beginning. The evils of the human world continue and increase, defiling the stream of time, until suddenly the Head of Days will appear and with him the Son of Man, to execute judgment upon all, angels and men, righteous and unrighteous. And all will be judged according to their deeds, for their deeds are weighed in the balance. The kings and the mighty will confess their sins and

pray for forgiveness, but in vain. They will be delivered over to the angels of punishment for a retribution of everlasting suffering: 'This is the ordinance and judgment of the mighty and the kings and the exalted and those who possess the earth before the Lord of Spirits.' For the remaining sinners and the godless—the 'rank and file,' as it were of the unrighteous—there is a more merciful fate. The Son of Man will destroy them with the word of his mouth. In the transformed heaven and earth the righteous will possess their mansions. They will live in the light of eternal life, and seek after light and find righteousness and peace with the Lord of Spirits.

IV

These illustrations from Daniel and Enoch are sufficient to bring before us the main varieties of outlook embraced in the apocalyptic eschatology. References to other representative writings of this kind would not introduce anything fundamentally new for our present purpose. I hope that our illustrations have helped to emphasize the *intensely ethical motive* pervading this literature. We have adverted to this already and

shall have to return to it again. Apocalyptic is rooted and grounded in an ethics based on the eternal righteousness of God. The deep undertone, sounding through all the complex and sometimes confusedly harsh music of the apocalyptic symphony, is heard in the great demand—Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?

The new thought introduced in what we have called the *third* of the Enoch 'tracts'—the thought of a temporary duration of the ideal future so far as it is realized on this earth—demands fuller examination than we have yet given. It is not peculiar to this writer; it is found in more than one of the later Jewish Apocalypses, and after the author of our Revelation of John had incorporated it into his work (xx. 1–10), it formed the basis of the famous Christian conception of *the Millennium*. We can assign an historical or literary reason and an ethical or religious motive for its appearance.

When the later apocalyptic writers compared the teaching of the ancient prophets with that of the existing apocalyptic books, they concluded that they must make a great distinction between the appearance of the Messiah at the head of his kingdom on earth,

and the appearance of the Almighty himself among his people and in the human race at large, for the final judgment. The messianic kingdom precedes the final judgment, and therefore must have a definite limit. The 'age that knows no end' follows, and follows as the result of a divine intervention vaster and more far-reaching than that involved in the appearance of the Messiah. We can also trace religious and ethical motives for this adjustment of the two ideas. The imagery portraying the messianic kingdom usually exhausts itself in visible and tangible wonders. The religious consciousness was outgrowing such conceptions. It could no longer be satisfied with an ideal future that must realize itself in material glories. The expectation of an earthly messianic kingdom was not abandoned but was given the place of a temporary stage in the ideal future. There was an instinctive effort to find a place among the ideals of the hereafter for a more spiritual and universal anticipation—a blessedness of a kind which is above and beyond what mere material images can express, because it is altogether above and beyond earthly conditions. By implication, in the end, it is an effort to formulate a life which

is limited by no spatial conditions and is *beyond the power of time*.

Historically, this profound thought—which we shall endeavour to analyse in the sequel—is connected, in both Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic, with the *dualism* between God and the world, which was a leading feature of contemporary thought. We saw that according to the Hebrew faith Jehovah was very near his people, like a 'Great Companion.' Hence Jerusalem, under its sacred name Zion, became a holy place because Jehovah was actually in the midst of it; and prayer was directed to an actually present Jehovah. After the Exile a change can be traced, and it culminates in Apocalyptic. The Deity is far away from his own people. Whether the 'far away' is spatial or metaphorical, the religious result is the same—a gulf, or a series of gulfs, between the human and the divine. Along with this we trace another change. Anthropomorphism disappears. A Deity who is far away from man is far away from him in likeness as well. Some apocalyptic passages seem to deny this. We read of a 'Throne' and of a Being 'seated' on it. But there is no attempt to describe that Being in human terms. A

favourite phrase in the Enoch literature is the impersonal one, a 'Great Glory' sits on the throne. And if 'garments' or 'raiment' are spoken of it is immediately added that they are such as no man can look upon—they shine more brightly than the sun. Contemporary philosophy had arrived at a similar result. In each of the main streams of contemporary speculation we can trace the widening and deepening of the gulf between the divine and the earthly.

There is no suggestion of an earthly millennium, or of any temporal limits to the kingdom of God, in the Gospels or Epistles. In fact it is not a Christian doctrine. It is a Jewish doctrine incorporated into a Christian Apocalypse. What is the picture given by John? Before the millennium begins, Christ has appeared as a victorious warrior and destroyed the great power of this world, Satan's chosen instrument, imperial Rome. Then Satan is bound so that for the time his activity is at an end. The Christians that have been faithful through the last catastrophes, and have laid down their lives for the faith, are raised and reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years. At the end of that period Satan is loosed again, and pre-

pares an onslaught more desperate than ever, but only that he may be finally destroyed by direct divine interposition. Then the final end is consummated, and the last judgment: the whole human race is raised and judged; and the new heaven and earth take the place of the former world (xx., xxi.).

If this ultimate ideal is spiritual in its inner meaning, why does John employ the crude imagery of precious metals and precious stones? In reply we must ask, How far does this imagery belong to the essence of the author's conception, and how far is it accidental? If it is merely accidental, then these chapters bear out what was said above—the millennial idea exhausts the purely earthly conception of the future, and the kingdom that follows is universal, ethical, spiritual. Why may we say that the material imagery is unessential? Because we may drop out every detail in it and yet leave higher conceptions consistent and complete (compare xxi.).

V

The Revelation of John represents the Apocalyptic outlook in its most complete and characteristic form. Hence it is of im-

portance, for our purpose, to grasp his *ethical point of view*. He is not a mere editor, or a mere compiler. That he embodied apocalyptic fragments from different ages is highly probable; this accounts for the conflicting indications of date and for other contrasted features found in the book. Hence the present interest in 'documentary theories' of its origin. In all probability this is the line along which an explanation of the difficulties of the book will be found; but as long as rigid and unimaginative literary standards of analysis are employed, the results will not be of much value. We must maintain that the writer has moulded his material into a substantial literary unity, though by no means a perfect unity. Hence we can distinctly discern his ethical point of view.

In its earliest form, the hope of Christ's 'second coming' rests on the conviction that *there can be no reconciliation between Christ and the actual world*. The victory of Christ is the destruction of the world, the victory of the world the destruction of Christ.

The attitude of the writer is perfectly intelligible. The 'world' is Imperial Rome, whose irreconcilable opposition to everything for which Christ stood is summed up

in the demand which she made, that divine honours be rendered to the Emperor. The passion of loathing and detestation which Rome inspired in the prophet's mind, as expressed, for instance, in chapters xvii. and xviii., is abundantly intelligible from our knowledge of the world in which he lived.

With the utmost impatience the prophet longs for the end. 'His purpose is the same as that of all Apocalypses—to confirm and strengthen the little family of believers in their patience, their courage, their confidence, by urging that the sufferings of the time will last only for a little while, and that the present troubles are already the beginning of that end when sorrow and suffering will in a moment be transformed into glory unspeakable.'

The moral teaching arising out of this view of things is *pure anarchy* as far as any earthly order is concerned. Such a State, such a Government, drove men to desperation, and in their desperation they became anarchists—not anarchists of terrorism and violence, but anarchists to this world in faith and hope of another (not the Christian 'heaven' of later tradition, but the *transformed earth*). Nothing is further from the

author's mind than open rebellion (xiii. 10); 'this is the patience and faith of the saints.' The war against the diabolic powers embodied in 'the world' (that is, the State), is, under God, all in the hands of Christ and his angels, not in the hands of men. Men cannot improve the world. But each one can keep watch over himself; for by their own works men are judged. Each of the seven letters (chapters ii. and iii.) begins with the significant warning: 'I know thy works.' Conduct alone is the test of salvation (xx. 13, 14). In the mystic marriage of Christ with the body of the faithful, the wedding garment is 'the righteousness of the saints' (xix. 8). What is required of men is to refuse to 'worship the beast' (the imperial power typified in the Emperor), and to be steadfast under persecution, even unto death; to resist the enticements of ease and wealth, and avoid like poison the pernicious teaching (ii. 14, 20) that the sins of the flesh are morally indifferent; to be true to 'the first Love,' 'unto him that loved us,' and to one another in mutual charity and service.

This book is a document full of instruction for those who are willing to understand the

moral attitude of the earliest Christians. This morality is individualistic in the extreme. The world is evil altogether, and the State, the Roman Government, is the focus of that evil. Our only duties are, control of the body, charity and service to the brethren, and patient endurance until the Lord shall come. All depends on this hope; the whole interest is in the coming world, the world that Christ will bring, not in this present world, between which and Christ there is irreconcilable antagonism.

VI

What elements of lasting value can we discern in this strange literature, with its defeated expectations and vain dreams? We shall find an answer to the question when we perceive that the most obvious defects of Apocalyptic present us, as it were unexpectedly or by a counter-stroke, with elements of truth and insight.

We have seen the characteristic *dualism* of Apocalyptic—the entire separation made between God and the world: and we have seen that this separation has an ethical basis, which appears very clearly in the Revelation of John. Dr. Burkitt has made the re

suggestive observation that what gives the Jewish Apocalypses vitality is 'the struggle between religion and civilization, of which the Maccabean martyrs are the symbol.' If we include the great Christian Apocalypse, we may add—'and the early Christian martyrs.' 'I omit the adjectives,' he continues; 'my readers themselves, according as they view the thing, can say "between spiritual religion and material civilization" or "between fanatical religion and enlightened civilization"—and they will judge the Apocalypses accordingly'—and not only the Apocalypses, but the whole history of the world, to this day. The Apocalypses have only over-stated a truth which Church and world alike have not only forgotten but have desired to forget. Nevertheless the effects of the initial dualism can be traced through the whole apocalyptic outlook.

The writers can see no future with any *natural* bond of connexion with the past. The great characteristic of Apocalyptic is the breach between 'this world' (i.e., the present age) and 'the world to come' (i.e., the new and future age). The view springs from a profound sense of the evils pervading 'this world'; and it was made all the

darker by the demonology that prevailed. The evils of the world were believed to be the work of unseen malignant personal beings, so that 'this world' was literally and strictly a kingdom of evil. With this sense of appalling evil, these writers had a profound sense of the inviolability of the law and will of God. From the clash of these two convictions the essentials of the apocalyptic eschatology arose. On the one hand there is the kingdom of darkness—'this world'—and on the other hand there is the inviolable design of the Almighty, in every detail opposed by the kingdom of darkness, which seemed to be growing stronger and more real as time went on. Given these two convictions, the result evidently is that there can be no natural transition from 'this world' to the world where God's Will is done—there must be *an entire breach of continuity in the series of events in time*, and entire disappearance of one age before the new age can begin.

This historical dualism is related to the ethical dualism which divides mankind into two classes, 'godly' and 'ungodly,' 'righteous' and 'wicked.' This touches an abiding distinction; for human character, in so far as it is definitely good, or bad, is in a

sense formed and fixed. But it is never *merely* formed and fixed; it is a process, an activity, a tendency, capable of variation, and never capable of separation into two types with all the good quality in one and all the bad quality in the other. The tares and the wheat grow together in all men. This makes the problem of the success of some and the failure of others less simple than the Jewish prophets and Apocalyptists supposed. Evil may succeed by being mingled with good. The expectation of an earthly millennium illustrates the working of some of the defects to which we have alluded, in the mechanical way in which its advent and conditions are conceived. Its advent is due to an external mechanical miracle; by another mechanical miracle, the last vestiges of sin are removed from the hearts of its members; and the blessedness thus secured for a limited number of 'righteous' is maintained by their local separation from the 'wicked.' This is to exclude the conditions which experience shows to be indispensable to the spiritual education of moral beings.

Along with their historical dualism, as we have called it, the writers have an intense conviction of the unity of history: and the

paradox is significant. The discontinuity in time does itself bear witness to something that is beyond the power of time. The divine purpose is beyond the power of time; no passage of time, however vast, no accumulation of temporal changes, can add anything to that purpose, or take anything away from it. We find, accordingly, that these books attempt to deal with history as a whole, and to trace in it a definite plan with a definite culmination. It is the divine purpose that gives unity to history. The writers' object is to explain the relation of that purpose to a 'world'—that is, a long series of events in time—in which evil is increasing its power. Hence they picture the rise and fall of whole empires. They regard every event as an element in a connected series, a series that proceeds after all according to an intelligible plan. The book of Daniel illustrates all this. He wants to enforce the idea of human history as a unity, proceeding according to an intelligible plan to a culmination that justifies the course of events. He wants to explain the present in the light of the past *and of the future*. He wants the people to understand their place in history. Then their troubles are seen in due perspective.

It has been said that these Jewish writers had a firmer hold on the idea of the unity of history even than the Greek philosophers. This was because the unity of God means the unity of history. Their ideal was that of a great plan in which every event could fall into its place and be explained. Hence also a modified view of the problem of evil. It was no longer possible to ask, about every trouble that came, 'Who sinned, to bring this upon us?' The writers saw the best men suffering, and they gave up the attempt to look for any secret sins on the part of good men to explain their sufferings. These things—they urged—were an inevitable part of the present order, which—they were convinced—was a temporary and an evil order.

Hence we find in these books a decidedly deterministic view of history. The significance of human personal agency is very small in the course of events. In the final development of the apocalyptic outlook, as we find it in the Revelation of John, the whole struggle against the powers of evil is taken out of the hands of men. We may contrast a modern writer like Carlyle, whose outlook on history has many points of contact with

that of Jewish Apocalyptic. His *French Revolution* is an apocalyptic drama. But for him, 'great men' are the determining forces in the course of events. The original apocalyptists did not believe that. According to them, the great contending forces are the Almighty and his angels, and Satan and his angels: and to such a contest there could only be one end. They depreciate human personal agency, but they personify nearly everything else. The conflicts of social tendencies and moral qualities are resolved into conflicts between super-human personal agencies.

This view is closely connected with the place given to the Messiah in these books. Just because human personal agency is believed to play so small a part, the importance of the Messiah is limited. In Daniel he never appears on the scene at all. The same may be said of part of the Enoch literature. In other kindred writings the Messiah appears, but plays no very significant part. In the *fourth* Enoch tract, his work is all-important: but, though called the 'Son of Man,' he is in no respect human; he is a supernatural, pre-existent heavenly being, coming from the world of God and the angels,

His appearance is symptomatic of the general tendency to depreciate human agency in the great movements that constitute the crises and transitions from age to age. We may contrast all this with the attitude of Isaiah. Here the Messiah is an idealized David; and the material for the pictures of the ideal future is drawn from the traditional greatness and glory of the age of David and Solomon.

The intensity of the apocalyptic faith in the eternal and absolute righteousness of God burnt away, as it were, all faith in the creative energies of men. 'What we do and suffer is in moments,' says Emerson, 'but the cause of right for which we labour never dies, works in long periods, can afford many checks, gains by our defeats, and will know how to compensate our extremest sacrifice. Wrath and petulance may have their short success, but they quickly reach the brief date and decompose, whilst the massive might of ideas is irresistible at last. Whence does knowledge come? Where is the source of power? The Soul of God is poured into the world through the thoughts of men. The world stands on ideas. . . . The ether and source of all the elements is

moral force. As bird on the air, . . . so nations of men and their institutions rest on thoughts.' A human thought, if it is a living thought at all, is the beginning of a deed. Political institutions, industrial systems, social customs, the accumulated armies and navies of the world, possess no power in the end capable of contending with the power of ideas. They were all nothing else at one time. Before they ever appeared in the outward world, they were at first only faint movements in the minds of men.

Although the apocalyptists are passionately convinced of the eternity of the righteous will of God—although they dare to aspire to a future state beyond the power of time—yet an *ethical* motive moulds their view of the future rather than the *distinctively religious* motive which we traced through Hebrew prophecy. For them, there is no eternal life now attainable, carrying in itself the promise and potency of immortality. Their demand is first of all for personal recompense, personal retribution. Worthy men in modern times encounter this demand with asseverations of goodness being 'for its own sake' and not 'for reward.' But the difficulty is not to be disposed of so easily.

It points to a fundamental demand of the moral consciousness. It arises from the great discrepancy which has furnished moralists with a theme since history's dawn: the disproportion between the abilities and just deserts of men, and the recognition given to them in this life. May I express what this means in words which I have used elsewhere?

'When every allowance is made for the possibility that the inequalities of life are not so great as they appear, and that worldly honour, success, and happiness are not the true reward of moral desert, there remains a range of facts so vast that we cannot number the individuals who in this life have suffered incalculable wrong. . . . It is not merely by their own suffering that men are oppressed. "I feel a pain in my brother's side," is the motto of the higher ethical endeavours of to-day. This feeling is intensified in modern times, apart from all questions of desert, by a consciousness of the intolerable conditions under which tens of thousands of our fellow creatures pass their lives. Grant that in the future the civilized world will see to it that no such black spots disgrace the very name of "civilization," can there have been no other possibilities for those who have

come here only to swarm and fester for a little while, too miserable to be conscious of their misery, shut out for ever from the possibility of living a human life? The great and good, who have known the inward joy of noble work, might be more justly believed to perish, for they at least have *lived*. Yet for these too there is a claim of equal strength. They are the strong workers of the world, builders of the city not made with hands. Is it possible that these great souls who have accomplished so much—they and all that was in them—have become dust and vapour, and nothing more? Are they to have no share in the abiding glory of their work, and never to see the oncoming of the ideals for which they laboured and died?'

It is not merely by their own sufferings that men are oppressed. The apocalyptists were unable to anticipate any future blessedness save such as they shared in common with their brethren. Is it too much to say that here they were in touch with the profoundest truth of the moral life—that the individual can only attain to his highest in the life of the community, here and hereafter—that in the ideal life the individual and the common good are found to be at one?

Chapter IV

ETERNAL LIFE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

WE have surveyed, at least in their essential outlines, those beliefs concerning 'the last things' which form a striking feature of Jewish faith during the two centuries before Christ and in fact until the first destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Can we ascertain, with any definiteness, the form which these beliefs had taken when the public ministry of Jesus began?

I

To answer this question, we may refer briefly to a collection of apocalyptic utterances which we have not yet mentioned, known as the *Psalms of Solomon*. This collection contains material dating probably from 75 B.C. to 50 B.C. (the Roman intervention occurred in 64 B.C.). New Testament

evidence confirms the inferences which may be made from these utterances.

The last two Psalms in the collection deal explicitly with the question of Israel's future. So far as the pictorial setting goes, we seem to have an outlook like that of the original Isaiah—a reformed Israel under an ideal king. But sinister elements have entered into the conception, which distinctly betray the secularization of the national hope. It becomes national in the exclusive sense, and political in the secular sense. This is really the drift of the ethical language which is used. The utterances have passed the parting of the ways and started on the line that led to the destruction of the nation. The tragedy of A.D. 70 can be connected with the period of which we speak. The exclusively national and political character given to the traditional hope of Israel, led the Roman Government eventually to wipe out this nation as a political entity.

In these two Psalms the Messiah appears as a powerful leader of David's line. He is a righteous ruler raised up and taught by the Almighty. Although supernaturally endowed, he is wholly human. He is described as 'Son of David,' which he is to be by de-

scent: as 'Lord,' because he is to be an earthly ruler: as 'Christ,' because he is to be divinely appointed to a great mission.

He will purify the people from sin, bring back the scattered ones from abroad, and make of them a mighty nation: they are thus to become a 'holy people' in the legalist sense, and a mighty people in the political sense. Only Jews are to share in this holiness and this power. No 'stranger' is to dwell within the gates any more. What then of the rest of the world? The incorrigibly hostile and ungodly peoples will be destroyed; the remainder will submit to the Messiah and he will govern them strictly but mercifully.

All this represents the outlook of an important—perhaps the most important—section of the Pharisaic party in the years immediately preceding the Christian era. Now this party were closely in touch with popular feeling; they influenced it and were influenced by it. When we turn to the New Testament we find that this assumption is confirmed and particularized. We refer especially to the cycle of traditions relating to the birth of John and of Jesus, preserved by Luke.

The angel-sayings reported by Luke use some significant names and phrases in a way which shows that they were current and had a traditional meaning. The celestial messengers name the fulfilment of an ancient prophecy which spoke of Elijah's return, immediately preceding the advent of a king of David's line whose reign should have no end, and who is Son of the Most High, Messiah, Christ, and Lord. The significance of these expressions becomes more definite when we turn to the canticles which Luke has preserved—the *Magnificat* (i. 46–55; compare I Samuel ii. 1–10), the *Benedictus* i. 68–79, and the *Nunc Dimittis* ii. 29–32. In themselves these contain nothing distinctively Christian; they ring like utterances of pre-Christian Judaism. We may assume that they arose in the heart of the original circle of Christian Jews, at a time when the language and thoughts of pre-Christian Judaism sufficed for the expression of the new devotion. The eschatological position is the same as that of the *Psalms of Solomon*, with a stronger assertion of the ethical element in Israel's mission, and (in the *Nunc Dimittis*) an assertion of universalism: the light is not only 'the glory of thy people Israel';

it is also 'to lighten the Gentiles.' It is probable that these canticles afford an insight into the mind and feeling of many among that multitude of Jews, the 'quiet in the land,' who stood apart from all political and social movements, but cherished in their hearts the hope of a divine intervention, when through the instrumentality of the Messiah the deliverance of Israel would be achieved and the glorious national mission inaugurated.

There was, however, a party who refused to maintain the merely passive attitude. These 'zealots' desired an immediate appeal *to force*, believing that if they took the initiative God would intervene on their behalf. And on several occasions they interpreted religious duty in terms of actual revolution. Their zeal degenerated into a fierce fanaticism which indirectly caused the final destruction of the Jewish State.

We find, then, that popular expectation was concentrated on the idealized figure of a 'Davidic King' who would bring deliverance and glory to the Jewish nation. The 'Enoch' literature was in circulation, among various other apocalyptic writings; but the variety of representations given in this litera-

ture does not appear to have affected the popular view. The more educated and thoughtful classes, on the other hand, were probably much influenced in particular by the picture given, in the *fourth* 'Enoch' tract, of a wholly supernatural and superhuman Messiah.

II

Our question is, how much of the popular view did Jesus simply accept? How much did he simply reject? How much did he accept with modification? The answers to such questions depend on the meaning which must be given to the great characteristic term 'The Kingdom of God.' And in dealing with this question, we must assume that Jesus was at least equal in spiritual insight to the greater Hebrew prophets. Ideals which they could entertain, he could entertain. We must assume also that Jesus possessed sufficient spiritual genius to deepen and heighten the best ideals of these prophets.

There is no need to multiply evidence of the fact that the kingdom, according to the mind of Jesus, is non-national and non-political. It is not constituted by the use of a common language, nor by the possession

of common territory, nor by union under the same political government. A prosperous political state is an utterly inadequate expression of its meaning. Among the numerous indications of this, which are to be found in the Gospels, the Temptation narratives deserve special mention. Jesus deliberately faces and rejects the idea of coming before the people with the claim to inaugurate a new earthly kingdom. And the positive character of the kingdom is shown by the way in which the conditions of membership are indicated. They are ethical and spiritual conditions. Among numerous illustrative
3 passages, the Beatitudes may be specially mentioned. Very significant also is the linking together of the two petitions, 'Thy kingdom come' and 'Thy will be done,' in Matthew's version of the Lord's Prayer. Luke omits the latter petition; but that is no sufficient reason for regarding it as unauthentic, especially since he records an impressive reminiscence of it in the Prayer of Gethsemane—'not my will but thine be done.' The kingdom comes just as God's will is done on earth, and its coming links together heaven and earth—'as in heaven, so on earth.' This is not merely a logical

sequence of thought, but a religious idea in harmony with the whole outlook of the Gospel. There is no real ambiguity, in our gospel sources, as to the character of the kingdom 'in itself'; but there is ambiguity in the evidence as to how Jesus conceived the *coming* of the kingdom.

We must maintain that the teaching of Jesus on this subject involves an 'antinomy' or apparent contradiction, the religious significance of which we shall examine after we have taken a clear view of its two contrasted features. The contrast may be illustrated by the following sayings from one of the most primitive of our sources—the Gospel according to Mark: 'Verily I say unto you, there be some here of them that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power' (ix. 1 = Luke ix. 27); but, on the other hand, 'So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed upon the earth, and should sleep and rise night and day, and the seed should spring up and grow, he knoweth not how. The earth beareth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear' (iv. 26–28). Jesus teaches, on the one hand, that the kingdom's coming is a

miraculous catastrophe or sudden happening in the near future; and, on the other hand, that it is a present reality: it must grow in the future, but the thing itself is here now.
4 It is impossible to explain away either of these contrasted features in the teaching of Jesus in reference to the coming of the kingdom. The group of sayings which describe it as present, and the group of sayings which describe it as future, are equally founded on traditions preserved in our oldest sources.

III

In view of the present reaction against the so-called 'liberal' tendency to assign as much as possible of the apocalyptic eschatology in the Gospels to later hands and explain away the remainder, we must dwell on some features of the evidence that Jesus believed the kingdom to be a present reality. We have first the series of definite sayings, already referred to, which imply that the kingdom has arrived. The impression made by these sayings is borne out and strengthened by the *Parables of the Kingdom*, especially those which dwell on the analogy between spiritual and natural growth. The kingdom

affect the course of events. Jesus seems to contrast *this* way with the way of the fanatic or the zealot. Prayer is concentrated effort, 'bringing the power of living faith to bear on the divine purpose.' No such prayer goes unanswered, even when the verbal petition in which it expresses itself is not fulfilled. The apocalyptic eschatology means that we have not to work for the kingdom or set it up by our efforts: we have only to wait for it and prepare ourselves for it; and this is foreign to the Lord's Prayer.

This brings us to a position from which we can see the practical significance of the question at issue. If the whole outlook of Jesus has its centre and root in apocalyptic eschatology, then he had no real interest in the present world; his religious passion is concentrated on the world to come. It has been supposed that Jesus was obsessed by this passionate interest in the future as opposed to the present, and that his interest in the present can be reduced to a few utterances of no consequence. If so, the moral teaching of Jesus is the most insignificant of all his teaching, except in so far as it throws light on his conception of the future world. Is it possible, then, to reduce all the ethics

of the Gospels to a temporary scheme of life intended for the interval between the time of the teaching and the time of the miraculous second advent of Jesus to inaugurate a new world? Is it possible to regard the moral teaching of Jesus as directed merely to *self-preparation* for that new world?

We may answer in the words of Professor F. G. Peabody, of Harvard: 'The practical instructions of Jesus for the conduct of life do not easily fit in as a whole with the apocalyptic drama. Many passages there are undoubtedly which touch the anticipatory and millennial note, and some which strike that note firmly and unmistakably. If one fixes his attention on single passages, or a single group of passages, he may easily conclude, with Tolstoi, that the essence of the gospel is in the single virtue of non-resistance, or, with Schweitzer, that it is in the single idea of eschatology. When, however, we recall the prevailing tone of the ethical teaching, and still more the traditional attitude of the Teacher towards the world in which he found himself, it is difficult to see in it a predominating quality of indifference to the world's affairs or a complete pre-occupation with a supernatural catastrophe. On the contrary,

the ethics of Jesus exhibit on the whole a kind of sanity, universality, and applicability, which are independent of abnormal circumstances and free from emotional strain. There is nothing apocalyptic in the parable of the Good Samaritan, or in the appropriation by Jesus of the two great commandments, or in the prayer for to-day's bread and the forgiveness of trespasses, or in the praise of peace-making and purity of heart. Yet in these, and not in the mysterious prophecies of an approaching desolation, the conscience of the world has found its Counsellor and Guide.'

Even the teaching in reference to the accumulation and use of wealth, does not take the purely apocalyptic form, as, for example, of urging detachment from worldly possessions *because the end is near*. We may contrast Paul's reason for advocating detachment from all natural ties and worldly pursuits in a portion of his first Corinthian letter (vii. 29ff.). The central thought of Jesus, in reference to such things, is always —do they interfere with devotion to the supreme good, which is God? The truth is that Jesus builds his practical teaching on his conception of God, which is much more

fundamental to the ethics of the Gospels than are the varying conceptions of how the kingdom is to come. From that conception of God he deduces, for all time, principles of life showing what the nature of the kingdom is.

IV

On the other hand we have a series of sayings, which have as high a claim to authenticity as any contained in the Gospels, and which affirm that the kingdom is wholly future. God will break in with omnipotent majesty, bringing history to a close, in modes which human co-operation in no way affect. The impression made by these sayings is strengthened when we consider them in connexion with those which refer to a miraculous second advent of Jesus Christ.

'Art thou the Christ?' said the High Priest. Jesus said: 'I am; and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven' (Mark xiv. 62 – Matthew xxvi. 64 – Luke xxii. 69). With a more definite note of time, he said to his disciples: 'Ye shall not be gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come' (Matthew x. 23).

and to the people, on another occasion: 'There be some of them that stand here, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom (Matthew xvi. 28, amplifying Mark ix. 1 = Luke ix. 27).

Three possibilities have to be considered in reference to the apocalyptic sayings. The *first* possibility is that they are wholly unauthentic. This we must reject. No substantial reason is offered for discrediting these sayings except the desire to remove some theological difficulty or to support some theological conclusion. How are we to account for their persistence in the Gospel records in contexts where they obviously create difficulty? The persistence of belief in the genuineness of such sayings, during the first age of the Church, proves that they rested on a strong and ancient tradition; and the intensity of belief in the immediate second advent, among the early Christians, must have had some basis in the words of Jesus Christ himself. We may also ask, what evidence is there that Christian theology in the apostolic age intensified and amplified apocalyptic ideas? The New Testament evidence points in the opposite direc-

tion. This is clear when we compare the earlier and later epistles of Paul; and the process of spiritualization reaches its climax in the Fourth Gospel.

The *second* possibility is that such sayings are unauthentic in their present form, but are based on misunderstanding of things that Jesus really said. If the actual utterances were apocalyptic, the difficulty is not removed. If the meaning is that they were not apocalyptic, then our previous objections, to any such assumption, are renewed.

The *third* possibility is that the sayings are verbally authentic but are wholly symbolic or metaphorical. For example: 'Some of you will live to see the beginning of the triumph of my kingdom' (Matthew xvi. 28); and again: 'From this moment of actual defeat you will see the tokens of the triumph of my kingdom' (Matthew xxvi. 64). It is quite true that oriental expressions are often not to be taken literally. Sayings are recorded in the Gospels which are obviously figurative: 'If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye would say to this sycamine tree, Be thou rooted up, and be thou planted in the sea: and it would have obeyed you' (Luke xvii. 6); 'if ye are willing to receive

it, this is Elijah which is to come' (Matthew xi. 14); 'I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven' (Luke x. 18); 'if thy right eye causeth thee to stumble pluck it out and cast it from thee' (Matthew v. 29). We may assume that in some cases the *form* of an apocalyptic utterance may be accounted for in the way suggested, but not the whole substance of such sayings. Are we entitled to appeal to 'metaphor' and 'hyperbole' in order to make an utterance mean just the opposite of what it says? Can 'figurative interpretation' be stretched so far as to turn an affirmative proposition into its corresponding negative? When Jesus said: 'This will happen in your lifetime' could he have meant: 'This will *not* happen in your lifetime'?

V

A corresponding antinomy is found in the passages referring to the Judgment. God's judgment sometimes appears as a process through time, sometimes as a final act. The conception is so closely involved with those of the coming of the kingdom and the coming of Christ, that detailed illustration is unnecessary.

It is moreover remarkable that the various utterances of Jesus in reference to the life beyond death, seem to imply a twofold view which, at bottom, corresponds to the great antinomy involved in his general view of the future. On the one hand, we find that various characteristic expressions of the apocalyptists are freely used. The faithful are assured of a blessed life hereafter. They will be 'as angels in heaven' (Mark xii. 25 = Matthew xxii. 30 = Luke xx. 36); 'accounted worthy to attain to that world, and the resurrection from the dead,' being 'sons of God, sons of the resurrection' (Luke xx. 35, 36); their good deeds will be 'recompensed in the resurrection of the just' (Luke xiv. 14). No stress is laid on the corporeal aspect of the resurrection, although an embodied resurrection-life is not excluded; and nothing is said as to the ultimate fate of the unrighteous, unless the saying recorded by Matthew at the close of the judgment-scene 6 is authentic: 'These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into everlasting life.' These aspects of belief about the afterlife were familiar to contemporary Jewish thought.

But we find other aspects of belief, sug-

gesting the full meaning of those thoughts which we found in the germ, so to speak, in Jeremiah, in Job, and in some of the Psalms. We may affirm that the unique religious experience of Jesus was central and decisive for the details of his teaching. While a determined protest must be made against the confidence with which theologians make of the Gospels a first-hand record of the 'self-consciousness' of Jesus, it is not open to question that there is revealed in the Gospels a unique personal sense of Sonship. This remains true, even when we perceive that most of what the Gospel records give us expresses directly the self-consciousness of the writers themselves—in other words, the moral and spiritual impression made on them by the Master's life and teaching. Our knowledge of Jesus is for the most part inferential and indirect. But it is not on that account false. We see him reflected. We may not see the sun when it rises, but from the hills it shines upon, we perceive that it is rising. None the less the Gospels reveal a decisive religious intuition of Sonship. Jesus himself belongs to the Father, and he labours to bring all men to the experience of the same relationship.

This is a fellowship with God; and because it is a fellowship with him, it cannot pass away in time. 'He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living' (Mark xii. 27 = Matthew xxii. 32 = Luke xx. 38). Fellowship with God is eternal life. This is the chief end of man. Jesus knows of a life which is the great good—even the absolutely supreme good. Everything else called 'life' is well lost if that life is won (Mark viii. 35, 36; ix. 43-5, with Matthew xviii. 3, 4; Mark x. 17 = Matt. xix. 17 = Luke xviii. 18).

What then is the inner meaning of the antinomy which we have traced through the Gospel teaching? The contradiction is only apparent. Look back for a moment to the position of the apocalyptists. Although they were passionately convinced of the eternity of the righteous will of God—although they dared to aspire to a future state beyond the power of time—yet an *ethical* motive moulded their view of the future rather than the *distinctively religious* motive which we traced through Hebrew prophecy. For them there was no eternal life now attainable, carrying in itself the promise and potency of immortality. Their demand was first of all for personal recompense, personal retribution.

In the gospel of Jesus Christ these two motives work side by side. The contradiction vanishes when we perceive that the ethical motive can work without any setting of apocalyptic expectations; it is the 'kernel' of which these form the 'husk.' But it is ever a hope and faith about the *future*; and the religious motive is an experience and insight of the *present* which time cannot destroy.

VI

In the Fourth Gospel the two motives, as we have called them, are found again side by side, but their relative prominence is very different. The coming of the kingdom is scarcely spoken of; instead of dwelling on the 'Kingdom of God,' the teaching, as it appears in the Fourth Gospel, dwells on 'Life' or 'Eternal Life.'

In the story of Lazarus the relative importance of the apocalyptic view and the religious view is effectively shown (xi. 23ff.). Martha's idea of the resurrection makes it a future eschatological event. Jesus does not call this view in question, but he emphasizes something else. He is the giver of life, and the life that he gives carries with it

a present—not future—victory over death. Her faith is to be fixed on him—in other words, on a present spiritual force—not on some distant event. We cannot read into this the notion that physical death is impossible for the believer; but, for the believer, death loses its sinister significance and destructive power. The life, of which Jesus speaks, wins a perpetual victory over death—whether it is the bodily death, which seems to hold Lazarus captive, or a more deadly moral and spiritual death. 'He that believeth on me, though he die, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die.' What is meant by this 'believing' which has such transcendent results?

We turn to the great discourse on the Bread from Heaven (vi. 32ff., 47ff.). This is the Bread which gives eternal life. It signifies that continuous offering of himself, in which the life of Jesus consisted. As men appropriate his spirit, the Bread from Heaven becomes theirs, giving them a life over which time has no power. Of such a life we can never say, 'Now that which decayeth and waxeth old is ready to vanish away' (Hebrews viii. 13). The appropria-

tion of the Christ-spirit is what John means by the 'faith' or 'belief' which in his experience has accomplished so much. It is spiritual fellowship in the widest sense; not mere intellectual assent, but kinship of spirit, actual vital union as of the branches with the vine (xv. 1–9). Faith is sometimes spoken of as a kind of *knowledge* (compare the group of sayings, iii. 36, v. 24, vi. 40, 47, with the group viii. 32, xvii. 2, 3, xviii. 37); but it is a knowledge which springs from kinship of spirit (viii. 55), and is learnt through living from the same spirit (vii. 17).

It is clear then that eternal life is nothing merely future. It is a present possibility for all, and it is the present possession of whoever 'heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me.' It stands *sub specie aeternitatis* as man's divinely appointed goal. And death likewise takes on a spiritual significance. This is the only death to be dreaded—the loss of that which eternal life implies. The 'true believer'—the man who is kindred in spirit with the Master—has already passed out of the death which is really death, into the life which is really life (v. 24). And the actual language of the old resurrection-idea is used in order to make it

refer to a present experience: 'The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live' (v. 25). Such life is a victory at once over spiritual and over corporeal death. The Judgment, too, becomes a self-acting condemnation, the result of a present inward state. 'This is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light'; 'he that heareth my word . . . cometh not into judgment'; 'he that believeth not hath been judged already' (iii. 19; v. 24; iii. 18).

Nevertheless John had not surrendered the expectation of a miraculous second advent. He had abandoned all expectation of a glorified earth, and of any unique mission in the future for a glorified Israel. The apocalyptic ideas have been simplified to the uttermost, but they are not extinct (v. 28; vi. 44, 54; xi. 24). On the one hand, Jesus says: 'He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and manifest myself to him' (xiv. 21). This and the immediately following sayings imply a purely spiritual second advent. On the other hand,

Jesus says: 'If I go and prepare a place for you, *I will come again* and receive you unto myself' (xiv. 3). It is not true, therefore, to say that the apocalyptic eschatology is wholly abandoned in the Fourth Gospel. But the emphasis is not what it is in the first three Gospels. Salvation becomes a present experience which points to the future only for its unfolding and consummation.

VII

When we turn to the Pauline epistles we find a series of conceptions which indicate a gradual modification and development of thought. This is of considerable interest for our purpose, because Paul starts from a position which embraces all the characteristic features of apocalyptic eschatology. This is evident from the Thessalonian letters.

7 Paul starts with the thought of the miraculous end of the world by an act of divine intervention, after evil has attained its climax and consummation. The moment of divine intervention depends on the relative power of the forces of good and evil in the world. The forces of evil are increasing; and while this is going on those who are capable of

salvation are being sifted out from those who are not. This is the significance of his statement that the end cannot come until the Apostasy is fulfilled and the 'Man of Sin' revealed. This is the only passage in Paul where an 'Antichrist' appears; in him the revelation of evil culminates, as the revelation of God culminates in Christ. This is the moment of divine intervention. Christ will descend from on high, and the very breath of his lips is sufficient to destroy Antichrist. Paul at this period expected the end within his own lifetime. It is the great day. In the final judgment, vengeance is dealt out to the surviving wicked, the unbelievers, and the careless. We cannot read the meaning of 'eternal torment' into Paul's expressions; but however metaphorical they are, they imply a loss of everything that makes life worth living.

For the faithful a glorious future is prepared. Some feared that those who had died would lose their share in the inheritance of the future. Paul teaches that they will be raised and with the surviving righteous enter into their everlasting home. The scene is that of a transformed heaven and earth—perhaps it would be truer to say, a

wholly unearthly state of being. There is an organic relation between Christ and his people; they are raised as he was raised: 'For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also that are fallen asleep will God through Jesus bring with him.' They enter into fellowship with Christ, in that new order which is the completed kingdom of God (1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. i. 5).

8 The next stage in the development of Paul's thought on this subject appears in the first Corinthian letter. As compared with the position represented in the Thessalonian letters, we find significant modifications and additions. He never doubts the actual second coming of Jesus Christ. It is preceded by the usual apocalyptic signs—the increase of evil—and by a progressive victory of Christ over his enemies (xv. 22–24). It is followed by the resurrection of the righteous and faithful believers. For others there is no resurrection. Paul does not tell us how he thinks of the fate of these others. Perhaps the lingering Hebrew notion of *Sheol*, the under-world, was in his mind, but there is no positive indication.

He bases his hope for the resurrection of the faithful on their fellowship and living

union with Christ. 'As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.' On the one side they are organically united with the first man, the frail, the sinful; on the other side they are organically united with Christ. In the one case the relationship is natural and genealogical, but ethical as well. In the other case, the relationship can only be ethical and spiritual. The believer shares mortal and sinful humanity with Adam, and immortal and sinless humanity with Christ. Those who are 'in Christ' are to share 'a life-giving spirit.' To be 'in Christ' is an actual spiritual achievement which has in it the power and promise of immortality.

'How are the dead raised up?' Paul takes for granted that we ought to know without being told. We ought to know from our experience of the order of nature. As an object-lesson he points to the growth of a seed. What happens when a seed is sown? It dies to live—something in it dies, and something lives on. That which lives on receives a new body. Paul's statement is true to nature. The material wrapping of the seed decays; and as this happens, the germ of the coming plant is set free and begins to develop. As the living germ

develops, it assimilates from its environment material for a new body. That new body is the form of the plant that emerges into the light of day. How is the analogy to be applied? It is clear that Paul does not teach the doctrine afterwards known as that of 'the resurrection of the body.' The death of the earthly body *is* the beginning of the new life.

Dr. Charles holds that when Paul spoke of 'sowing,' in corruption, dishonour, weakness, he meant the embodiment of the spirit in the form of a living human being. The 'sowing' is realized throughout the whole earthly bodily life of a man. And the 'raising,' in incorruption, glory, power, is realized through the whole spiritual life, which is the progressive embodiment of the spirit in immortal form. This interesting interpretation is not new. Whatever we think of it, it is clear that, in Paul's view, the 'natural' and the 'spiritual' bodies are two different embodiments of the same spiritual principle. The only resemblance between them is that they are expressions of the same personality. But Paul does not believe in the possibility of a 'disembodied spirit.' The heavenly life is an embodied life, though the body is different

from that of our present sense-experience.

When does the transition take place? According to Paul's inherited apocalyptic conceptions, it takes place in the future—at the second advent of Christ. In the interval the soul is imprisoned without its immortal embodiments (xv. 51, 52). But the analogy of the seed shows that beside these inherited ideas, and in partial conflict with them, Paul had a new and developing thought of his own. The death of the mortal body is the moment of the great transition, when the spirit is set free to construct for itself a new body out of a new environment.

Passing from the First Corinthian to the 9
Second Corinthian and the Roman letters we find some significant changes in Paul's outlook. Resurrection *at the Second Advent* is no longer mentioned; resurrection is the transition which takes place at death. And, while previously only a fraction of the human race could share in the heavenly future, all the rest being in some sense lost, he now teaches that the entire Gentile and Jewish world will be gathered in at the end.

Finally, in the Philippian, Colossian, and 10
Ephesian letters, the doctrine of 'the last things,' like everything else, is affected by

the enlarged Christology. Christ is the cosmic principle, the beginning and the end, the starting-point of the universe and its goal. The historic Jesus has passed into the background here. The divine Christ-spirit fills the picture. 'Christ' is the divine activity creating, sustaining, and guiding the universe. The eschatological teaching is profoundly affected, in reference not to the nature or content, but to the scope of salvation. All things and all beings, both visible and invisible, were created through Christ. What is the conclusion to be drawn from this? It is, that all must be redeemed and made perfect at last. Christ's kingdom becomes identical with the eternal kingdom of God, as the goal towards which the entire universe is moving. Christ, in the end, is *all in all*. This ideal involves the final salvation of every personal being; or, if there be any finally irredeemable, it involves their annihilation. Nothing evil can exist where Christ is all in all.

VIII

One of the greatest lessons that the New Testament has to teach is that eternal life involves the union of the present and the

future—the union of that which, if real, must be ever present, and that which, if real, must be ever future. This explains the apparent contradiction in the teaching of Jesus, in the first three Gospels, about the coming of the kingdom, as now present, now future; it explains the deliberate retention of apocalyptic expressions and ideas in the Fourth Gospel, in an atmosphere of thought apparently foreign to them; it explains the fact that Paul's gradual abandonment of apocalyptic conceptions only implied an intensifying of his interest in the life that is yet to come.

In their essentials, the spiritual and ethical necessities of the problem are set forth by Jesus. He lays down two principles which, though apparently in conflict, are really necessary to one another. He teaches that the kingdom of God is future, sudden, God-given, and soon to come. This expresses an ultimate dissatisfaction with the temporal; a sense of the irremediable insufficiency even of the totality of all our earthly conditions though improved to the uttermost; a longing for a life which time can neither give nor take away. When we regard this ideal by itself, we find that it is 'transcendent' and

'other-worldly.' But, with it, Jesus also offers an ideal which is 'immanent' and 'this-worldly'—if we empty the word of the sinister meaning usually put into it. The coming of the kingdom of God is shown in the works of healing and in the parables of growth. It is the realization of a social life inspired by the same spirit which dominated the work of the Master. It is present now; and the Divine Source of the spirit animating it is present with it.

If we take either of these principles by itself, and attempt to build on it, and reject the other, the result is disastrous. In the one case, we have a religion which denies all the claims of this world and of the life of time; in the other case, we have a secularism which recognizes no claims but those of this world. On the one side we have nothing but 'other-worldliness,' and, on the other side, nothing but 'this-worldliness.'

There have been periods in Christian history in which the one-sided ideal of 'other-worldliness' has really been glorified, as though it were the greatest good to be poor in spirit, poor in energy. Look at the ecclesiastical ideals of 'saintliness,' for instance; or turn to that beautiful and almost inspired

book, 'The Imitation of Christ.' If you tried to learn from that book what kind of person Jesus was, all you would find would be that he was some one whose whole life was one continued martyrdom, for whom there was not a single hour that was not filled with suffering and pain. You would find that for his sake we are to despise ourselves and be ready and willing to suffer even as he suffered. This is the spirit which made men retire from the world into monasteries, cloisters, and hermits' caves. It is the ideal life still, according to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church; and some kinds of Protestant religious teaching are not distantly related to it. Canon Liddon, one of the ablest and most persuasive preachers in the Anglican Church, speaking in St. Paul's Cathedral in London before a vast audience, called upon his hearers to realize that religion rightly treated did actually involve the withdrawing of their energies from the concerns of this world. He pleaded that the eternal world is quite as much of a real thing as the world in which we now live; that common prudence, to mention nothing else, calls upon a man to make adequate preparation for this eternal state into which he must needs pass;

that such preparation rightly prevents a permanent interest in the 'good things' or even in the progress and welfare of this world; that the man who is truly religious must be content to enrich his soul at the cost of his body, his intellect, his affections. What is this but an admission that, for some types of Christianity, the very charge that Nietzsche makes—of its being on the whole, in tendency, a thing injurious to the development of life in this world—is justified?

We find a similar tendency in some kinds of evangelistic teaching, where we are told that the only use and meaning of this world is to be a scene where men may learn to win their salvation in another—that nothing whatever which this world values can bring them security for their fate in the world to come.

Now if this kind of teaching were taken seriously, and its principles were worked out consistently in life, what would the result be? Would it not lead to a real neglect of, and even hostility to, some of the plainest interests and duties of our life here? And for the sake of what? For no earthly good, high or low; for the sake of standing aloof from all the struggles and trials and progress

of mankind; for the sake of making this life into a meditation on death; for the sake of cultivating an indifference to all the interests that bind men together here; for the sake of another world of which they tell us it is a deliverance, an escape from this world.

It is possible, on the other hand, to interpret the kingdom of God as altogether of this world: and then we are exposed to disastrous moral and spiritual errors of another kind. 'There exists a well-known modern type of thought,' says Professor H. R. Mackintosh, 'which takes the perfectibility of human nature by circumstances as its working theory, regards character as the mere product of nurture and environment, and insists that the true path to the *summum bonum* for man is to conduct life strictly according to scientific principles. And even when ideas of this sort are put aside, owing to the acknowledgment of Jesus' supremacy, the prospect held forth is an earthly one.' He illustrates by a quotation from a recent author: 'The wonderful life promised by Christianity will, like all inferior forms of life, realize itself through a process of gradual and orderly evolution extending over many generations of mankind. . . . We believe

that there is in store for mankind a far higher and more joyful existence than it has at present; and we may even hope for the conquest in time of sickness and death.' It may be freely admitted that in such ideas there is something that appeals for sympathy. But if we accept as sufficient an ideal of progress which makes it consist of a gradual accumulation of small increments of advance through the ages, completing itself in a certain form of specifically earthly life, then we are not only untrue to the mind of Jesus but also untrue to the inexorable logic of history and fact. All history denounces as an idle dream the notion of a gradual onward and upward movement of man. It is an illusion, sprung from an attitude of distant detachment such as might make ocean waves driven by the wildest storm look like a 'wrinkled sea.' History tells of victories that were defeats, of defeats that were victories. The Cross on Calvary, the death agony of the secular power of Rome, the fierce life begotten by the young northern nations over the ruins of the ancient world, the resurrection, as from the grave, of the spirit of that old world with power to mould in countless ways the mind and heart of the

new—these things are not exceptional but typical of the stuff of which progress is made. And through it all there sounds the message of the Master, that the issue of all these ages of storm and stress cannot be found on the field of time.

From the New Testament we may learn that human nature has a greater capacity than earth can ever satisfy, and yet that its satisfaction can only begin here, in these conditions of time and space. Jesus saves us from attaching such importance to this world as to suppress all thoughts of another world; he saves us from attaching such importance to another world, as to discourage the beginning of the kingdom of God here and now.

Chapter V

ETERNAL LIFE IN CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

THE mystical type of religion has well-marked and distinctive features. It is by no means peculiar to Christianity, although the most instructive examples of it are found in Christianity. It can grow in the most various soils and yet exhibits the same distinctive features.

I

If for a moment we disregard the special peculiarities of the various historic forms of mysticism, we find an essential element remaining which is one with the nature of all religion of the more vital sort—all religion which involves something more vital than intellectual acceptance of doctrinal propositions or outward conformity to custom and ceremonial. This essential element con-

sists in a certain intellectual conception and a certain practical or experiential attitude of the mind. The conception is the unity of all things in God—the all-pervading indwelling Power in whom all things consist. On the experiential side, mysticism holds the possibility, not merely of knowledge *about* this Being, but of direct intercourse or conscious vital communion with Him. For the mystic, God is an experience, a reality to be enjoyed for ever. And this experience appears as a thing to be achieved, not a mere occurrence in the course of nature. The most distinctive feature of mysticism is the intensity with which the divine factor in the relationship of man to God is realized. The relationship is so vital that the individual may be said to share in the divine nature.

When we consider the specific forms which mysticism has taken in the history of religion, we find that there are a number of definite features common to them all; and each of these is capable of assuming a degenerate form, destructive of mental, moral, and spiritual health. It is by no means necessary that this should happen; but in certain cases it has happened. It will be useful to enumerate these characteristics of mysticism,

and distinguish the normal and morbid forms of each.

(*a*) The soul has a faculty which is above and beyond the ordinary reason of man, and which opens up an avenue of intercourse with the spiritual world. It is a faculty of spiritual discernment which can be trained and increased in power until it becomes a full vision of the Infinite. It is above and beyond reason, because the activity of reason is assumed to be always of the nature of analysis, separating the things reasoned about. Mysticism would overcome all separation. It desires complete union with the divine—a union which is beyond reason because it is beyond separation—a union in which self as a separate thing disappears.

In its degenerate forms, this ideal lends itself to expression in sensuous metaphors, and may come to be regarded as if it were a sensuous union and interpenetration just like physical intoxication. In some of the lower forms of mysticism, God is treated as though he were an object that could be physically assimilated in some way; and the mystical state becomes a pathological physical condition.

(*b*) Eternity is no mere future state or

endless series in time, but a present reality whose fulness time can neither give nor take away. Eternity is another name for the life of God. It follows that personality, so far as it involves growth in time, would limit rather than express the full truth about the divine. In its extreme form, unbalanced by a living interest in the temporal and the future, this conception makes the eternal world the only real world. The world of experience in time and space becomes unreal. We come to reality and to ourselves by dying to this world.

Peace, peace! He is not dead, he doth not sleep—
He hath awakened from the dream of life—
'Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife.

* * * *

The One remains, the many change and pass;
Heaven's light for ever shines, earth's shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments.

In the lower forms of mysticism, this dualism of the divine and the earthly is capable of leading to extreme consequences both in theory and practice. The world and all human experience is not a revelation of

God, but a barrier shutting us off from God. We must annihilate that barrier and set ourselves free, not only from outward things, but from every inward desire that points to anything in this world. An ideal is made of the uttermost possible detachment from this world. The result is mental vacancy. In certain cases a practical conclusion of a very different kind has been drawn—the assumption that all manner of indulgence is possible, because it is an affair of the body only and cannot affect the good of the soul which is independent of the body.

(*c*) A high value is attached to *asceticism* in one or other of its various forms. The Greek word, from which this term is derived, means 'exercise' or 'training.' So far, this is an essential element in all life. It is a question of how far it is carried. In the higher forms of mysticism it becomes the training of the spiritual athlete, and manifests itself in moral efficiency. In the lower forms it becomes a tendency to mere physical self-mortification, a torturing to death of the impulses of the body.

(*d*) The true mystic tends to sit loosely to institutional and legal religion in general. Some mystics have regarded institutional

religion as harmless, and have been merely indifferent to it. In the Middle Ages, such men could remain in the Church. In other cases mysticism led to open revolt and rebellion, and the mystic became a heretic. Both attitudes have at times been carried to extremes. Some have yielded the most absolute submission to the Church; others have passed to the extreme of revolt and have died as martyrs. These various results have, of course, been due to the special conditions which Roman Catholicism has historically involved.

Baron von Hügel's striking volume on *Eternal Life* shows how a sane and healthy mysticism, advocated by a modernist Catholic, may find its natural expression in Institutional Religion. His mysticism demands something more than the personal action of the individual soul. It demands common worship, communion in intercourse with the Deity. It demands the symbolism of sacraments, since philosophy, psychology, and experience show that material elements as such can appeal to our higher spiritual nature. And it demands to be kept in touch with every other movement of life. Religion is not ethics, or philosophy, or art, or science,

or economics; but it can never shut itself apart from these without condemning itself to emptiness and sterility. On such grounds he maintains that the convictions which bring man into union with God are dependent for their full development on institutional religion.

Nevertheless all mysticism suffers from a tendency to remain stationary in its retirement and inwardness. It rarely finds 'the way from the sanctuary of the love of God to the workshop of the kingdom of God.' It is in constant danger of falling into indifference to the moral condition and needs of society, or at least of failing to exert any influence for its improvement. The paradox of the divine life that is for ever present and yet for ever future, remains beyond the grasp of the mysticism of the individual soul. Why then concern ourselves with it?

1 We may answer as Charles Kingsley does in his striking preface to Susanna Winkworth's translation of Tauler's *Sermons*. 'The speculations of the mystics, whether right or wrong in any given detail, go down to the very deepest and most universal grounds of theology and metaphysics; and however distinctly Christian they may be,

are connected with thoughts which have exercised men of every race which has left behind it more than mere mounds of earth. We find in the Greek, the Persian, and the Hindu, in the Buddhist and in the Mohammedan Sufi, the same craving after the absolute and the eternal, the same attempt to express in words that union between man and God which transcends all words. . . . When we see such thoughts bubbling up, as it were, spontaneously, among men divided utterly from each other by race, age, and creed, we can conclude that those thoughts must be a normal product of the human spirit, and that they indicate a healthy craving after some real object; we can rise to a tender and a deeper sympathy with the aspirations and mistakes of men who sought in great darkness for a ray of light, and did not seek in vain.'

In Kingsley's day there were some—as to-day there are some—prepared to regard all these experiences as the consequence of a diseased brain, deranged nervous system, or weakness brought on by voluntary asceticism. Of such, he says: 'When they found these mystics, whatsoever might be their denomination, all inclined to claim some illumina-

tion, intuition, or direct vision of eternal truth, eternal good, eternal beauty, even of that eternal Father in whom all live and move and have their being; yet making that claim in deepest humility, amid confessions of their own weakness, sinfulness, nothingness, which to the self-satisfied may seem exaggerated and all but insincere; they would have been perhaps more philosophical as well as more charitable; more in accordance with Baconian induction, as well as with Saint Paul's direct assertions in his Epistles to the Corinthians, if they had said: "This testimony of so many isolated persons to this fact is on the whole a fair probability for its truth; and we are inclined to believe it, though it transcends our experience, on the same ground that we believe the united testimony of travellers to a hundred natural wonders, which differ as utterly from anything which we ever saw, as do these spiritual wonders from anything which we have ever felt."'

For our present purpose we select three celebrated representatives of medieval Catholic mysticism, from among the men who have been described with considerable truth as 'reformers before the Reformation.' We

take first Johannes Eckhart, known as the 'Master.'

II

Eckhart flourished during the latter part of the thirteenth and the early part of the fourteenth century. Although he held a high position in the Dominican Order, he eventually incurred ecclesiastical condemnation, among other reasons, because some of his statements had an antinomian tendency, and he was wrongly believed to have shared in the practices of a sect known as the 'Brethren of the Free Spirit,' who held that their mystical privileges absolved them from common moral duties and restraints.

Eckhart was a strong thinker of an intensely speculative temperament. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that he begins his mystical doctrine with a theory of the divine nature. His primary distinction is between God and Deity or Godhead—between the divine person and the divine nature. The divine nature is beyond every possible predicate that our thought can frame; it is incomprehensible in the strictest sense of the word. Yet with this there goes a counter-stroke. This incomprehensible being con-

tains the potentiality of all beings. But the Godhead is not God as known to us. God as known to us proceeds from the Godhead. How is this process to be thought of? It is a process of self-expression. The Absolute in expressing itself realizes that supreme personality which we know as God. This realization must take a trinitarian form. Why that form, necessarily? Because in thus realizing itself the Absolute becomes personal and self-conscious: and this involves a duality and a relation between two aspects or terms. God as knowing himself is the Father; that which he knows of himself is the Son; and the unity of the two in one life is the Spirit. It is evident that this differs widely from the traditional doctrine of the tri-personality of the Godhead.

What, then, of the world? The realization of the divine Son involves the creation of the world; for the Son is God's mind in expression, and that expression involves creation. Creation is therefore an eternal process. On this basis Eckhart uses the traditional theological phrases in reference to God's relation to the world. But he is in contact with the fundamental difficulty —the origin of the *material* world. That

which is created in the Son is the *ideal* world. Whence comes the material world, with its imperfections and evils, and its apparent independence of everything ideal? Eckhart has no answer. He does not reduce the actual world to a mere illusion. Neither is it absolutely independent of God. The material world is in some mysterious way involved in the divine process called creation. It follows, then, that the Son of God, who is God in expression, is actually immanent in the material world. This is the downward movement from the divine to the earthly.

With the downward movement there arises also an upward movement. All beings have arisen from God and all desire to return. All beings have ultimately arisen from the Absolute or the Godhead, so that what all desire is not only God but Godhead; and Godhead is beyond God. The soul, says Eckhart, receives from the Trinity (from God) all that can be measured by the faculties of the soul; but from the absolute Godhead, a light shines into the very being of the soul, which the soul's faculties cannot receive. This is the ineffable state, the mystical ideal beyond any faculty or condition of the soul that speech can name.

In man the upward movement is realized and its nature seen. Man has the power of returning to the Absolute. But this return involves in the end the annihilation of all difference, even the difference between the knower and the known, the lover and the beloved. This is the chief end of man. How then is man, the actual being, related to the ideal man? There must be a common point between them. There must be a common point even between the natural man and the Absolute, because from the Absolute all things have come. The common point is found in the divine scintilla or 'spark' in the human soul. As that spark grows in intensity it consumes the finiteness and the evil that springs from it, and only the divine is left.

How is the scintilla to be set free to grow in intensity? Eckhart's expressions, like those of some other mystical writers, suggest that he failed to distinguish two different answers to this question. There is the negative way and there is the positive way. The negative way of seeking salvation is by extinguishing all the desires and aims that link us on to this world. As the soul moves away from all these, it realizes its union with the Godhead. The positive way is not by negat-

ing the faculties of the soul but by developing and perfecting them.

In the *via negativa* there is a sheer identification of the human and the divine; the progress consists in destroying the illusion of separateness. Seek nothing, and God himself will be thine abode. He who is still increasing in goodness and knowledge never comes to God, for God does not increase. We are accustomed to say 'I am not you,' 'You are not I.' That is false. We reach the truth by leaving out the 'not.' We are all one, and that one is the Son of God. There are not many sons but one Son. Such conceptions call to mind the eastern parable: 'The lover stood at the door of the Beloved, and knocked. A voice said, Who is there? And he answered, It is I. The voice replied, There is not room here for me and thee. After many days he returned and knocked again at the door. A voice said, Who is there? And he answered, It is Thou. And the door was opened.'

Beside this negative ideal of the disappearance of all human endeavour, Eckhart has in view a positive ideal. Two of his most concrete statements of it are thus rendered by Baron von Hügel: 'That is beautiful

which is well ordered. The soul ought, with its lower powers, to be ordered under the higher, and with the higher, under God. . . . The right and perfect state of the soul would be, not simply that it should practise virtue, but that all the virtues should constitute its state (should have become the soul's second nature), without being practised with deliberation.' This is the way not of the suppression of desire, but of its right regulation and control. He condemns those who say: 'If we have God and God's love, we can do whatever we like!' The man who can do anything against God's command, is without God's love. And it is better far to do outward works of compassion for others than to strive after a condition of inward freedom from all particular knowledge and desire.

Eckhart, like many other mystics, teaches that evil is nothing positive; it consists in being without good, it is only a privation and a defect. This doctrine is sometimes supposed to spring from a tendency to explain away the real character of moral evil. The following passage, from one of Eckhart's sermons, will show how groundless such a
3 supposition is: 'The question has been raised, what it is that burns in hell. The

masters generally say, it is self-will. But I say, in truth, it is *not having* (privation) which constitutes the burning of hell. Learn this from a parable. If you were to take a burning coal and put it on my hand, and I were to assert that the coal is burning my hand, I should be wrong. But if I be asked what it is that burns me, I say it is the *not having*, because the coal has something which my hand has not. You perceive, then, that it is the *not having* which burns me. If my hand had all that which the coal has, it would possess the nature of fire. In that case, you might take all the fire that burns and put it on my hand without tormenting me. In the same manner I say, if God, and those who stand before His face, enjoy that perfect happiness which those who are separated from Him possess not, it is the *not having* which torments the souls in hell more than self-will or fire.'

III

Johann Tauler, of Strasburg, who flourished in the first half of the fourteenth century, was one of the most famous of the disciples of Eckhart, and belonged to the same order; but he was before all else a

great preacher to the people; and with him, the speculative side of mysticism is in the background and the religious and practical in the foreground. He was associated with the societies of men and women, along the Rhine-land, who had banded themselves together, under the name of 'Friends of God,' to cultivate disinterested love to God—a love free from all desire of reward—and to carry on philanthropic and beneficent work among the poor and the neglected. This they did even amidst the ravages of the Black Death. From one of these groups there went forth anonymously the *Theologia Germanica*. This book was rediscovered by Luther in 1516, and he published it with a preface ranking it, for its spiritual power, next to the Bible and the writings of Augustine.

So far as the standing regulations of the Church were concerned, Tauler's principle was one of passive obedience. He never questioned the duty of conscientiously fulfilling the requirements of ecclesiastical law. But he regarded the outward exercises of religion prescribed by the Church as a preparation for a higher stage of spiritual experience. He knew how to warn against all

externalization of religion, and against the supposed efficacy of 'good works'—penances and other set tasks formally undertaken as 'meritorious.' 'God gives all things that they may become a way to Himself, and Himself alone be the end and aim of all. Your station makes you neither blessed nor holy. Not my cowl, nor my bald head, nor my monastery, nor my religious order, nor any such thing can make me holy.' Deliberate discipline and penance-life, when not carried too far, serve to weaken the resistance which the flesh offers to the spirit. But there is a more excellent way: 'Wouldst thou master and subdue the flesh in a many times better way? Then lay upon it the curb and fetters of love. With that thou wilt overcome it in the easiest way of all, and with love thou wilt load it heaviest of all.'

Nevertheless he believed that the outward exercises of religion have their rightful place. If they are ever cast aside, it must not be by any decision of merely personal self-will. They can only be naturally outgrown as the result of a higher enjoyment of God which does not need these supports. And this is a height that not many can attain unto. In

the same way, the dogmas prescribed by the Church have a rightful claim to make; although many of these dogmas involve mysteries utterly incomprehensible by the human mind—mysteries which the greatest masters of theology may discuss, and which they may elucidate to a slight extent, but only very imperfectly. Thus, in reference to the Trinity, he declares that however much we talk we can neither express nor understand how the super-essential Unity can co-exist with the distinction of the Persons: 'The whole subject is at an infinite distance from us, and wholly foreign to us. It is hidden from us, for it even surpasses the understanding of angels. We therefore leave it to great prelates and learned men. They must have something to say in order to defend the faith, but we must simply believe.'

This passive acquiescence in what ecclesiastical authority prescribes is however only as it were the outer fringe of Tauler's religion. His religion is a thing of intense, personal, experimental conviction. To see what he really had at heart, we turn to such passages as the following.

'Children, the Lord's Prayer is a mighty prayer: ye know not what ye pray for in it.

God is himself the kingdom, and in that kingdom he reigns in all intelligent creatures. Therefore what we ask for is God himself with all his riches. In that kingdom does God become our Father, and manifests there his fatherly faithfulness and fatherly power. And in so far as he finds place in us to work, is his name hallowed, and magnified, and made known. That his name should be hallowed in us, means that he should reign in us and accomplish through us his rightful work. And thus is his will done here on earth as it is in heaven; that is, when it is done in us as it is in himself, in the heaven which he himself is. . . . Give thyself to him afresh; trust thyself to the power of thy Father, who has all power and might, and whose presence thou hast so often and so plainly felt, and art yet made to feel every day and hour. Trust him wholly, and seek his righteousness. For therein is his righteousness shown, that he abideth ever with those who heartily seek him, and make him their end, and give themselves up to him. In such he reigns, and all vain care falls away of itself in those who thus keep close to God in true self-surrender.'

This does not mean that we are to tempt

God by neglecting due prudence in things needful and profitable to ourselves and the community. 'That which is your end when you sit and meditate in the Church, should be likewise your end when you are busied in all the affairs of daily life; . . . do all to the glory of God and not for thyself. For a noble man will make these perishing things of time a mere passage-way by which he will ascend, through the created things, not being held down by any selfish cleaving to them, up to his everlasting home, his eternal source from which he sprang at his creation.'

The satisfaction of natural desires and needs is inevitable, so long as nature is nature: 'but this pleasure, ease, satisfaction, enjoyment, or delight, must not penetrate into the depths of thy heart, nor make up a portion of thy inner life. It must pass away with the things that caused it and have no abiding place in thee. We must not set our affections thereon, but allow it to come and go, and not repose on the sense of possession with content or delight in the world or the creature. . . . These and all other inclinations must be brought under dominion to a higher power; for till this is accomplished, Herod and his servants, who

seek the young child's life, are not altogether 6
and of a surety dead within thee.'

We spoke of his submissiveness to the dogmas prescribed by the Church. But on what authority does he base his knowledge of God? 'I have a power in my soul which enables me to perceive God: I am as certain as of my own life that nothing is so near to me as God. He is nearer to me than I am to myself. It is part of his very essence that he should be nigh and present to me. He is also nigh to a stone or a tree, but they do not know it. If a tree could know God, and perceive his presence as the highest of the angels perceives it, the tree would be as blessed as the highest angel. And it is because man is capable of perceiving God, and knowing how nigh God is to him, that he is better off than a tree. And he is more blessed or less blessed in the same measure in which he is aware of the presence of God 7
and knows and loves him.'

There are passages which sound the note of the *via negativa*—and these especially occur when he is exalting the mystic ideal of union with the eternal ground of the soul's deepest life, which is God. But other notes never fail to mingle with it. The ideal is that

state wherein we do not wish to be ourselves or to be anything, save for His sake and by reason of His will, not ours. How could God be all if, in man, anything of man remained? Yet something of man remains, though in another form, another strength, another glory. As a drop of water is diffused in a jar of wine, taking its taste and colour; as molten iron becomes like to fire and casts off its form; as the air transfused with sunlight is transformed into the same brightness, so that it seems not illumined but itself the light; so in the saints every human affection must be ineffably purified of itself and transfused in the love which is God.

This is no love which is sundered from all the claims of social service. Works of love are more acceptable to God than lofty contemplation. Spiritual enjoyments are the food of the soul, and are only to be taken for nourishment and support to help us in our active work. Sloth often makes men eager to be excused from their work and set to contemplation. Never trust in a virtue which has not been put into practice. All kinds of skill are from the Holy Spirit. 'One can spin,' says Tauler, 'another can make shoes; and all these are gifts of the

Holy Spirit. I tell you, if I were not a priest, I should esteem it a great gift that I was able to make shoes, and would try to make them so well as to be a pattern to all.' 9

IV

Kindred in spirit to Tauler was his contemporary Johann Ruysbroek, the great representative of mysticism in the Netherlands. No one saw more clearly than Tauler the mischief of that morbid mysticism which, straining after a pantheistic absorption of self in the Infinite, was in danger of passing over its opposite and making self into God. But Ruysbroek had a clearer intellectual perception of where the root of this mischief lay. He exalts to the uttermost the ideal of pure mysticism, to be of one life and one spirit with God. But his fundamental meaning is such as might be expressed in the word of one who in our own age lived near to the Unseen: 'our wills are ours to make them Thine.'

Even in its uttermost attainment the creature remains a creature. We must be conscious of ourselves in God, and conscious of ourselves in ourselves. Though we may rise above reason, still we are not without

reason. Hence we perceive that we touch and are touched, love and are beloved. We are continually renewed and return back to ourselves. We come and go. Although love absorbs the soul, consumes it, and even demands of it what is impossible; and although the soul longs to resolve itself into love as into nothing; yet it can never perish but will always endure. It belongs to our nature to look up to God and to strive towards him; and this endeavour will abide eternally with us.

While Ruysbroek thus earnestly contends that we can never lose our nature as created beings, and can never, through all eternity, cease to be different from God, he teaches with as firm a conviction that our being is rooted in and vitally united with an eternal ground, which is God. It is part of our nature to be thus, in the innermost, joined by a vital bond to God. In this sense, we combine a created and an uncreated life; a life subject to time, and a life beyond the power of time. Our created life, though we share it with the angels, and though like their life it is immortal, is not in its own nature *blessed*. It can become a blessed life, by God's grace, if we attain to *faith*, *hope*,

knowledge, and *love*. In attaining to these, we practise the virtues which are well pleasing to God. We rise above ourselves and are united to God. Yet the creature never becomes God.

He thus explains the distinctive paradox of the Gospel—'die to live': 'The act of life must drive man outwardly to practise virtue; the act of death must drive him into God, in the depths of his own being. These are the two movements of the perfect life, united as matter and form, as soul and body.' He exalts the contemplative life of the spirit, but he believes that love is the highest because it unites the contemplative and the practical life. If one should rise to a height of contemplation equal to that which any of the apostles ever reached, and should then learn that some poor man stood in need even of a cup of cold water or of any other service, it would be far better that he should for the time awake out of the repose of that contemplation and bestow aid on that poor man in true charity, than that he should surrender himself to the joy of his present contemplation; for God's commandments are not to be neglected for the sake of any exercise, however great it may be. Who-

ever would give himself up only to contemplation and neglect his neighbour in distress, is lost in self-deception, knowing neither his own needs nor the meaning of the contemplative life.

Every good work, however trifling, if done with a pure disposition of love, in reverence to God, obtains likeness to God and eternal life in him. A pure intention brings the scattered powers of the soul into unity, and places the spirit itself in union with God. A good will, in its internal communion with God, is the crowning of the spirit with eternal life. When it is directed outwards, it is master of all external acts. It is in truth the kingdom of God, where he reigns by his grace.

It was this vigorous moral consciousness which saved Ruysbroek from the extremes to which some of his contemporaries carried their doctrine of mystical absorption. His moral consciousness reacted on his Christian consciousness, and determined his conviction of the way in which God is known in Christ. We cannot redeem ourselves, but if with such powers as we have we follow after Christ, living, in our measure, in his spirit, then our acts are united with his acts and

become ennobled by his spirit. In this sense Christ has redeemed us by his acts, not by ours, and by his own merits has made us free. Observe that this is no doctrine of substitutionary atonement. It implies what has been called the 'moral theory' of the atonement—that Christ redeems through the influence of his life and work on the individual soul. Ruysbroek teaches that if we would possess and feel the freedom which the redeemer can confer on us, then *his* spirit must kindle *our* spirits to love. We are as it were baptized with his spirit. That which constitutes our will dies to itself and is absorbed in his will, so that we will nothing but what God wills. And this is the root of love, working inwardly in union with God and outwardly in acts of goodness, beneficence, and mercy.

Such counsels were needed in the age of Ruysbroek and Tauler. In a time when the Church and the world seemed abandoned to corruption and the people to misery, spiritual minds turned away from outward things and sought within for God:

> He who himself and God would know,
> Into the silence let him go:
> And, lifting off pall after pall,
> Reach to the inmost depth of all.

In our time all these words about the 'contemplative life' have lost their meaning. It is because we have lost the sense of a truth which is worth enjoying as well as worth seeking, of a life that is worth living as well as worth gaining. In the old Belgian mystic dreaming and writing in his cell in the convent of Soignies, we have once more found a man who perceived that our true life is at once an absolute gift from God, from beyond time, and an achievement of our will through time. This is the secret of the antinomy of Jesus—the apocalyptic and the ethical side by side.

V

If we followed the teachings of genuine mysticism in its distinctively Protestant forms, or again in its later Catholic, or in its distinctively modern forms, we should find nothing new *in principle*. The fundamental lesson would be the same throughout. Historic mysticism constitutes a powerful reaffirmation and re-enforcement, in special ways and under special conditions, of the old idea that the truth of religion is based directly on our actual experience.

What is 'experience'? In ordinary

thought and language there is a close connexion between experience and *reality*; the main feature of 'experience' is that in it something *real* comes home to us. But the word is constantly used in some limited sense or other, in the interest of some narrow system of thought. The most unfortunate and unjustifiable of these limitations is to make it mean only the facts which our bodily senses appear to give us. Yet it is from this arbitrary limitation that Positivism derives all its prestige—from appearing to have a monopoly of 'experience' and of the real, solid foundation of knowledge which the word suggests. Experience, far from being a fixed, finite thing, is a seed, a germ, a potency; it may be almost infinitely magnified in capacity and character, in intensity and scope.

Whatever enters into our living experience is *real*; this is true throughout the many different forms which such experience may take. Thus, in simple sense-experience, such as the perception of a sound or colour, —in intelligent 'observation,' as of something that arouses our interest—in the 'instinctive' verdicts of conscience, and the social and sympathetic feelings—in these

and all other types of experience there is the actual presence of something real, something that we 'get at' directly. The kinds and degrees of experience are infinitely various, for they comprise all the variety of *realized* objects, human thought and action. Hence the type of experience which a man will have, depends first of all on the direction which his own activities take: but it depends also on the intensity with which he puts forth the native energies of his spirit into those activities. By this effort and energy his very personality will grow in power as his experience grows in depth of meaning. Again, whatever an experience may be, before it can teach us any lesson it must be *thought* about; and as human intelligence has in itself infinite varieties of maturity and power, this adds a new set of variations to experience. These things are true of whole ages and races of men as well as of individuals; and the historic forms of belief depend on these two 'variables'—degrees of intensity and scope in experience, and degrees of truth in its interpretation.

Amid all this boundless complexity and manifoldness of experience, where can the Idea of the Divine Being have its source?

In all kinds of experience, something real comes home to us; in what kind of experience does the 'something real' appear as the very presence of the divine? Speaking, at the close of his *Gifford Lectures*, of a possible experience of the heavenly life, the late Principal Caird said: 'Even here, in this earthly life of ours, there are moments, few and far between, when the infinitude of the spiritual nature reveals itself, when the gross vesture of carnality seems to fall away, and a latent splendour of spiritual nobleness, nothing less than divine, to be disclosed. When thought comes with a rush of inspiration on the mind of the man of genius, when in the experience of very holy and saintly men infinite hopes and aspirations flow in upon the soul, raising it above the littleness and narrowness of life, quelling every ignoble thought, silencing every baser passion; or when the call for some great act of self-sacrifice has arisen, and the sense of duty triumphs over all lower impulses, and the deed of heroism and self-devotion is done—in these and like experiences there are premonitions of a larger, diviner life within this nature of ours.'

Yet—when viewed in the light of our

conception of experience and its interpretation—even these rarest and highest spiritual experiences of the best and noblest of men are seen to be only a specially intense form of an experience which is shared by all who endeavour to realize their ideals. Human ideals, embodied in the work of life, become symbols of the Divine Being. Whether it is truth that is sought, or beauty, or righteousness, or human love—if we seek to possess and be possessed by any of these things, we shall find in them traces and motions of a strength that is not of our making and yet becomes ours as we work. Or if we think that *we* have no experience which can thus be interpreted—none, even in our moments of sincerest work—none, even when we have lost all thought of self in 'doing out the duty' and living out the love that is claimed from us, then it remains for us to accept as true the insight of others who, working out the same ideals, find in them a strength rooted in the 'deep things of God.' *We* share the same experience with them; but for us the light of its meaning may be closed, while for them the light begins to break forth. Let us understand, once for all, how great are the variations which an

experience of the same kind or type may have for different beings, and how many are the motives leading to divergent interpretations of what is experienced: and then we can understand that the germs of the experience of God are universal. The consciousness of weakness and dependence—the restlessness that issues in 'divine discontent'—the unwillingness to be satisfied with any merely temporary good—these are some of the first beginnings of what in its intenser, clearer form becomes a recognition of God in the ideals of man.

If this is the source of belief in the Divine Being, we know what we mean when we speak of God; the eternal perfection, the absolute goodness, truth, and beauty, whose light

> guides the nations, groping on their way,
> Stumbling and falling in disastrous night,
> Yet hoping ever for the Perfect Day.

In this perfect life, all that our struggling ideals point to is for ever realized; and every ideal of ours—partial, fragmentary, and imperfect though it be—is a direct revelation of some aspect of the absolute perfection, in whom all ideals are consummated. Thus do all the paths of human goodness

begin and end in God, although men may not always see this, and may not always know who goes with them and guides their footsteps when with earnest effort they maintain the nobler way.

The only possible 'proof' that the appeals, which truth and love make to us, are literally divine, is found in *living* up to them as far as we are able. If duty is divine, there can be no way of 'proving' it but through an experience which can be attained only by *living the life* of duty. Doubt is indeed possible: but that is true of all such doubts, which we were told long ago: they can be 'ended by action alone.' 'Truth must be ground for every man by himself out of its husk, with such help as he can get, indeed, but not without stern labour of his own': and the deepest truth of life—the divine meaning of life's duties and ideals—can be won only in the work of life.

The winning of this insight, this assurance, this experience, this enjoying of God—this *is* religion. Religion begins when our highest springs of action begin to be *experienced* as divine; when something ideal, which seems at first only a dream of future possibility, becomes more than this, and brings us into

touch with a real presence, higher still, ready to strengthen us as we try to make the ideal a part of ourself. To *realize* an ideal: what is it, in truth? If the ideal is genuine, it is part of God. The men who have laid down their lives for an ideal have been able to do it because they have seen this. And when you realize an ideal, it is still part of God, but now it is part of yourself as well. Whenever you have an ideal living and moving in a human soul, a living thought in that soul of *something better* that is desired, there you have a possible, and sometimes an actual, vision of God.

In one of his finest passages, Martineau has said that 'amid all the sickly talk about ideals, which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that so long as they are dreams of future possibility and not faiths in present reality, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with infinite perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles glittering in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind. You do not so much as touch the threshold of religion so long as you are detained by the

phantoms of your thought; the very gate of entrance to it, the moment of new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting real: no transient brush of a fancied angel's wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls.'

Chapter VI

MODERN SECULARISM

WHEN we say that anything exists 'in Time,' or is 'subject to Time' we mean not merely that it changes; we mean that it *has a history*: in other words, that it comes to be, and increases and grows, and, therefore, may decrease and cease to be. At a particular point in the series of events its beginnings can be traced, and before that point no trace of them appears. Its qualities and activities, as they appear in the series, increase in variety and complexity until a certain stage is reached, after which they begin to decrease and at length disappear from the series of events.

By 'secularism' in the wider sense, is meant the assumption that our knowledge is limited to events in time. If anything beyond time exists, we have no knowledge of it, and can have none. All that we can know

of anything—the universe and all its worlds, of this world, and all that it contains—is limited to its history, understood as we have defined it above. If we ask 'What is the chief end of man?' Secularism has a definite reply to make. From the practical point of view, it is possible to frame a conception of the end or supreme good of man and to bring all the results of secular knowledge to bear on its realization. 'But when we consider things theoretically'—a recent thoughtful writer of this school observes—'then it is the conception of Law that is supreme: we are no longer at the practical point of view: and to the impartial outlook of the theoretical reason, the good of man is no longer anything but the term of a single series among innumerable other series in a process of universal change.' The contrast between this utterance and the *cogitatio fidei* of Martineau which we have quoted, is striking and suggestive.

Secularism is, then, primarily a doctrine of the limitation of knowledge. But it implies also a doctrine of the limitation of reality, or at least a denial that reality beyond the time-series can make any difference to any event in the series. It implies further a

doctrine of the limitation of experience: experience consists only of two series of events—one in time and in space: physical or material facts; the other in time but—according to the usual assumption—not in space: mental facts. The difficulty of understanding the relation of these two series leads to the assumption that the physical series is fundamental. This assumption is the basis of Naturalism, the normal form of which is Materialism. And it is with Materialism that Secularism, as ordinarily understood, is specially associated, with the inevitable implication that the idea of God and the idea of the soul are mere illusions.

I

It is well known that the most profound and disturbing effects on the traditional ideas of God and the soul have been produced by the development of physical science in the nineteenth century. Astronomy, notwithstanding recent speculations about the 'finiteness' of the universe, has found no trace of any limit to its extent in space or in time. Chemistry and physics have opened up a new world of facts which suggests that there is no limit to the internal complexity

of the material of which the universe is composed. Geology and biology have shown that even our earth has a history to be measured not by centuries but by millions of years.

The first and third of these revolutionary conceptions, though both are a part of established knowledge, have not really entered into or been assimilated by the popular mind. The meaning of the second is not realized even by some men of science. Samuel Laing, a painstaking popularizer of science, writing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in a book entitled *Modern Science and Modern Thought*, said that if any fragment of matter were magnified so as to become as large as the universe, we should actually see that it is not solid but composed of an indefinitely large number of particles varying in size from a pea to a cricket ball. In the light of recent conceptions this view is seen to be grotesque. Step by step, but ever more thoroughly, science has been realizing the complexity of the elements of the material universe. The atom must be conceived as more like a little universe in itself than like a diminutive pea or cricket ball. Instead of thinking of a world of 'dead matter' we are

led to think of a world teeming with energy in incessant discharge.

In the course of establishing these results science has wrested from theology the whole domain of cosmological theory; and in the process she has destroyed the traditional doctrine of creation (involving the separate and special creation of man) with the whole scheme of beliefs dependent on it. And this, added to the discovery of the immensity of the universe and the insignificance of man's position in it, has made many hungry-hearted men feel that they are all adrift in an infinite world.

This general disturbance of the grounds of belief, arising from what has been called "the conflict of science and religion" in the last century, arose from two causes: a misuse of the Bible, which was made into an authority in questions of physical science; and further: an extension of scientific principles, as then understood, beyond their proper sphere, with the result that dogmatism was substituted for science, and the last word laid down about a whole range of life-questions, all of which have had to be reopened. For example: physiology, or rather, a certain type of physiological theory,

groping among brain and nerves, found no trace of mind or soul; and declared accordingly, and still declares, that all mental and spiritual facts are nothing more than material changes in the brain. And again, a certain type of evolutional theory, realizing that the whole doctrine of evolution rests on the assumption of law or uniformity of method in the operations of nature, went on to declare that all human life is bound in a network of fatal law, that life is the outcome of its conditions, that human endeavours have physical causes, and ultimately can be traced back to a condition of things anterior to the appearance of life or mind.

Materialism, then, is the theory which says that the mind, as we know it, is the product of the brain: 'if no brain, then no mind.' The brain, like all forms of matter, is on good grounds believed to consist of innumerable multitudes of minute particles all in a state of almost inconceivably complex movement. The champions of materialism, when their argument is driven to its last stronghold, either take refuge in total ignorance, or else endow the elementary particles of matter with some kind of mental life, in order to 'prove' that they can produce mind. Take,

for example, Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*, a book which has had a great vogue. His purpose is to prove that the ideas of God and the soul are mere illusions. He insists that the mind is the product of the physical and chemical forces working in the nervous system. Does he prove it? He simply takes it for granted. He admits that within historic times, so far as we know, life has never been produced except from life. He admits that there is no trace to-day of any knowledge by which chemistry could account for consciousness. But he tells us—as though this ought to be satisfactory to us, and as though we ought to be glad to get rid of God and the human soul so easily—first, that we must remember that ages ago chemical conditions on this planet were very different from what they are now; and again—without any evidence—that material atoms have some kind of low grade of consciousness. In the same way another enthusiastic materialist—the late Professor W. K. Clifford—assumed what he called 'mind-stuff' to be connected with every particle of matter. All this is not science; it is dogmatism. Men like Huxley and Tyndall were truer to the scientific spirit when

they frankly admitted that the production of such a thing as consciousness by the brain—when the brain is understood simply as so much 'matter in motion'—is more than a mystery; the assumption of it is an absurdity.

An instructive example of the coincidence of extreme idealism and extreme materialism, in the work of an eminent philosophical thinker of our own day, may be found in the first series of *Gifford Lectures* delivered in
3 Edinburgh by Mr. Bernard Bosanquet. The difficulties—we might use a stronger term—of materialism are not diminished when the theory appears in such a setting. But it must be distinctly understood that, whatever may be said from the side of abstract metaphysical speculation, materialism as a theory has no vestige of right to claim the prestige belonging to any of the assured results of science—although as popularly presented
4 this claim is almost always made for it.

II

It is, of course, not our purpose to belittle the constructive elements in modern religious thought. It is undeniable that the vast movement of change, in the midst of which

we find ourselves, is a movement of mingled destruction and construction, whose beginnings, if we can date them at all, are from the Reformation, and whose end no man living can foresee. It is undeniable that when we compare the condition and outlook of the religious world as it was in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and as it is to-day, we see a new and better spirit at work.

This change is not the work specially of any one of the various religious bodies as compared with others. It has had many simultaneous beginnings. No denomination, sect, or party, no single group of men, can claim as their own peculiar privilege to have originated it or to guide it. The true claim, for example, that the people called Unitarians can make is, not that they have originated the new spirit that has entered into the religious world, but that they were among the first to feel it and respond to it. They may also most justly claim that, in the face of much bitter prejudice, they have done their part in helping forward the spiritual emancipation of humanity. Even those religious communities who have been unconscious of this movement as affecting themselves, and some who have fought hard

against it, have been deeply affected by it. They have moved like that party of explorers in the Arctic regions, who were travelling to the north over what seemed to be a limitless expanse of ice, which, though they did not know it, was a vast ice-floe, drifting slowly but irresistibly to the south, and carrying all on its surface with it. What more usually happens, however, is that a number of tendencies, which existed already in a half-conscious state, more or less suddenly become conscious of themselves collectively and of their combined mission. As time has gone on, this has taken place in so many different religious bodies, and from so many different points of view, that there is an accumulating aggregate of unconcerted movements, of which we can say that, one and all, they are endeavours after a wider and deeper truth, a larger good, a fuller life, a more completely encompassing divinity.

But this movement of progress is no gradually increasing accumulation of small increments of advance. It has involved destructive work whose full scope and significance is not, even yet, rightly understood.

Four centuries ago the Church Catholic had spread out her arms to clasp, if it might

be, the entire world in her embrace. There was no part of human life from the cradle to the grave which she did not pretend to control and direct. Her power was the result of long ages of stress and struggle, and it had taken a firm hold both of the heart and the intellect of man. The essential characteristic of the Church was the note of the absolute and the eternal sounding through her dogmas, her ordinances, her rituals. 'Thus and only thus must you believe, thus and only thus must you worship, or you are lost for ever!' In saying this, she meant no less than she said.

The ideal of such an ecclesiasticism, divested of the dogmas on which in its characteristic Roman form it rested, is the ideal of some of the finest minds of our day, in both the Anglican and the Roman communions. It may be questioned whether those who cherish this ideal realize the extent of the gulf that is fixed between the old and the modern appeal—a gulf which, once crossed, cannot be recrossed. On the further side, of it, the claim is a command, the authority absolute, the sanction eternal. On this side, the claim is an appeal, the authority is relative, the sanction is 'pragmatic.' In other

words—to take a special case—the claims of a *ritual* of the Catholic type are urged because with a greater or smaller number of persons they 'work,' that is, they satisfy real or supposed needs, they appeal to the sense of the dignified and the beautiful, and above all they symbolize ethical and spiritual realities. So far as they do this, they provide the essential thing, and for such people they are the true forms. But such an appeal is relative to accidents of personality and temperament. There are many others whose appreciation of ethical and spiritual realities is no less intense, whose needs are not met in these ways at all; and for such people, these are not the true forms.

When we turn from the authority of the Church to that of the Bible, we find a similar state of things. Joseph Blanco White said that 'the Bible is to Protestants a true idol, and they consider the worship of it, as an oracular idol, as the first condition of being a Christian.' This was true of orthodox Protestantism as recently as half a century ago. To some extent, it is true still. But during that time another reformation has accomplished itself, quite equal in importance to that of the sixteenth

century, not attended indeed by so many outwardly dramatic circumstances, but one whose ultimate consequences we who are in the midst of it cannot foresee.

The infallibility of the Bible as a rule of faith and life has been completely undermined by literary and historical investigation; and with the infallibility of the Bible, the age of dogma is coming to an end. But there are many who, while accepting in all essentials the newer views of this venerable literature, still urge its claims as supreme —unconscious of the gulf which has been crossed and cannot be recrossed. On the further side, the Bible is declared to be verily God's Holy Word, and every statement in it to be as sacred as if it had been spoken by the Almighty from heaven. On this side, the Bible is declared to be through and through a human record of human experience, having the pragmatic or working value naturally belonging to a literature moulded by the powerful religious genius of Hebrew prophets and lawgivers and primitive Christian apostles.

The root of the matter seems to be this. Formerly the sources of religion were not only separated from human life, but regarded as being outside the utmost range of human-

ity, and were found in infallible persons and infallible books; but now, the sources of religion are sought for in human life itself. The presentation of religion is subject to all the uncertainties that belong to life, with its multitudinous variety, its illimitable possibilities, its unscaled heights and unsounded depths. We are thrown back in this manifold of human life for our answer to the continued cry of the human heart—'Show us the Father!' For surely the desire of all the ages is concentrated in those words. We would see the Father at work; see in the blind struggles of men his eternal judgments, in man's persistent effort after wider truth his revealing wisdom, in man's ever-renewed devotion and loyalty to good his redeeming love. We would see him through our humanity as Job saw him through the mighty and majestic order of nature—'I have heard of thee with the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee!'

This is the lesson of Mysticism. Our knowledge of God must spring from actual experience. All knowledge, it may be maintained, comes from experience—experience formed by action and interpreted by thought, and *not limited to the experience of the senses*.

Any understanding of human nature, which deserves to be called 'understanding' at all, as we know, must spring from an experience which has been chastened and purified and enlightened by observation up and down the broad order of things and the ways of men, and made wise by much reflection. By repeated experience, we know the world outside of us; by repeated experience, through inner consciousness, we know the faculties and powers of our own soul; by repeated experience, through reason, conscience, and the spiritual nature, we come to know God. Reason, knowledge, and the spiritual nature are themselves kinds of experience. And we know that these kinds of experience become deeper and stronger by active effort—by practical loyalty to conscience, practical trust in goodness, practical obedience to truth. So far is this faith from being 'broad and simple' that it is beset with spiritual and moral dangers. 'A city is builded, and set upon a broad field, and is full of all good things: the entrance thereof is narrow, and is set in a dangerous place to fall, like as if there were a fire on the right hand, and on the left a deep water, and one only path between them both.'

Abstractly stated, it is the idea of the divine immanence whose difficulties and dangers now lie before us. In modern times we have dwelt much on the truth that God is everywhere and in everything, and on the fact that the distinction between the sacred and the secular has broken down, and on the great spiritual and ethical good which has been accomplished in this change. But it is a process of levelling; and we may level up or level down. The doctrine of *God in man* may lead to thorough secularism in practice. 'God being all in all, he is everywhere and in everything. But instead of our literature becoming in consequence as inspired as the Bible, the Bible has become as uninspired as ordinary literature. Instead of the Monday becoming really as holy as the Sunday, the Sunday has become as secular as the Monday. Instead of the factory becoming as sacred as the house of prayer, the house of prayer has become as profane as the factory. Instead of the man in the street becoming as divine as Christ, Christ has become as human as the man in the street. Instead of the budding of a leaf, or the opening of a flower, or the birth of a child, becoming as miraculous as the rise of

Christianity, the rise of Christianity has become as natural as the budding of a leaf.' 6 That these sentences state a real possibility, which has to a certain extent become an actuality, cannot be denied.

Indeed the doctrine of Immanence has only to be carried far enough, and a point is reached where it formally and essentially resolves itself into Atheism. The Deity is completely identified with the inworking force of nature or humanity. Martineau was thinking of this conception when he said that Immanence excludes Theism. Atheism as a doctrine precisely means that *nothing, higher or better than human beings as they are, is known to exist.* If we speak of God at all, he must be regarded as coming into existence in the evolution of man. The only good that exists is the good conceived by human brains and achieved by human hands. 'Only man helps man; only man pities; only man even tries to save.' 'Only man' might be taken as the watchword of Atheism.

When this doctrine is taken seriously and not merely played with—not uttered verbally while something else is really meant—it has profoundly injurious effects on life. Let any man once thoroughly understand and grasp

and believe this alleged fact, that all ideals, all good things we desire or aim at, are nothing but ideas in our heads; that no greater good is known to exist than such good as man has at present attained; that all hopes and aims beyond this are only *our ideas*; that *only* man helps, *only* man tries to save: then it is only a matter of time for that man's life to sink to the level of the merely animal. The life of many an atheist and agnostic is pitched high: but why is it? Is it not evident that such a man has an ideal and a faith which he does not treat only as an idea in his head; which comes to him as the expression of something higher than himself yet vitally related to himself, and calling for devotion and sacrifice? Some who in words deny God, in reality have a religion—a faith, a devotion, to something which for them is divine, and abides while human endeavours rise and fall, because it is beyond the power of time.

III

The forces working for secularization can be distinctly traced through modern history from the Reformation onwards. The contrast—or rather, the opposition—between

this world and the next world remained; but the centre of gravity has been shifted to the things of this world.

The Renaissance—the re-birth of non-Christian and pre-Christian antiquity—meant that the nations were throwing off the influence which hitherto had guided their religious, their scientific, and their moral life. The Hellenic ideal became the ideal of the Renaissance—free creation, free life, free enjoyment, free access to reality or what seemed to be such. Christian antiquity was antiquity grown old and crabbed—so it seemed—and Hellenic antiquity was antiquity in its youth.

This stream of influence—in the northern nations—was crossed by and partly mingled with that of the religious movement represented by Luther. Although Protestantism set up an infallible authority and developed a 'scholasticism' of its own, it has been throughout profoundly affected by its own claim that the individual must be self-dependent in his highest relations—especially in his relation to God. Luther's attitude to the Church resembled that of Jesus to the self-righteousness and formalism of the Pharisees. But the influence of Luther's movement went

much further than the aims which Luther himself had at heart. He advocated the abolition of institutions for the cultivation of formal asceticism because to him they stood for indolence rather than true self-sacrifice. He approved the restriction of ecclesiastical exercises because to him they were mere external compromises with heaven. The true reconciliation was through faith, an inner condition of the emotions and the will. These were Luther's conscious aims; but the thoughts of men were instinctively turning earthwards, and the spirit of the age took the ultimate issues out of Luther's hands. The reaction against institutions for the cultivation of formal asceticism became the expression of the desire for secular civilization and comfortable living; and the restriction of ecclesiastical exercises was valued because it left time for more important worldly affairs.

These tendencies, whose beginnings can be traced in the sixteenth century, have proved to be the leading characteristics of the modern movement. Before attempting to decide how far this is good, or bad, it is necessary to face the facts, and to understand that 'this-worldliness,' in opposition

to 'other-worldliness,' has proved to be the distinctive feature of modern life. Everything that a history of modern society, modern civilization, modern philosophy, modern literature, and art, is accustomed to deal with, belongs to this world and this world alone.

It has been said that the place given to *natural science* is the surest indication of the character of a civilization. The Renaissance revived the Hellenic ideal of life, and the new world which the Renaissance inaugurated exalts knowledge, but in a spirit other than that of the Greeks. When the Greek pondered the problems of philosophy and sought to understand things, it was for the sake of understanding, and not 'for all men's good,' which Epicurus afterwards took to be the chief aim of philosophic thought. It was pure scientific speculation, dealing with such subjects as the basis of certainty, the laws of thought, the laws of nature, the meaning of the world. The perfect life, for Aristotle, is a life of mental self-realization, of philosophical truth-seeking and truth-seeing, ever successful, yet perennially interesting.

In the modern period, on the other hand

practical utility is the watchword. Francis Bacon has proved a true prophet. Cowley compared him to Moses—

> Who did upon the very border stand
> Of that fair promised land.

Bacon dated the beginning of the modern era from the period of the invention of the magnetic needle, of gunpowder, and of printing. His whole philosophy of science is based on the ideal of natural knowledge as a source of power. Its possibilities, as he conceived them, are set forth in imaginative
7 form in one of his latest works, the *New Atlantis*, a picture of the ideal civilization of the future. Its central and supreme institution is a vast organization of workers engaged in investigation and research in every department of science. Their common aim is 'the knowledge of causes,' for the sake of increasing the *regnum hominis*, the 'kingdom of man,' and for 'the effecting of all things possible.' Under the auspices of this organization innumerable things of interest and utility are done, among which the following achievements are specially noteworthy: the prolongation of human life; the production, by artificial selection and breeding, and

also by vivisectional surgery, of new species of animal and vegetable life; the wholesale vivisection of animals, in order to throw light on what may be done with the bodies of men; the perfecting of all kinds of optical instruments; the manufacture of cannon of enormous power, of flying machines, and of submarine boats.

With less power of imaginative intellectual prophecy, but with far greater grasp of principles, Bacon's younger contemporary, Descartes, formulated a programme of reforms in philosophy, which included physical science. 'As soon,' he says, 'as I had acquired some general notions respecting physics, and, beginning to make trial of them in various particular difficulties, had observed how far they can carry us, and how much they differ from the principles that have been employed up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without sinning grievously against the law by which we are bound to promote, as far as in us lies, the general good of mankind. For by them I perceived it to be possible to arrive at a knowledge highly useful in life, and in room of the *speculative* philosophy usually taught in the schools, to

discover a *practical*, by means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, . . . we might apply them to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature. And this is a result to be desired, not only in order to the possession of an infinity of arts by which we might be able to enjoy without any trouble the fruits of the earth and all its comforts, but also and especially for the preservation of health, which is without doubt of all the blessings of this life, the first and fundamental one; for the mind is so intimately dependent upon the condition and relations of the organs of the body, that if any means can ever be found to make men wise and more ingenious than hitherto, I believe it is s in medicine that they must be sought for.'

If such thinkers as Bacon and Descartes could rise to-day and survey what the intervening generations have accomplished, on the lines which they thus laid down in advance, they would not deny that the labour has been both earnest and successful. They would also admit that the extension of the *regnum hominis* by these means has brought

about some results which, in the enthusiasm of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they had not anticipated.

The place of science in modern life was foreseen, in the main, with an insight deserving to be called prophetic. But another series of connected changes, not so dramatically predicted, has worked itself out through these centuries. Visitors to parts of Europe where the old medieval cities still preserve most of their original appearance, have remarked that these places take their character from their churches, round which they were gathered as the original centres of their life. In the modern cities the State buildings predominate: the palaces, the courts of justice, the government offices, the barracks, the railway-stations, the prisons. The Church, the characteristic and dominant institution of medieval times, has been supplanted by the State, the characteristic and dominant institution of modern times. The State has become a comprehensive institution for the advance of civilization.

When we allow for the fact that polities, in the best sense of that misused word, can never be an exact science, we may say that the modern development and treatment of the

political sciences has been analogous to that of the natural sciences. The various 'Utopias,' from the pictorial visions of the sixteenth century to the ideal constructions characteristic of nineteenth century socialism, are indications of a conviction that a perfect state and a perfect social order are conceivable, that their general structure can be imagined, and that they are consistent with human nature as realized on this earth. The goal is an earthly civilization, based on scientific knowledge, and secured by perfect political institutions. Crudely conceived, as it often is, this becomes a purblind faith in man as a 'progressive animal,' whose progress is essentially a thing of 'years.' In a thousand years, he will have made a great advance over his present state. In a million years, mental and physical good order will be so organized that no one will have any
9 experience of pain or evil.

How are the representatives of organized religion attempting to deal with the situation that confronts the Churches to-day? It is a vast question. But there are some relevant facts of deep significance which it is impossible to overlook. Some of the largest religious bodies of our day—hitherto con-

fident of their numbers, wealth, and personal influence—are beginning to feel a consciousness of incipient failure. Every one whose eyes are not blinded by secularist prejudice can see that an immense amount of very beneficent effort is put forth by these bodies, and that this is true, even though what used to be the characteristic humanitarian functions of the Church—namely, educating the young and tending the sick—have been largely taken in hand and much more efficiently dealt with by the 'secular' community. We need have little sympathy with the habit of railing against the clergy, many of whom are in an exceedingly difficult position, and are sincerely acting in the light of the best wisdom at their command. Signs of decline in large religious bodies, doing much good work, are not hopeful signs.

No explanation of this decline has any claim to serious consideration if it overlooks certain facts: the frantic struggle of the Churches, in the last century, against physical and historical science; the ageiong endeavour to put spiritual things out of all relation to human and natural things; the ever-renewed attempts—in recent times—to compromise ancient beliefs and modern

knowledge, as though it were possible to be on both sides of the gulf at once; the persistent indifference to social reform, and the consequent failure to give this movement the spiritual inspiration which it needs.

These errors and failures have given secularism a force which it would not otherwise have possessed. Not only in the past, but in the midst of the hardships and troubles of present-day industrial life, the clergy have too often spoken and acted as if they were the paid apologists of the exploiters of labour. Champions of the spirituality of religion, like Dean Inge, of St. Paul's, protest against the secularization of Christianity which would make it little more than a department of economics, as though the whole aim and essence of the gospel were exhausted in securing improved material conditions and a greater fulness of life, in the purely worldly sense, for the masses. Protests against such an interpretation and limitation of Christianity are needed. On the other hand the question must be pressed: does the spiritual character of religion absolve Christians from practical righteousness in any department of life? What is the worth of a spirituality which does not express itself in

practical righteousness in the fullest sense? And the demand for social reform and reconstruction is a demand for nothing else and nothing less than fundamental righteousness.

Baron von Hügel, in his work on *Eternal Life*, deals with this demand with much insight. He distinguishes three causes for the aggressive 'this-worldliness' which has characterized the social reform movement. One cause is the attitude of the clergy; to this we have already referred. He also points out that the all-engrossing endeavour after mere physical maintenance prevents men, who have little capacity for thinking of more than one thing at a time, from looking beyond the present world. There is, further, a widespread ignorance of religion and of the religious needs and history of mankind. But on the other side, he sees some significant and hopeful indications of change. The advocates of the cause of the 'proletariat' to-day show a crude, at times violent, but at least self-sacrificing faith, which, though it may take for a time a materialistic form, is ennobled by much personal unselfishness. And the pressure of the social problem serves to bring home to the community the necessity for a measure of security in the means

and circumstances of physical existence. The case of the poor of to-day is entirely different from that of the Galilean poor, of whom and to whom Jesus spoke; the problem is not simply intensified for us, it is radically altered. There is necessity, for the average man, of some social decency, some home life, some assurance concerning the morrow, and some little leisure, as preliminaries for the growth within him of the religious instincts.

IV

As an explicit doctrine or theory of life, Secularism is probably a factor of small account among the complex influences working on the modern mind. But as a practical attitude to life, as an influence pervading western Christendom and moulding the lives of millions who are sincerely unconscious of it, as a force determining standards of value and definitions of right and wrong, Secularism is the most powerful offspring of the spirit of time. It is a practical expression of the conviction that 'things seen,' which are temporal, are the whole of what we may know and value. As a *doctrine*, it finds its most precise expression to-day in that theoretic view of things which the late William

James and many other writers have called 'Rationalism,' but which is more accurately described as 'Naturalism.' 'Rationalism' is an admissible term, in this connexion, only if we make clear the narrow sense in which we are using it.

Rationalism assumes that we come into contact with reality in one way only, namely, through our bodily senses. When any new fact comes before the mind in this way, the distinctive method of Rationalism is first to class it with other objects previously known, and then to lay bare its causes. These causes are limited to other events which went along with it or preceded it. With substantial accuracy, the method is thus defined by James: 'Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds. Such grounds, for rationalism, must consist of four things: (1) definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite facts of sense-perception; (3) definite hypotheses based on such facts; (4) definite inferences logically drawn.' 11

What can Rationalism, so understood, accomplish? Obviously it can *criticize*; and its tests will be very simple, as David Hume showed long ago: 'If we take in hand

any volume of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask :—Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.' But what can Rationalism do, constructively? James does full justice to it in this respect, describing it as a splendid intellectual tendency, of which physical science, among other good things, is the result. But the very successes of science from the sixteenth century, and its unparalleled achievements during the nineteenth century, have made it only too easy for the devotees of science to lose their heads. Many of them speak as if all the fundamental conceptions of truth have already been found by science, and that the future has only the details of the picture to fill in. 'But,' says James, 'it is hard to see how one who is actively advancing any part of science can make a mistake so crude. Think how many absolutely new scientific conceptions have arisen in our own generation, how many new problems have been formulated that were never thought of

before. . . . Is it credible that such a mushroom knowledge, such a growth overnight as this, *can* represent more than the minutest glimpse of what the universe will really prove to be when adequately understood? No! Our science is but a drop; our ignorance a sea. Whatever else is certain, this at least is certain—that the world of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of *some* sort, of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive idea.'

Secularism admits this to be true theoretically, but forbids us to turn it to any practical account. We have no right to suppose anything about the unseen part of the universe until there is distinct evidence in the way of sense-perception and experiment, to warrant our hypothesis.

V

When Secularism thus leaves us, practically and theoretically, in a 'blind alley,' it is not surprising that ways of escape should be sought for with some passion and persistence.

One of the most widely influential books of recent years is William James' volume

entitled *The Will to Believe*. Its importance consists by no means only in the fact that it contains some of the most characteristic work of a stimulating and original thinker. The author preaches the liberty of believing, the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith, the right to adopt a believing attitude in religion even though our logical intellect may not have been coerced. He wishes to make us feel that we have a right to believe that the physical order is only a partial order—that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust if only thereby life may be made more worth living.

There is no 'scientific evidence' by waiting on which we may hope to have this principle proved or disproved. To wait, or to doubt, is to reject: because, if we really doubt a conclusion it cannot influence our lives. It ceases to be for us a living hypothesis. To 'will to believe,' on the other hand, is not only to allow our intelligence to enter into the meaning of the religious principle, but to realize it into our total conscious life and hence to live as if it were true. We have made the belief a working power in our life. We have 'willed to believe.' And the

question of our right to do that is to be decided by an appeal to its results in life.

What are its results? To answer this question, James considers our attitude to concrete evils, and asks what it will be under the two opposite suppositions: in a world where there are none but *finite demanders*, a merely human world without a God; and in a world where we face struggle and even tragedy *for an infinite demander's sake*. In the merely human world, the music of life may be a genuine ethical symphony, but it is played within the compass of a few poor octaves. The infinite scale of values does not open up. The appeal to our moral energy falls short of its highest stimulating power. When, however, we believe that God is there and that he is one of the claimants, then the infinite perspective opens out. There is no mere vacuum. The scale of the music is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals begin to speak with a quite new significance and power, and to utter 'the penetrating shattering tragical note of appeal.' They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo's Alpine eagle, who cries from the precipice and is echoed in the deep; and the strenuous mood awakens at the sound.

Such is the issue of the will to believe. Every sort of energy and endurance, every sort of courage and capacity for dealing with life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith.

After this brief exposition of the point of view which Professor James is concerned to defend, let us hear what is said by his critics on behalf of the duty to doubt. Professor D. S. Miller says: 'No one can retort that the mind does not arrive at convictions in the way indicated by Mr. James; the process is all too easy, the issue with many tempers all too assured. The will to believe is a thing to be absolutely separated from the will to know the truth. The former is a desire for a purely subjective result, a state of our own minds that we seek in the first instance for its own sake, and may be willing to take an efficacious intellectual drug to produce. The latter is a desire that our convictions may correspond with reality, and naturally leads us to seek simply, with inflexible directness, for the fact. The will to believe is the will to deceive—to deceive oneself; and the deception, which begins at home, may be expected in due course to pass on to others. It is the will to hold that

thing to be certain which we now feel to be uncertain. It says, this thing now seems to my best intelligence doubtful; but I will subject my mind to such a course of treatment, I will so tempt and beguile it by presenting this one matter for its belief and withholding rivals, I will so hypnotize it by keeping its gaze on this one brilliant object that I shall presently find myself reposing in the peaceable possession of a full conviction.'

In the same way the late W. K. Clifford declared in an essay on *The Ethics of Belief*, that it is a sin to give belief to unproved statements for the private satisfaction of the believer. And he sums up the doctrine thus: 'It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence'—even when the thing so believed is actually true!

Both writers are concerned to teach—in diametrical opposition to James—that we have no right to believe anything about the unseen part of the universe merely on the ground that to believe it will further what we are pleased to call our highest interests. We must always wait for sense evidence for our beliefs; and where such evidence is not

forthcoming, we must not only refuse to believe but must refuse to entertain any hypothesis or supposition. In this way the 'duty to doubt' is set against the 'will to believe.'

If we apply Mr. Miller's doctrine to a large number of inevitable beliefs by which we live every day—wanting which, we should become dangerous lunatics—we find that these beliefs cannot be proved, if by 'proof' we mean *verification by sense-perception*. Miller recognizes this himself, observing that 'reason cannot communicate validity to all beliefs, for reason itself rests upon certain beliefs,' i.e., there are legitimate beliefs which cannot be proved. We need not pursue this point further, for we are concerned with the bearing of the two opposed doctrines (James and Miller) on religious belief; and we do not claim that Theism, for instance, is a necessary presupposition of all rational argument, or that belief in God is a 'law of thought.'

VI

With the two opposed principles before us, how are we to proceed?

We may see the way to an answer if we can ascertain what science can really do for us

in the matter of belief. How much, at the most, can science really give us in the way of verification of belief? By 'science' we mean, in this connexion, physical science. So Miller and Clifford use the term.

Science consists in nothing else than the discovery of what exists in the material universe. The only things science cares about are bare facts or events in time and space. She seeks to go on adding fact to fact for ever, connecting them together in a vast system. At bottom science does rest on a kind of faith—a faith that the universe is rational and is so made that we can comprehend it. This faith is not a matter of sense-observation or sense-perception: so that already we are led to suspect the soundness of the position adopted by Clifford. But waiving that, we must ask, How much can science give us in the way of belief from her vast system of facts?

The answer is, that she can correct false beliefs. She has set the human mind free from an accumulation of superstition; and she can give us the means of avoiding and correcting many errors of belief. But so long as she remains physical science she can do no more. She is limited first to the infinite ascertain-

ment of physical fact and next to the criticism of error. It is possible that one day science will enable men, if they desire, to live in an earthly paradise from which pain and everything inconvenient is removed; it is also possible that one day science may find out enough about the constitution of matter to enable men if they desire to blow the whole universe (including themselves) to atoms and to disintegrate the very atoms into their component electric forces. But science cannot demonstrate that the one desire would be any worse or better than the other. Hence the fallacy of assuming as 'scientific facts' that, for example, the process of natural evolution is good, or the stability of society good, or the increase of human life good, or the happiness of the greatest number good. If man chooses to deny any of these statements there is not a word from the merely scientific point of view to be said against him. The statements may all be true, but their truth cannot be established by physical science alone.

This limitation is all-important. Science cannot estimate the goodness or badness of any of the facts she discovers. All that she requires is that they shall be shown to be

actual facts. Her findings may indeed be turned to practical purposes, good and bad; but she knows nothing of their goodness or badness. Her results may be employed equally to save life or to destroy; but scientific observation cannot prove that life is any good, and it cannot prove that life is not any good. Science has discovered evolution and its natural causes; but she cannot show that evolution is any good, or the reverse. Good means good for some kind of human purpose. But physical science can give no clue for estimating the value of those human purposes which she may serve. She is limited to the ascertainment of what *is*; and human purposes deal with what *is to be*.

We are, therefore, driven to the following conclusion. If you say that scientific evidence is the only evidence, you have indeed cut the ground from under religious belief, for religion always looks beyond the visible world; but you have also dissolved morality into chaos, by cutting away the ground for any distinction in the value of human purposes. The most characteristic feature of human life is action in the light of purposes.

The gospel of 'the duty to doubt' is evidently an emotional and practical rather

than a rational attitude. But it claims to be ideally rational; whereas James admits that his gospel of the 'Will to Believe' is mainly emotional and practical. But in the former case the claim of exclusive rationality must be denied and the charge of irrationality pressed. You are implored to believe nothing, to keep your mind in suspense for ever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence to run the awful risk of believing something that is not true. Let us test the value of this attitude by applying it to the question involved in religious belief. The Infinite Being is not merely an *It* but a *Thou*, caring for our best things and welcoming our struggle for these things: and for this reason, life is worth living. The gospel of the duty to doubt, if it means anything, means that we are not to believe until some kind of evidence which will literally *compel* belief has been produced; and for such evidence we are to wait. We are to be 'passive resisters' until the evidence itself verily captures us.

Now suppose that the religious hypothesis is true; suppose also that the evidence for it is of such a kind that we cannot appreciate its worth at all until we meet it

sympathetically or, so to speak, go to meet it half-way. In these circumstances, the 'passive resistance' mood would effectually prevent us from ever recognizing the truth. 'A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent us from acknowledging certain kinds of truth, even if those kinds of truth were really there, is an irrational rule.'

We cannot remain mentally motionless. Our minds must be tending in one or other of certain definite directions; in the case now before us, either in the direction of wanting to believe in God or in the direction of wanting to disbelieve in him. This is an actual matter of fact and experience. We talk about a person halting between two opinions. The more important the question at issue is, and the more a man feels its importance—the more living and momentous the two alternatives are—the less possible it is to 'halt' between them. A man may try to dismiss the whole subject from his mind and may think that he has succeeded in doing so; or he may incline now in one direction, now in another; but in spite of all this there can be no doubt that there will be a general drift in his mind and that this will be towards a mood in which belief seems

desirable or towards one in which belief seems *undesirable*. In the former case he is open to conviction, for he is ready to go to meet the evidence; in the latter case there is no evidence that would convince, because the mood in which it would be approached would prejudge the case. These things have to be tested by experience. It is psychologically inevitable that there must be the general drift mentioned above. The plea for holding conviction entirely in suspense is in the end practically impossible. In the end, therefore, it is practically impossible to distinguish doubt from dogmatic negation. In the case of doubt *versus* belief, he who is not *for* is *against*.

The objection to our assertion comes from the side of the agnostic, who would say, that the desirability or undesirability of the belief has nothing to do with the question, which is, Is it true? This we may call the 'passive resistance' mood. It may seem a hard saying—but this mood resembles the procedure of a fraudulent commercial company promising to pay on the strength of mines which do not exist. The passive resister professes to be ready to believe when evidence is produced, although he knows quite well that

there is no evidence which could ever make him believe. The mental mood in which we approach the evidence is all-important. For examples of extreme cases illustrative of what we have said, we may refer to those agnostics who think that the world and humanity would gain much if every vestige of Theism were to disappear. What is the use of such men asking for evidence in favour of Theism? They not only do not want it to be true, but they want it to be not true.

VII

This then is the first main conclusion to be drawn from James' doctrine of the will to believe. In discussing what is called 'the existence of God' the primary question is, Do you want it to be true? If you do not, then all discussion is useless. The second main conclusion arises from the question, Under what conditions is it possible for faith in something to create that something? Can faith thus bring forth its own verification?

This is generally recognized in the case of things dependent on our own personal volition. Thus, by trusting in another person, we may beget trustworthiness in him.

By believing in our own moral responsibility, we actually become more conscientious. By believing that we are able to overcome some difficulty, we are actually helped to conquer it. It hardly needs to be said how well this is illustrated in cases of bodily exertion, as in athletic contests. The principle suggested is one of vast importance. Faith in an uncertified result can help to make that result come true; faith in a fact helps to create the fact when it is a fact into which our personal action enters or which is dependent in part on our personal action.

Consider the great question involved in the issue between optimism and pessimism. These are statements of the meaning of the world. 'The world' includes our own life and conduct. Small as these may be in bulk, they are integral parts of the whole thing, and they help therefore to determine what the meaning of the world shall be. Life is worth living if we choose to make it worth living. Life is to a great extent what we make it; and on what we make it depends our conception of its meaning and of the meaning of the world. Thus far we may follow the contention that faith in a fact helps to create the fact.

But how does this principle apply to the supreme question involved in religious belief —that there is an unseen order which is absolutely rational and righteous? How does faith in the unseen verify itself? James' answer to this question brings out a great ambiguity of the Pragmatist doctrine. He points out that if we regard *this visible world* with all its riddles as the *ultimatum*, the last word of things, then faith in the worth of life cannot long survive. He illustrates this by asking, on what do the best human efforts really depend—those efforts and that endurance which are making this world a better world. He answers: they depend on *faith* that this visible world is not the 'last word'; our belief in the possibility of making this world good depends on our faith in an unseen world where the clues to the meaning of this world are really found. He implies that faith in the goodness of the unseen order—in other words, faith in God —verifies itself because it works with this inspiring power in life.

This is to test the religious view of life by its practical working power. The value of this test has been admitted both in ancient and modern times. But it is one thing to

point to the possibility of this test of the truth of religious belief; and quite another thing to say that the fact of God is in some way *created* by the practical working of the belief in God. 'Faith in a fact helps to create the fact,' when the fact is largely dependent on our own personal action; but not in other cases. James speaks as if he did not see the importance of this limitation. The whole motive of the belief in an 'unseen order' is that there may be an order (or a world) which is better than ours *and yet is not dependent on our own personal wills*. A God created by our faith in him is nothing but the shadow of ourselves.

Stated abstractly the ambiguity may be thus expressed. It is one thing to say that truth is tested by its consequences, its working power in human life. It is another thing to say that these practical consequences create truths, or rather realities, which were not there before. We may accept the first contention, but we must reject the second.

Let us suppose a practical application to be made of James' principle of the will to believe. A man wants to indulge his passions, but is aware of a moral principle or moral claim which if binding on him will

hamper them. He cannot all at once, but by degrees he can, deaden his recognition of the moral principle or claim until at last he ceases to feel it, and self-indulgence has a free course. This is a case of 'willing to believe' (immorally) which cannot lead to truth, for the moral claims, which he has trained himself not to feel, are binding still. How far would James admit this as a possible exemplification of his doctrine? The man has so acted that the moral claim ceases to count in his life.

James would probably reply that we have so far overlooked a main factor in the situation. The will to believe, regarded as a way to truth, means that you are to believe at your own risk, taking the consequences. What are the consequences in this case? They are the moral condition into which such belief leads when acted out in life. We suppose a man to believe that there is nothing to restrain the indulgence of favourite passions; to act on this belief is to indulge them, and the results are to be valued from the human point of view. The results are that he has ceased to lead a human life, and comes to lead a life which may be described in a well-known phrase of Hobbes, as 'soli-

tary, poor, nasty, brutish, short.' This man has ceased to be a man.

We reply that this is a true account of the consequences which would inevitably follow in the case supposed. The case is an example of how the will to believe is a test of what is believed—showing its working power in life. But nothing has been said to show that man can create truth which was not there before. The fact that this man has chosen to cease to be man, does not make the ideal meaning of manhood any less true. The man in the case before us has not created or manufactured anything true in his life; his 'will to believe' has created something which is the opposite of truth; and the truth of what ideal humanity means, still remains. It is eternal.

James might however make this further comment. We speak of the ideal of manhood or true humanity. How should we know anything about the various possible meanings of humanity unless various human beings had created these meanings in life—unless they had lived out and realized in their lives these ideas of what humanity is and may be? What else is meant by the moral supremacy of Jesus or of any heroic soul?

We in turn must reply that all this is undoubtedly true; but the life and work of all great or true men did not simply create these meanings of humanity, but brought them to light—discovered them rather than manufactured them. The 'discovery' is a matter of action and life, not merely of theory and logic; but it does not amount to the creation of the thing itself.

Consider the case of science. The unity of nature is the fundamental presupposition of modern science. This may be called a modern creation. Yet it has been real all the time. We have not taken a *chaos* like that spoken of in the opening of Genesis, and made a *cosmos* out of it. The cosmos was always there. Science has been working at nature like a man dealing with a palimpsest, who with great pains removes the superimposed writing in order that the original word, which has all along been hidden beneath, may be made plain. Science has *created evidence* for the unity of nature—evidence which shows more and more how persuasive and inevitable this unity is: but she has not created the unity itself. Again, consider the efforts to realize the deeper unity of social life and of humanity at large.

All these social investigations and social experiments, these tentative national and international policies, these are not creating the spiritual unity of man as such, but discovering it—or rather, these endeavours are creating more and more evidence which shows that this spiritual unity is and was and will be. It is eternal.

The position we have reached is plain. We have found that the will to believe is not a means of manufacturing truth or creating it; it is a means of creating new evidences for belief. It is therefore a *test* of truth. The practical results of beliefs, or their working power in life, constitute new kinds of evidence by which any truth that the beliefs contain may be tested. These new kinds of evidence are actually created by the man who makes the belief a working power in his life. But if this test is to be worth anything we must understand the 'practical results' and 'working power' very broadly and humanly.

Consider again the case of a moral belief, a belief in the power of some moral principle. Where are you to look for demonstration of its working power in life? Surely you can only look to some actual personal life that

has been moulded by that principle. You will judge the truth of the principle by the worth of the character it has produced. You will not take into account the effects it has had on merely material welfare or happiness. The thing that matters is to be more of a man, to attain a state of manhood which is heroic, and in the highest souls sublime, and which at the same time works with a helpful redeeming power in its social effects.

Jesus of Nazareth, as regards outward fortune, made a wreck of his life; but in all probability he saved the Western world; and the moral sublimity of his own soul was nowhere more apparent than in the bitterest hour of outward ruin and shame. He willed to believe the principles he taught to men, from this point of view his character and his work are the demonstration of their truth.

We repeat then that the will to believe creates, not truth which was unreal before, but evidence which did not exist before; and therein lies all its significance. The 'passive resistance' mood cuts itself off from the beginning from the possibility of finding such evidence. The importance of this for our present subject is of the highest. It is affirmed that new evidence for the truth

of religious belief may be created and has been created again and again by those who are willing to make such belief a working power in their lives.

Mr. Miller has spoken as follows about belief in God: 'It is, despite its difficulties, so sovereign a thought, that one cannot better express the futility of the "will to believe" mood than by saying that the whole nature's craving to know it true may be quite disjoined from any temptation to drug one's doubts, creep into the belief on any terms, and have done.' Here we have a belief which by admission is a desirable belief and cannot be judged by the evidence of the senses. Surely it is reasonable to adopt towards it such a mental attitude that we may have at least an opportunity of experiencing any other kind of evidence which there may be for it?

Thus the final reply to the gospel of the duty to doubt rests on the conviction that there are other kinds of evidence than that
13 of the senses. There are fundamental reasons for holding that we can philosophically demonstrate the possibility of other kinds of evidence. But the only way to find them is to sympathize vitally with the belief which is to be tested—to understand by our own

experience or by sympathy with other people's, its working power in life.

If we will not do this, then by that act of refusal we cut ourselves off from the possibility of appreciating all such evidence. Mr. Miller has said that the will to believe is a will to have faith in excess of the evidence. This is only half the truth. It is a will to have faith in excess of one special and limited kind of evidence, namely that of the senses, in order to discover experimentally whether there are not other kinds of evidence or verification.

Chapter VII

IS EVIL NECESSARY?

OUR examination of Secularism, and of the way of escape from it proposed by William James, has shown that the human mind, in its active function in time, may create the means by which the content of its rational beliefs is tested and verified: but the objects of these beliefs, the 'things believed in,' do not come into being when the beliefs are verified. And in the case of the ultimately ideal beliefs, this is equivalent to saying that their objects are eternal.

We now proceed to examine the conception of the universe as the realization of an eternal order. The practical question involved in this seemingly abstract conception, is indicated in the title of this chapter.

I

In the concluding paragraphs of his work on *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, Herbert Spencer

observes that the people who consider science to be dissipating religious beliefs, seem unaware that whatever of mystery is taken from the old interpretation is added to the new. For an explanation which has a seeming feasibility, science substitutes an explanation which, carrying us back only a certain distance, there leaves us in presence of the avowedly inexplicable. One truth, he maintains, must grow ever clearer—the truth that there is 'an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested,' to which the man of science can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. 'Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an infinite and eternal energy, from which all things proceed.' We are not concerned to press the question, in what sense an existence which is 'everywhere manifested' can be 'inscrutable'; but no one, competent to express an opinion on the subject at all, will deny that Spencer's final conclusion states the content of the conviction which science, as it progresses, is impressing with increasing force on the thought of the age.

The infinite and eternal energy manifests itself everywhere as an inviolable order; and wherever this order can be traced, we can understand it, and anticipate it. 'O God, in thee have I trusted: let me never be confounded': the scientist may not use these words, but the aspiration expressed in them is realized in his work. He has never been put to confusion in trusting to the order of nature.

What do we mean by a 'law of nature' as science uses the term? To answer the question, we may appeal to any experimental science. In chemistry, for example, it is found that certain elements will combine in certain definite proportions to produce a certain definite result. The same quantities of the same substances, treated in the same way, always produce the same result. Generalizing this example, we get the conception of a law of nature. We have found a law of nature whenever we have found things which act in the same way under the same conditions. We must distinguish and set aside the meaning of 'law' as standing for those great natural probabilities, or moral certainties, based on past experience, that such and such things will occur in the future as they

have done in the past; that 'while the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease.' Such laws, or uniformities, are only the starting-points of scientific investigation. The laws that science *seeks for* go deeper than these superficial uniformities. The real laws of nature, though they never tell us absolutely that anything 'must' happen, do tell us that *if* certain things are done *then* certain things will follow. The real laws of nature are laws with an 'if'; they do not themselves provide the occasions of their own operation. So far as man has succeeded in understanding this universe, he has done it by tracing such laws, which form the 'order of nature.'

If there were no such order of nature—if, for example, water were to freeze at one temperature to-day and another to-morrow, other things, such as the pressure of the atmosphere, being the same—how should we be situated? It is easy to see that under such conditions or no-conditions, knowledge, and even life itself, would be impossible. If this kind of uncertainty prevailed universally we could neither understand things nor learn how to use them. In order that I may

lay out an intelligent plan for my life and follow it, I must be able to count on things. The same thing is evident with regard to moral growth. I must be able to know what will result from the words I utter, the thoughts I think, the deeds I do. Only so can I develop a consistent character standing in intelligible relation to an orderly world. If human beings are to train themselves as intellectual, moral, and spiritual beings they must be in a 'school-house' where perfect order is observed; and such a 'school-house' this universe appears to be.

The meaning of the reign of law has not taken root in men's minds even at the present time. People constantly speak as if they did not know it or did not believe in it. Why is this? It is clear that there are countless laws of nature of which we are ignorant. We know nothing of their significance for our life. Hence over a large part of life we act in ignorance of the laws on which the results of our actions depend. Then, when results happen which are really the expression of law, we ask *why* they happen. We forget our own ignorance. Sometimes the results of laws which we have ignorantly put in action are very terrible.

From the ethical point of view, it is admitted that often such ignorance is culpable. We ought to have known. But it is clear that at other times we may in entire innocence and ignorance act so as to bring terrible suffering on ourselves and others. It is in the light of such facts that the reign of law appears blind and pitiless, utterly undivine. For such events are clearly the expression of law. They are the inevitable result of given conditions; and we in all ignorance and innocence set to work conditions which we do not understand, and we have to take the consequences. Hence the question arises and presses for an answer—why should it be so? Light on the problem comes in the form of a definite suggestion which we cannot prove, but which seems more possible the more we think it out. The question is, *What is the value of the reign of law in the universe?*

Death and suffering are its worst consequences; and these take place through our ignorance. Its best consequences we have seen. Because law is inviolable, intellectual moral and spiritual growth are possible. This is a matter of experience. But we seem driven beyond experience to the assumption that the reign of law is not merely the *actual*

but the *only* means of realizing these supreme forms of good. In other words, that the reign of law is supreme over all minor goods; and is of far greater value than the preservation of life and the avoidance of suffering. By this we mean that the reign of law is supreme not from the pitiless point of view, but from the point of view of our own higher life—that is, from the divine point of view. This is a reasonable assumption. We find material for its application to the facts of life, in those accidents and disasters which are the outcome of human ignorance and the inviolability of natural law. What we instinctively want is that nature's laws should be supreme *with exceptions*; in other words, that there should be constantly special interventions. But the inviolability of law must be of such value that these interventions would themselves be evil—a greater evil than the actual suffering and death which result from our mistakes. This is an assumption which is at least reasonable, though admittedly it goes beyond experience.

II

How does the infinite and eternal energy manifest itself in human nature?

Here we find the revelation not merely of an order which consists in the reign of law, but of an order which consists in the realization of purposes. It is unquestionable that the whole process of evolution, from the dawn of life onwards, has led to the attainment successively of definite results, which again are combined into more complex and significant results. In the history of man, definite results in the evolution of morality, of religion, of civilization have been attained. The capacities of human nature which express themselves in these institutions have progressively increased. Human acts, of individuals, of groups, of societies, of nations, have been brought together to produce further results which were beyond the power of those human agents even to conceive. To-day we can foresee certain things which are promised in the future, and towards which human forces which are at work are collectively leading. And we may be confident that, as it has been in the past, so it will be in the future: that the full outcome of the human forces, now working together, even in this world-struggle, will be far greater and more significant than at present we are able to understand.

The bare fact that the evolution of life and of humanity does not present itself to the mind as an absolute chaos, implies that it does (even though only in its outlines or broad outstanding features) reveal order and method; for only so far as it reveals order and method can we understand it at all: and its significance begins to appear when the order is found to involve the progressive realization and unification of *purposes*.

In the character of this process we may read the character of the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which it proceeds. That which produces purposes and works through purposes cannot itself be less than purposive. And we have a right to go further and affirm that its purposes are transcendent. It is not merely the equivalent of that degree of wisdom and goodness realized in humanity now. This would make God a mere double of the Comtist *Grand-Être*, actual humanity. But as we believe that the vitality of the fruit-tree will avail to complete the flowering of the buds which it bears in spring, and to complete the fruit whose germ the blossoms bear in midsummer: so we believe that the power which did not exhaust itself in the humanity of ten thousand years ago has not

exhausted itself in the humanity of to-day. As the promise of a better humanity, written in the crude material of the human life of that distant age, has been made good, so the promise of a better humanity which can be read even in the tragic human conflict of to-day, will be made good in like manner.

When life began far away in the past it began at the lowest possible point; all living creatures were practically alike, and represented the most elementary type of living matter. They proceeded to increase, multiply, and vary in different directions, at length forming different branches. One main branch has been progressively ascending through all the ages, ascending from one form to another that must be called a higher form, through the life of the lowliest water-creatures, and the creeping things of the earth, and the birds that fly in the air, the four-footed beasts that live on dry land, up to man who can stand upright and use his fore-limbs as hands. And when this being appeared, not only was he differentiated from all other living things by his physical form, but he was endowed with a larger, stronger brain, so that he had a keener and larger power of thought. And though

weaker physically than many of the creatures around him, he has become their master, because he could think. And though at first that thinking may have been only a superior kind of cunning, yet that cunning was the first stage in a line of growth which resulted at last in the power that produced those great intellectual achievements of human genius which have enriched the world. Not only has humanity grown thus through the ages as thinking; it has grown in its moral life, at whatever cost, always making for the same result, the working out of a higher type of life with possibilities of nobler achievement.

Those forces that bring human beings together and inspire them to work together, in tribal, in social, in national, and finally in international life—these are forces of wisdom, sympathy, helpfulness—the 'cohesive' or 'centripetal' forces which we call morally good. The forces which tend to disintegrate and destroy all such unions, are forces of individualistic self-seeking and selfishness, which we call morally evil. Therefore the mere fact that society exists proves that the strength of goodness is being actually expressed in life more than that of evil; and

human history shows that it is being increasingly from age to age expressed. And today it is scarcely too much to say that the mightiest forces in the world are the moral forces. At the present day no civilized nation would dare to go to war in a cause that was obviously and confessedly unjust and immoral. Every nation even in war at least claims that it was in the right, and defends itself by pleading and argument as being in the right. Even if this were only hypocrisy, we must remember that hypocrisy is 'the unconscious homage that vice pays to virtue,' and testifies in spite of itself to the power of the moral ideas.

And even beyond that, there have grown in this ascending race of beings, powers and capacities which prove themselves to be akin to the infinite mystery which is beyond us and above. We have passed through the different stages of what we call the physical life of man, where men like Hercules and Samson, creatures of mere bone and sinew, are the greatest, and Nimrod is a mighty hunter *before the Lord*; from man as physical, through the intellectual, through the moral nature, where the prophets of eternal righteousness are the greatest; on to the soul,

the spiritual nature that links man to the infinite and the eternal, so that he dreams and hopes and feels that there is a thought and life to respond to his own: and here the prophets of eternal love are the greatest. This pathway of progress, which can be traced like a beam of light in darkness, presents itself to us as the revelation of an eternal purpose.

III

What, then, of the evil in the world? We are reading the infinite and eternal energy in the light of what it has produced; and it has produced the evil.

The pessimist poet, James Thomson, in one of his essays, represents himself as passing in vision through 'Our Forest of the Past,' and seeing the numbers of those who have suffered and those who have known true happiness, and conversing thus with his mysterious guide: 'And I said, How few are these in their quiet bliss to all the moaning multitudes we have seen on our way! And my companion answered, They are very few. And I sighed, Must it always be so? And he responded, Did nature destroy all those infants? Did nature bring

forth all those idiocies and lunacies? Or was not rather their chief producer the ignorance of man outraging nature? And the poor, the prisoners, the soldiery, the ascetics, the priests, the tyrants: were these the work of nature, or the perversity of man? And I asked, Were not the very ignorance and perversity of man, from nature? And he replied, Even so: yet, perchance, putting himself childlike to school, he may gradually learn from nature herself to enlighten the one and control the other.' Here we find the simple yet profoundly true thought, that creation itself gives the means of warding off or destroying all the evils it seems to inflict. We do not yet know the means, save in a limited number of cases; and when we do know them, we often disregard them; but every advance in knowledge and experience is directly or indirectly a new discovery of means of avoiding or doing away with some evil that besets human life. The power which has produced the evil has in every case produced the means by which the evil may be and is being overcome.

This is true both in the physical and in the moral world. In the physical world, as we learn 'the means by which things are

perfected,' we are able to 'improve on nature,' as we sometimes say; but it is by nature that we do it:—

> Yet Nature is made better by no mean
> But Nature makes that mean; so, even that art,
> Which you say adds to Nature, is an art
> Which Nature makes, . . .
> Which does mend Nature, change it rather, but
> The Art itself is Nature.

In the moral world, too, we must remember that we have not good and evil side by side like two kinds of fruit on one tree. The very life of goodness lies in overcoming evil, just as the very life of knowledge lies in overcoming ignorance.

The power which has produced the world has produced us, and has given us the ideals in the light of which we condemn the world: and if it is the source of the evil in the world, it is also the source of the love which spends itself in overcoming the evil. There are not two separate facts in the world—good and evil; there is one fact, good overcoming evil. Only when we doubt the possibility of this fact, is the problem of evil absolutely insoluble.

It may be said: 'I see that, in the moral sphere, life and experience verify this fact;

but what of physical evil, due to the inevitable operation of natural law?' All that we can say is this: No natural law would do us any harm, were it not for our ignorance—ignorance either of the law itself or of the means overcoming the harm that is done (see above). And here again the fact is not simply ignorance, but ignorance being overcome by knowledge. This is surely an indication that evil—great as its mystery may be—is intended at length to pass away, and that *we men are intended to co-operate in its gradual destruction.* The real 'solution of the problem of evil' is its solution in life—not merely in thought.

Our method has been to ask not for the origin of evil but for the origin of goodness. Light on the problem of evil is found by seeing in what way 'evil is overcome by good.' What really happens when a lower impulse is subdued into the service of a higher purpose?

The answer which we suggest is this: Moral evil is what Browning called 'stuff for transmuting.' When good overcomes evil, it transforms it. A physical illustration may be given, which, because it is merely physical, is of course exceedingly imperfect. The electric energy which is displayed in the

thunder-storm, and in that form is sometimes destructive of human works and human life, is the same energy which may be subdued to human purposes and becomes man's obedient and beneficent servant. But we may find all the illustrations we need in human life. When the restless impulses of children are—not uprooted or destroyed, but disciplined by exercises such as those of drill and kindergarten, into the service of rational purposes; when the selfishness of the child is set towards service, under the influence of love; when, in the man, anger is disciplined by courageous self-control; when what is sensual in love is turned towards the spiritual, under the influence of morality and religion—in all such cases, what happens? The lower impulse is not simply
1 destroyed. It undergoes a change which may be called *redemption*. Something in it is destroyed and something is saved. Our language is hardly capable of expressing these basal facts of experience. May we put it in this way? An energy that was in the lower impulse is taken up into the service of a higher purpose; and the energy which is thus taken up, would not have been available *in that way* if the evil had not been there.

It cannot be denied that the illustrations which have been given are illustrations of what actually happens in the lives of human beings through voluntary self-control, whether or not it is aided by inspiring influences from without. And when it takes place, it means the growth and strengthening of the moral personality in goodness. This, then, is the paradox: goodness grows by conflict with the very thing that tends to hinder its growth. The only goodness of which we have any experience is a goodness which has grown through struggle, ending—even if through temporary defeat—in victory.

'The only goodness of which we have any experience.' This is sometimes not true of the individual, unless we go back from him to his ancestry and in general to the past history of humanity. Some children, for instance, have such a natural impulse to sympathy and love that another's trouble becomes their own, and they give up their own advantage willingly and gladly for the sake of another. But in general, or speaking broadly, the statement may be admitted. To say that a man is good means that he has wrought out goodness as the result of trying, of failure, of falling and rising again. The

struggle with inward evil is essential to the growth of character as we know it. The defeat, the failure, the falling, are indeed not essential. Defeat, which is the actual adoption of an evil impulse by the will, only means that the inward struggle has to be renewed with an enemy stronger than before.

Evil in certain forms remains a real possibility to a man at any given stage of moral development. He accepts it as a condition of moral progress. But such progress as he has already made has rendered certain other forms of evil impossible. What has happened? Certain tendencies have changed their nature; they no longer operate as evils. The old alternatives no longer present themselves to his mind. Certain possibilities have ceased to exist. Let us suppose the case of two men, each of whom is offered a bribe to betray his country. Neither takes the bribe, but one is tempted to take it and the other is not. The one will feel his 'fingers itch' and so forth, the other will be perfectly at ease however long the period of temptation may continue. The difference between the men is briefly this, that the one has his anarchic or lower desires under control, the other feels no such desires; the one is incapable

of crime, the other incapable of temptation. Here the possibility of evil in one of its forms has ceased to exist. The lower impulse has been taken up into a higher enthusiasm—love of one's country.

IV

Admitting the necessity of conflict with evil for the growth of goodness, we may fairly ask ourselves on what condition is the process justified. If we are here in this field of struggle to learn to live, if this is a moral and spiritual gymnasium through which we are to be developed and trained so that at last we may willingly live the life of the children of the highest, and attain to the service which is perfect freedom, then the process is greatly and amply justified on one condition only.

The condition is this—that in the very nature of things this highest goodness cannot be realized save through this conflict. In no respect is it a solution of the problem of moral evil to say that our goodness grows by conflict with it, if the same goodness could be equally attained by a process free from the element of perpetual effort and struggle. It is true we cannot conceive the nature of

such a process entirely free from effort and struggle, but an infinite spirit could. But if in the very nature of things the goodness which is worth most could only be realized by this means then the case is very different. All the goodness *known to us* has grown in human souls through the overcoming of evil even inborn in human nature and points back to human effort and struggle in the past. But the required condition is that from the point of view of the infinite and eternal the highest goodness can be realized in no other way. What men have wrought into their very being through effort and struggle, and, it may be, through suffering, must have a far greater value than we at present understand. In truth its value must be all but infinite to justify the process by which it is attained. We know of ourselves that the strength and experience and sympathy so gained are of great worth; but the truth must be that their worth is so great that no price is too high to pay for them. We can state this condition, and we can see how it is involved in the facts; but we cannot demonstrate its reality, because it is a condition the experience of which is beyond our finite experience. At this point, however, we do

seem to have reached the final act of faith on which we must stake all our conviction of the meaning and value of life.

Our conclusion is then that when good conquers in the inner conflict, it takes up into its own service an element that was in the evil, which is therefore necessary for the growth and realization of the good.

It may be said: 'If this is so, would we not be justified in doing evil that good may come—in sinning, that through the forgiveness and transfiguration of the sin, grace may the more abound? If it is true that evil is good in the making, then the more evil there is in the world, the more abundantly good will the universe ultimately be.'

This conclusion does not follow from our principle that conflict and struggle are necessary for the realization of goodness. The more evil there is in the world, the worse the world will be, unless there are also in the world more men and women strong enough in soul and good enough to grapple with and conquer the evil. And if the inner conflict is necessary, it does not follow that we are justified in 'doing evil' in order that good may increase. We cannot begin to do evil without yielding in the conflict and giving

it up. To do evil is not to maintain the conflict; it is to desert the service of the better for the service of the worse. Suppose that it were necessary for certain great purposes that a far-reaching and severe international conflict should be carried on: to say that the struggle is necessary is not to say that the soldiers of the better side should become renegades to the other.

Surely, it may be said, in absolute and complete perfection evil must disappear? This is not denied. But to appeal to absolute and complete perfection is to appeal to something beyond finite experience. We are in every respect imperfect and immature. We are infants in the school of life, and we must accept the conditions under which alone progress can be made. If this condition of moral conflict is a stage, however long in time the stage may be, through which souls must pass on their journey to the highest, then—though there may for ever be some world, some part of the boundless realm of existence, where this condition of evil and struggle and development is going on, though there may always be some souls passing through it, it is *not necessarily a permanent condition as touching any one individual soul.*

Evil would be finally and utterly inexplicable only if it were to be permanent so far as any one soul or any group of souls is concerned. It would seem to be less dark and mysterious if its presence in the universe gives to goodness the material by which it grows.

We have said that absolute and complete perfection is beyond finite experience. This needs explanation. We are not committed to the view that perfection is 'inconceivable.' Plausible as this statement may be made to appear, none the less when strictly interpreted and taken seriously it is found to imply an agnosticism of the kind which definitely excludes Theism. When we compare the three propositions—'God is conceivable, knowable, or definable'; 'absolute and complete perfection is conceivable, knowable, or definable'; 'ultimate and complete good is conceivable, knowable, or definable'; we find that they mean the same thing, and stand or fall together.

Herbert Spencer perceived this, and stated it with remarkable force: 'Those who espouse the alternative position [to agnosticism—i.e., Theism] assume that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is

rather between personality and something that may be higher. Is it not possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will, as these transcend mechanical motion ? Doubtless we are totally unable to imagine any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence ; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen how utterly unable our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phenomena ? Is it not proved that we fail because of the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the unconditioned ? Does it not follow that the ultimate cause cannot in any respect be conceived because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived ? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations but degradations ? '

We set this argument in its true light when we contrast it with Comte's fundamental contention that the object of religion is humanity. Spencer unconsciously helps us to see what is true in Comte. The latter missed an essential factor when he refused

to allow that this object is an abiding and complete reality—in other words, when he refused to allow that the object of religion must be eternal. The religion of humanity confines the divine life to the short process of human history; and the tendency of this limitation is to undermine the very sense of reverence which prompted it, and to deaden our sense of the infinite greatness and infinite mystery of the world. But none the less it is profoundly true that our highest conception of the divine must be a conception derived directly from what is best in the human. We regard our ideals of love and goodness, of beauty and truth, as affording positive insight into the nature of the eternal. This is not an evanescent form of the anthropomorphism of savages; it is an anthropomorphism which is capable of growing in depth and critical power with the growth of human nature.

If we are able to grasp the idea of an infinite which does not exclude the finite from itself, but embraces it—and of a finite that does not limit the infinite, but realizes it—then we see that the experience of the finite may be a direct revelation of the infinite which is not 'degraded' by predicates de-

rived from that experience. It is true that any such predicate falls far short of the reality, and in this sense 'the ultimate cause is in every respect greater than can be conceived.' But this does not mean that it is 'unknowable,' as the late John Caird has eloquently and forcibly shown. 'It is because we conceive of the unknown not as "a mystery absolutely and for ever beyond our comprehension," but as containing more of what is admirable to us than we can grasp—because our intelligence is confronted by an object which is immeasurably above it in its own line, that there is awakened within us a sense of our own littleness in contrast with its greatness. In the presence even of finite excellence—of human genius and learning—we may be conscious of feelings of deep humility and silent respectful admiration; and this, too, may be reverence for the unknown. But that which makes this reverence a possible and wholesome feeling is that it is reverence not for a mere blank inscrutability, but for what I can think of as an intelligence essentially the same as my own, though far exceeding mine in its range and power. . . . In like manner, the grandeur which surrounds the thought of the absolute,

the infinite reality beyond the finite, can only arise from this, not that it is something utterly inconceivable and unthinkable, but that it is the realization of our highest ideal of spiritual excellence. The homage rendered to it is that which is felt for a being in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, all the inexhaustible wealth of that boundless realm of truth in which thought finds ever increasing stimulus to aspiration, ever growing food for wonder or delight.'

Here the question of the relation of evil to perfection arises in its most pressing form. Evil is always something which obstructs the true development of human nature in one or other of its aspects. We have seen the significance of this fact in the case of moral evil. And we have rejected the assumption that the struggle with evil is an everlasting condition as touching any individual soul. Hence the question may be pressed: must not this struggle, after all, in some way survive and be maintained even in perfection itself? Otherwise, it would seem that perfection must mean stagnation and even annihilation.

Chapter VIII

THE POWER OF ETERNITY

I

IN the opening chapter of this book we described an important general tendency of thought, which has grown in strength through modern times, and which, when applied to the interpretation of the series of events in time, involves the principle that 'to be is to be active,' with the implications that 'a thing is what it does,' and that 'a thing which does nothing is nothing.' The question stated in the closing paragraph of our immediately preceding chapter may, therefore, be expressed more definitely. Can there be an activity, not only devoid of the kind of change that is felt as trouble and insecurity (where things merely 'happen') but also devoid of all discord and obstruction and of all such change

as implies growth and decay (coming into existence and passing out of existence)? Imperfect activity—such as characterizes finite beings as we know them—involves just that kind of change. Its source is the longing of the imperfect for the perfect. It is the process by which the finite reaches whatever degree of perfection is possible under the limitations of its nature.

A perfect activity would be beyond this kind of change. Such would be the activity of a perfect spirit who is ever all that he can be. Such activity cannot be conceived as analogous to a Buddhist *Nirvana*. Instead of calling it *rest* we should call it *constancy*. Such constancy is beyond time because it is beyond that kind of change which time involves.

Analogies—necessarily imperfect, because mechanical—may even be found in the material world. 'Equilibrium' does not mean cessation of activity. The activity is as intense as ever, but it is devoid of mechanical instability, as for example when two forces are approximately balanced, or when two bodies have come to approximately equal temperatures. Again, in the world of life—adopting Spencer's conception of life as

consisting in the mutual adjustment of 'internal relations' and 'external relations'—we can imagine the correspondence between the organism and its environment perfected to any extent. Perfect correspondence would be perfect *physical* life, when the organism 'would either adapt itself completely to an unchanging environment or instantaneously and *pari passu* to a changing one . . . expressing its nature in its activities, without alteration or decay, gaining nothing and losing nothing, because of the perfect equi-
2 poise of waste and repair.'

In the world of mental life we seem to have —according to the time-honoured metaphor —a 'stream' of ever-changing events in the way of thoughts, feelings, desires, and so forth. Granting for the moment that this conception of mental life is wholly tenable —and obviously it points to an aspect of the truth—we are not entitled to infer that all spiritual life is only possible as the consciousness of such a 'stream.' On the contrary, the truth may be that this is the mark not of all possible consciousness but of an imperfect consciousness adapting itself imperfectly to the changes of an imperfect world.

II

We affirm that a life of perfect activity, an eternal life, beyond the power of time, is real, and is indeed the ultimate reality. In order to gain some insight into the possibility of such a life, we must observe what time is, in our actual concrete experience.

Time is not an independent thing existing on its own account. It is convenient for mathematical and physical science to form the notion of 'empty time,' after the analogy of 'empty space,' by abstraction from concrete experience. But time does not exist in this way. If we are to use language in strict accuracy, we may not even say, as we are in the habit of saying, that things are 'in time' or 'in space.' These expressions are admissible only as metaphors. To say that anything is 'in space' is an inaccurate way of expressing the unique character of the space-relationship which is such that one thing may be 'inside' or 'outside' of another. To say that anything is 'in time' is an inaccurate way of expressing the unique character of the time-relationship, which is such that one thing must come 'after' some things and 'before' others. I am not 'in time' as though time were something into

which my whole experience is fitted. I am experiencing my actual present, and looking back to a past which is no longer actual and forward to a future which is not yet actual.

Time, then, simply *is* the whole series of events. And the series, so understood, is necessarily without beginning or end. Any particular portion of the series—the life of a man or a nation, the history of a planet or a star—has a beginning and an end. But to find a beginning or end for the whole series is impossible, because all beginnings and ends are nothing but points of division within the series, marking off one portion of it from another. The traditional objection, that the conception of such a series is impossible or self-contradictory, is obsolete. Recent investigations into the scientific basis of mathematical conceptions—and especially the conception of series in arithmetic—have shown that an endless progress or regress is a necessity of thought.

Further, our experience implies that the series of past events is now real, and that the series of future events is now real.

The reality of the past is implied in the fact that assertions made about the past are now true or false. And this applies to the

whole range of narrative and historical statements. The past is not real in the way in which the present is. If we like to use a special term for this, we may say that the past is not *actual*. But it has a genuine and irrevocable reality of its own. Cæsar is not invading Britain now. But the statement that he invaded Britain in 55 and 56 B.C. is *true now*. His invasion is therefore not a mere nonentity; it is a reality of that kind which we call 'past.'

The reality of the future is implied in the fact that assertions made about the future are now true or false. 'A coming eclipse in any given year is regarded by an astronomer as a reality, when he adjusts himself to its being by preparing an expedition to observe it. . . . Life insurance is a provision made to meet future facts that are regarded as realities and are respected accordingly. Future being is thus the present object of hope and fear, of common-sense prudence, as well as of predictive science.' All this is true, quite apart from any theories as to fate or freedom. Belief in open alternatives still implies the reality of the future. It is now true that I shall do a certain thing tomorrow or that I shall not do it. It is now

true that I shall be alive a year hence or that I shall not be alive. My life a year hence is not irrevocable as the past is. It is, in part, not yet determined. But it depends on future conditions which even now are not a mere nonentity. They belong to that class of realities which we call 'future.' 'When we say that a youth, or a nation, *has a future, has a destiny*, we refer to an aspect of the being in question which we regard as a very real aspect. The assertion, *The soul is immortal*, is again an assertion about the supposed real being of the soul. It has a reference to the present being of the soul, yet it is *ipso facto* an assertion about the future. And common sense asks the question, Do you believe that there is a future life? Plainly all such expressions regard future being as a reality, and as inseparable from the present.'

III

We have seen that our experience of the real present, as such, implies an equally real future as its continuation, and an equally real past of which it is the continuation. The familiar experience of listening attentively to a discourse affords an effective

illustration. The words which I now hear may not be accompanied by any definite recollection of previous words or sentences; but the effect of what I now hear depends, in the first place, on the accumulated effect of the words which I have previously heard, and, in the second place, on the anticipation thus created of what is to come.

The illustration points to one of the fundamental characteristics of our experience of time as a continuous series of events. But it serves also to suggest the question, Are there traces, in our human experience, of the capacity to grasp a complete *whole* which expresses itself in a temporal succession? The answer is, that we find the beginnings of this capacity in every experience where we have the fulfilment of a purpose, which, though it is temporal, is one of progressive attainment. A convenient illustration may be found in the appreciation of a musical composition, in which there is a progress from chord to chord, from phrase to phrase, from movement to movement. Such a work has its value not only in the attainment of its final chord, but at every stage of the process which leads towards this conclusion. In other words, it is a whole. And any real

appreciation of it involves the grasping of it as a whole, through its successive chords, phrases, and movements.

We may say that all real attainment is progressive attainment, when every stage in the process is itself a contribution to, and in fact a portion of, the result attained. It is not a question of being more or less 'near to' a fixed goal, but of having now and here more or less realized an end. The attainment has no meaning and no reality save as the culmination of the entire process.

In moral experience this is seen in the realization of good through conflict with evil. When some form of evil has been overcome, when it has ceased to be an obstruction and a mere source of discord, when its energy has been taken up into the service of a higher desire and disposition, we find that there is an increase in the fullness and mental strength or 'apperceptive power' of the higher disposition which has thus been established.

Thus to transcend mere struggle, obstruction, and discord, is not to lose but to gain in intensity of life. This is only to say in other words that every *attainable* good implies an experience beyond mere conflict; and since a good really attained must be

possessed and enjoyed, it also implies transcendence of any change which involves loss or defect. We are finite beings, and we realize this fragmentarily, as it were 'here a little and there a little.' But when we combine these indications with the verdict of religious experience—as analysed, for instance, in the second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this book—and carry them to the ideal limit, we are led to the conception of eternal life which is thus defined by one of the most lucid thinkers of the Middle Ages:—

'Eternity is the complete and perfect possession of unlimited life all at once (*interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio*). This becomes clearer by the comparison of the things of time. Whatever lives in time, proceeds through the present from the past to the future. And nothing which is subject to time can embrace the whole space of its life at once; what pertains to to-morrow it has not yet laid hold of, and what pertains to yesterday it has already lost. . . . Whatsoever, then, endures the conditions of time—although, as Aristotle thought of the universe, it should never have begun, and should never cease to be, and its

life should extend to an infinity of time—would not yet deserve on that account to be regarded as eternal. It does not comprehend and embrace the whole space of its life, infinite though that life may be, all at once; the future it has not yet, the past it has no longer. Whatsoever, then, embraces and possesses the whole plenitude of unlimited life all at once, from which nought of the past has flowed away, *that* is rightly deemed eternal. Such a being of necessity, in possession of itself, must ever be present to itself, and must grasp the infinity of moving time as present.'

In view of this definition of eternity, it is hard to overstate the importance of a fact to which psychologists have called attention, as to the character of the *actual present* of concrete experience. It is not a mathematically indivisible point; this is a mere abstraction, though it is useful for certain purposes. The actual present includes temporal succession within it. It has a duration, brief, but perceptible. If the postman raps quickly enough, the two knocks fall within one actual present and are grasped in one mental act of apprehension. They could be distinguished from a single knock not be-

cause the first rap is merely remembered as past when the second is heard, but because the total impression of the double knock differs from that of the single knock. The truth is that the mind is able to grasp, and experience as 'now,' an actual though brief temporal succession. Professor Royce has called this the 'time-span' of consciousness. Though always brief, its limits are variable and 'arbitrary,' i.e., there is no necessity in the nature of things that its limits should be just where they happen to be.

It cannot for a moment be assumed that every possible form of mental or spiritual life must have a time-span limited as ours normally is. We can conceive mental life having a time-span extremely different from ours; and it would be almost impossible to estimate the psychological and ethical meaning of the difference. We can conceive a mind for which events happening within a millionth of a second would constitute a definite observable serial succession of present facts. We can conceive a mind to which events occurring during a thousand years would be present at once, and be grasped in their entirety in a single mental act of apprehension; just as

the duration of two seconds, for instance, may be present at once to a mind of the normal human time-span. We can conceive a mind whose time-span includes the whole endless series of temporal events—a mind whose 'present' is co-extensive with all of what *to us* is divided into two unlimited serial successions—'past' and 'future.'

We may express this conception in the language of theism. God's knowledge of the past is not *memory*. His knowledge of the future is not *foresight*. His experience of time must be that of a duration with no past or future. His knowledge must be an insight, a vision, which is whole and entire in every conceivable point of time. Here, the distinction between 'fore-knowledge' and other knowledge vanishes. We think of the divine *nature* as at once knowledge and vision—all is 'immediacy,' as to us is the present to which *our* 'immediacy' is limited.

When we grasp the possibility that God's knowledge of all time is *vision* in this sense, and that this vision is identical with his being, we see that mere 'fore-knowledge,' and mere 'memory,' are impossible as conditions of the infinite. We see that God's knowledge of the future cannot be 'fore-

knowledge.' We see that there is no more difficulty in God's 'knowing' the future than there is in his 'knowing' two different points of space at the same time, i.e., *in one mental act* of vision or attention. His 'knowledge of the future' is therefore a vision of what any finite being may do, necessarily or freely, at any point in the time-series in which it acts. It has been said that the divine activity is, as it were, 'attention concentrated everywhere.' If we take 'everywhere' to mean 'at every point in the endless series of temporal events,' then this statement points to the conception which we are trying to suggest.

Aquinas suggested a spatial image illustrating this presence to the eternal of the whole temporal order: the unmoved centre of an ever-moving sphere, turning in all directions round that centre. The time-relationship of the finite to the infinite is constantly changing not through any *essential change* in God, but through the constant changing of the finite beings in themselves.

IV

We now come to the culminating point of our inquiry. What light do these views of

time and of eternity throw on the problem of personal immortality? To answer this question, we shall contrast two contrary conclusions which have been put forward.
9 Professor Royce, of Harvard, adopting in principle one of Kant's fundamental doctrines, has urged with great force that every rational person must have in the endless temporal order an opportunity for an endless series of deeds, in order to fulfil the true meaning of his personality. Professor Münsterberg, of Harvard, has urged that endurance in time has no relation whatever to the meaning and worth of personality, any more than colossal stature is needed as an attribute of a great personality.

Royce's argument assumes that the realization of personal individuality is the means by which the divine purposes are fulfilled. The possibilities of every human soul are unique possibilities, and the fulfilment of these possibilities in the realization of each individual's perfection is essential to the divine plan of the world. Royce works out this argument on the basis of an idealistic construction of experience which is valuable and suggestive. In itself, however, the conception is substantially the same as the

traditional ethical argument for immortality 10
which we have discussed elsewhere. In this life, death is the event that seems to defeat all the higher types of individual striving known to us. Human personal individuality is, as it were, something attempted but, within our ken, never finished at all. In a rational universe, the defeat of the lesser purposes must be included within the fulfilment of a larger and more integral purpose without loss of individuality.

From this, Royce draws the conclusion of 11
immortality in the strictest sense of the word. 'An ethical task is one of which I can never say, My work is finished. Special tasks come to an end. The work of offering my unique service *as this individual* to God and my fellows can never be finished *in any time* however great. . . . A consciously last moral task is a contradiction in terms. For whenever I act, I create a new situation in the world's life, a situation that never before was and that never can recur. It is, however, of the essence of the moral law to demand that whenever a new deed of service is possible, I should undertake to do it. But a new deed is possible whenever my world is in a new situation. My moral task springs

afresh into life whenever I seek to terminate it. To serve God is to create new opportunities for service. My human form of consciousness is indeed doubtless a transient incident in my immortal life. Not thus haltingly and blindly, not thus darkly and ignorantly, shall I always labour. But the service of the Eternal is essentially an endless service.'

To this, Münsterberg's view is diametrically opposed. It is based on the assumption that the greater the *worth* of any being, the less significance has temporal duration for that being. The real man whom you esteem and love is the man of will and meaning, of ideals and personal character; and the more perfect these qualities are, the more they are timeless. This is in substance the same as a view which has found recurring expression in the history of thought on this subject. What is wanted is 'depth' not 'length' of life. The true immortality is a *quality* of life which may be attained here and now, and is independent of quantity, and therefore of duration.

As presented by Münsterberg, this view rests on two assumptions. The *first* is, that time is but an appearance belonging to the

'world of description'; the reality, the perfect whole, the divine life, is out of time. The *second* is, that what is good has eternal timeless value, which does not require temporal duration; perfection is indifferent to duration.

The first of these assumptions is open to grave objection. The eternity of God cannot mean that God is *out of time* altogether. In other words, change cannot be excluded from the Divine Being. Some religious thinkers have affirmed the contrary, but the logical consequences have not usually been faced. The most immediate and obvious consequence is to exclude all change even from the contents of the divine consciousness; and this means that God can have no consciousness of the world *as in time*, much less any such relation to it as is implied in the Christian conception of love. Eternity excludes, not all change, but what we may call *essential* change—that kind of change which 12
involves increase or decrease of being, gain or loss, excess or defect. Eternity is not *time-less* but *time-inclusive*.

The further assumption that perfection is indifferent to its duration, is also open to serious objections. It may be maintained

on the contrary that perfection, just so far as it is truly eternal, requires time for its expression. A work of musical art, though it has an individuality of its own, actually involves a temporal sequence of form for its expression. Apart from this temporal sequence it is nothing. Now the time-process is the form of that volitional activity which is essential to finite personality. A world where it is possible for beings to live a practical life, with purposes and wills to realize them—a world where it is possible for beings to strive and seek, to hope and pursue, to promise, to decide, to accomplish, to remember—is a world with time as a real aspect of things; because the realization of these purposive activities must take the temporal form. And in every case the temporal event called death leaves the personal task unfinished, cuts it off in its highest, that is, in its *personal* form.

On the other hand, does it follow that we must, with Professor Royce, affirm 'the essential endlessness in time of the task of the ethical individual'? Does the fulfilment of human personality require for every soul a strictly 'endless series of deeds,' in order that its meaning and individuality may

be realized? Our answer to this question is analogous to the answer which we have already given to the question, Is evil 'necessary'? It is necessary in the sense that it is a stage through which every individual soul must pass; it is not necessary as a permanent condition of any individual soul. In the same way we may venture to affirm that there may be a destiny for the individual soul where 'time shall be no more,' though this cannot be at what we call *death*. This does not mean that there will be no experience of duration; but that there will be no further essential change such as involves increase or decrease of being. The destiny of the soul is that continuous true vision and love of God which is the content of eternal life.

As an individual experience, eternal life has a beginning. There comes a time when, in one respect or in another, we begin to 'lay hold on eternal life.' This is the initial stage or seed, as it were, of a personal realization of eternity, which is spoken of as present in its first stage. This experience begins when something ideal, something which at first seems only a dream of future possibility, becomes more than this, and brings us into

touch with a real presence, higher still, ready to strengthen us as we try to make the ideal a part of ourself. If the ideal is genuine, and just so far as it is vital and true, it is a part of God. Those who have laid down their lives for an ideal have been able to do it because they have seen this. And when you realize an ideal *it is still part of God, but now it is part of yourself as well.* Here is a divine guidance and communion which even death cannot cut off—a present experience of eternity which points to the future for its unfolding and consummation. Whenever you have an ideal living and moving in an individual soul, a living thought in that soul of *something better* inspiring the will, there you have a possible, and sometimes an actual, experience of the eternal life of God. To be true to these appeals of our own highest aspirations, desires, and affections, is to lay hold on a life which must survive bodily death and ultimately pass beyond the power of time.

This final conclusion is in harmony with the principle which we laid down at the outset, and which finds confirmation in the records of Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian experience. We affirmed that progress must

involve a genuine attainment of something which may be an abiding possession: an attainment which is not a mere *becoming* but a *being*, and which is *eternal* because nothing that happens through time can weaken or destroy it. We found further that in Hebrew religious experience the sense of ethical individuality expressed itself first in an aspiration after a personally direct access to God, and that this aspiration after communion with God created a desire for a future life where such communion might be renewed. This is the distinctively religious source of the belief in immortality. The later Jewish view, as it appears in the Apocalyptists, reveals the primacy of a distinctively ethical source of belief, basing itself, not on an eternal life now attainable and carrying within it the possibility and promise of immortality, but on the demand for personal recompense and retribution.

This is the inner meaning of the antinomy which we traced through the gospel teaching. The contradiction is only apparent, and vanishes when we perceive that the ethical motive can work without any setting of apocalyptic expectations. None the less it is ever a hope and faith about the *future*;

and its final confirmation must be sought for, not 'behind the veil,' but in an experience and insight of the *present* which time cannot destroy.

'The destiny of the soul,' we have said, 'is that continuous true vision and love of God which is the content of eternal life.' This is the affirmation of Universalism; and this shows us what is at issue when it is asked, Shall every soul be saved at last? Is there an 'eternal death'—a continuous wrong vision and hatred of God, which never diminishes and from which there is no deliverance? This is the inner meaning of 'eternal punishment'; and it remains a real question, even when the crude imaginings which are usually associated with ideas of 'hell' and 'torment' are set aside.

It is a real question; for there are traces in human experience of something more even than infra-bestial depths of passion and savagery. There are traces of a wrong vision and hatred of good, a 'blasphemy against the Holy Spirit,' which has in it the real possibility of eternal death. The assertion, sometimes made, that Universalism means in effect 'it does not matter what we do, for we shall be all right in the end,' is

unworthy of discussion. Universalism rests on the same foundation on which rests our belief in the eternity of goodness and truth in God. 'The word of the Lord came unto me again, saying . . . All souls are Mine.' Therefore, all souls in the end are saved, even though 'as by fire.' The ethical motive of belief in immortality means that compensation and retribution, to be real, must be redemptive. The religious motive means that final communion with God is the destiny of every soul, and not alone of those who know in this present by living experience what such communion is. The chief end *of man* is, to glorify God and enjoy him for ever.

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES

CHAPTER I

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(1) On Heracleitus, cp. Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., pp. 36, 49–50, 58–59.

(2) The principle in itself has not any necessary or logical connexion with pantheism (as in Spinoza), or with determinism (as in Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Schopenhauer), or with pessimism (as in Schopenhauer).

(3) On the discontinuity of variations, see Essay by De Vries in *Darwin and Modern Science*.

(4) Compare Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, bk. i., ch. i (on the illimitable extension of the universe in Space and Time).

(5) One of the best statements of this view of life is given in James' *Will to Believe*, and (in its philosophical bearings) in the same writer's *Pluralistic Universe*.

(6) Carpenter and Wicksteed, *Studies in Theology*, p. 17, 18 (cp. ref. to Lessing and Mill, p. 47, 48).

(7) *Op. cit.* p. 21.

(8) 'Time *means* change': for explanation, see ch. viii.

CHAPTER II

References: R. H. Charles, *Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, Christian*: Cornill, *Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament*, Eng. tr.; the same, *Prophets of Israel*, Eng. tr.; von Hügel, *Eternal Life*.

(1) On the use of the term *Sheol* in the Old Testament the English reader should consult the Revised Version margins and the standard Biblical Encyclopedias.

(2) von Hügel, *Eternal Life*, p. 21, 22.

(3) The outlook on the future, in Amos, 'devoid of hope': that is, if (as is usually held) ch. ix. 11–15 is an insertion by a later hand.

(4) Duhm, *The ever-coming Kingdom of God*, Eng. tr., p. 35.

(5) See the whole of the remarkable ch. xxxi. in our Book of Jeremiah. The Messiah does not enter into this picture. It must be observed that the Messianic hope does not always enter into the Old Testament representation of the ideal future. Isaiah, for example, extols the gifts and virtues of a destined King; but Ezekiel does not.

(6) Cp. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, second edition, 1902, p. 43.

(7) A remarkable exception to the current Hebrew conception of the moral solidarity of individuals in the nation, is found in the early tradition preserved in Gen. xviii. 23ff.

(8) Cp. Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, ch. i., ii.

(9) Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 61 (on Jeremiah).

(10) Ezekiel sometimes (e.g. xxi. 3, 4) expresses the traditional conception of solidarity in guilt; and he conceives retribution as exclusively national (cp.

Peake, *Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament*, ch. iii.). But he insists that men are responsible for instructing and guiding one another (iii. 16ff., xxxiii. 1-20, xxxiv.); and his pronounced ethical individualism controls his outlook on life.

(11) Charles, *Expositor*, January, 1903, p. 60 (on Job). Cp. Huxley's contrast between the 'ethical process' and the 'cosmic process,' stated in his Romanes Lecture on *Evolution and Ethics*, Oxford, 1893.

It is impossible here to enter into a detailed discussion of the original *text* of Job xix. 25-27. Most of the 'emendations' proposed are conjectural and even arbitrary. But we must insist that the interpretation of the passage cannot be decided on textual grounds *alone*. Whatever view is taken of the text of the passage, there is an overwhelming presumption against the supposition that the writer is expressly stating, as his own abiding conviction, a developed doctrine of personal immortality with retribution and compensation. We contend, however, that no such presumption holds against the interpretation which we have suggested, that Job for a moment grasps and definitely states, as a real possibility, the idea of a renewal of communion with God after death, and that in this renewal the solution of his life-problem would be found. There are no valid textual reasons against this interpretation.

CHAPTER III

References: Charles (in collaboration with others), *Pseudepigrapha and Apocrypha of the Old Testament*, two vols.; the same, *Eschatology*; the same, *Book of Enoch, Translation and Commentary*; Burkitt, *Jewish*

and Christian Apocalypses; Fairweather, *The Background of the Gospels*.

(1) On the terms 'Apocalyptic' and 'Eschatological,' see Streeter, *Foundations*, p. 88.

(2) For a list of the principal apocalyptic writings, see Dr. W. T. Andrews' brief but accurate account, *The Apocryphal Books*.

(3) The best brief commentary on Daniel is that of Dr. Charles in *The Century Bible*. Driver's commentary in *The Cambridge Bible*, rather earlier in date, occupies the same critical position, and contains much valuable historical information.

(4) On the meaning of 'everlasting,' see *Encyclopedia Biblica*, vol. ii., col. 1402-9; and Charles, *Book of Enoch*, p. 181 *note*. The use of this term leaves little doubt that in the New Testament its significance is wholly concrete: 'that which—not absolutely or abstractly, but from the point of view of our limited human knowledge—has no discernible end.' As a concrete image suggesting what is meant, we may imagine a road disappearing in perspective in the distance so that its end is not discerned.

(5) See Charles' editions of *The Book of Enoch* and *The Secrets of Enoch*. Our references are limited to the former.

(6) The valley of 'the son of Hinnom,' the 'Gehenna' of the New Testament, originally associated with the hideous rites of the worship of Moloch (cp. Jer. xxxii. 35, Is. lxvi. 24). Jeremiah in effect pronounces a curse on the valley (vii. 32, xix. 6).

(7) Charles, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 61, 77. Compare the pictures of the secular future drawn by optimistic evolutionists.

(8) Charles' trans., ciii. 9, 10, 15, and xcvii. 2, 3.

(9) Charles, ibid. xci. 17 (cp. p. 294, 297-8).

(10) Burkitt, *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*, Preface.

(11) There is a significant difference among apocalyptic writers as to whether the ideal future is possible on this earth (as supposed in the first of the Enoch tracts) or only on a new earth (as in the third and fourth tracts). Later writers all tend to take the latter view. There is no difference in principle, among the later writers, between the assumption of a *transformed* earth and heaven and a *new creation*. In either case there is an entire breach of continuity.

(12) Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, p. 3-5; cp. Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons*, p. 276-7.

CHAPTER IV

References: Latimer Jackson, *Eschatology of Jesus*; Charles, *Eschatology*; Stevens, *New Testament Theology*; Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, Eng. tr.

(1) Luke i. 17 (cp. Mal. iv. 5, 6); Luke i. 32, 33 (cp. Is. ix. 6, 7, II Sam. vii. 12, 16); Luke ii. 9-14 (cp. Is. xix. 20, Obad. 21).

(2) We assume that the term 'Kingdom of God' is the one which Jesus used, and not (as in Matthew) 'Kingdom of Heaven.' The view of Wendt and Schürer that the latter term in its Aramaic original was used by Jesus or adopted by Matthew as a paraphrase for 'of God' (Wendt, vol. I, p. 371) is now abandoned. Matthew alters 'Kingdom of God' into 'Kingdom of Heaven' even when borrowing from Mark, although he uses the former term in his own records in vi. 10, 33, xii. 28, and xxi. 31, 43. See also Moffat, *Theology of the Gospels*, p. 63.

(3) The preponderant opinion, among students of the subject, is that Matthew's version of the Beatitudes is more authentic. Luke's variations can be accounted for. They point more definitely to persecutions of the primitive believers, and they can be connected with Luke's strong interest in the condition of the poor. Even if Jesus used the expressions recorded by Luke, his own meaning must have been mainly spiritual: e.g., he cannot have meant that mere material poverty is by itself a qualification for admission to the kingdom, irrespective of moral considerations. His blessing on poverty must imply a blessing on hardships voluntarily endured for the Gospel's sake.

(4) A few very able students of the Gospels (most recently, Wellhausen) still assume that the antinomy here specified cannot have belonged to the original teaching, and still defend a purely ethical interpretation (cp. Mackintosh, *Immortality and the Future*, p. 42, 43, and Jackson, *Eschatology of Jesus*, pref. p. viii.). We append a list of sayings illustrative of the two sides of the antinomy.

(*a*) Mk. ix. 1 (quoted), ix. 47 (entrance into the kingdom a future event), xiii. 30ff., xiv. 25; Mt. v. 20, vii. 21, x. 23; Lk. xiii. 29: these passages imply that the kingdom is essentially *future*.

(*b*) Mk. iv. 24-26 (as quoted), xii. 34; Mt. xi. 11 (= Lk. vii. 28: the new era already come), xii. 28 (= Lk. xi. 20), xviii. 4, xxi. 31, xxiii. 13; Lk. xvii. 20, 21: these passages imply that the kingdom is essentially *future*.

(*c*) Both aspects are recognized *together* in Mk. x. 15.

There are other longer passages (especially Mk. xiii., Mt. xxiv., Lk. xxi.) relating to the *parousia* or second Advent of Jesus, which for some purposes would re-

quire detailed examination, but they add nothing which is in principle new for our immediate purpose here.

(5) See 'Transactions of the Oxford Congress for the Historical Study of Religions,' Oxford, 1908, vol. II., p. 309.

(6) Cp. Stevens, *New Testament Theology*, p. 166.

(7) Eschatology in I and II Thessalonians: (*a*) Apostasy and Antichrist, II, ii. 3, 4, 6-10. (*b*) Second Advent, I, i. 10, iv. 15, v. 23; sign of coming, II, ii. 1-4 (in I, v. 1-3, no preparatory sign; cp. Mt. xxiv. 43); *manner of coming*, I, i. 10, *iv.* 16, II, i. 7; judgment of the surviving wicked (I, iv. 6, v. 3, II, i. 6-9). (*c*) Resurrection of the faithful 'fallen asleep,' and their salvation with the surviving faithful, I, ii. 12, iv. 12-17 (cp. Mt. xxiv. 31), II, ii. 1, 14.

(8) Eschatology in I Corinthians: (*a*) Second Advent and Judgment, i. 7, 8, iv. 5, xi. 26, xv. 51-2; brevity of interval, vii. 29; followed immediately by Judgment, iv. 4, 5 (cp. iii. 17, vi. 9, 10, *according to works*). (*b*) Resurrection (only of the faithful) connected organically with that of Christ, through spiritual fellowship, xv. 22; the resurrection-body, xv. 35-49 (esp. 42-44), implying resurrection *on the death of the believer*, against xv. 51, 52. (*c*) The consummation: victory over Death, xv. 51-54; realization of the fulness of God, xiii. 10, 12, xv. 24.

(9) Eschatology in II Corinthians and Romans: (*a*) Spread of Christ's kingdom: Rom. xi. esp. 25, 32. (*b*) Second Advent 'at hand,' II Cor. i. 14, v. 10, Rom. xiii. 11, 12, xiv. 10; followed by Judgment *according to works*, Rom. ii. 6, II Cor. v. 10. (*c*) Resurrection *at death*, II Cor. v. 1-8 (cp. Rom. viii. 19).

(10) Eschatology in Philippians, Colossians, Ephesians: (*a*) Christ not only the creative agent of the

universe but also its goal: Col. i. 16, 17, Eph. i. 10. (b) Hence Christ's kingdom is eternal: Eph. i. 4, 23, Col. iii. 11; and (c) the Atonement extends to the unseen world (Col. i. 16, 19, 20; cp. Phil. ii. 10).

(11) Mackintosh, *Immortality and the Future*, p. 134-5.

CHAPTER V

References: von Hügel, *Eternal Life*; Inge, *Christian Mysticism*; Evelyn Underhill, *The Mystic Way*; the same, *Ruysbroek*; Rufus Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*; William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (Gifford Lectures).

(1) Winkworth, *History and Life of Dr. John Tauler, with twenty-five of his Sermons*; preface by Kingsley; London, 1857.

(2) Compare William James' observations on 'medical materialism,' *Gifford Lectures*, ch. ii.

(3) Quoted in Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, vol. iii. p. 403 (Eng. tr. 1884).

(4) *Theologia Germanica*, Eng. tr. by Susanna Winkworth, preface by Charles Kingsley.

(5) Tauler, Winkworth's tr., p. 376-7.

(6) *ibid.* p. 212.

(7) *ibid.* p. 188.

(8) These similes are employed by S. Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, x. 28.

(9) See the passages quoted in Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, pp. 11, 188.

(10) Compare chapter I, notes 6, 7.

(11) On Protestant Mysticism, see Rufus Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*.

(12) The concluding paragraphs of this chapter are taken from a volume by the same author, *Leaders of Religious Thought*, now for several years out of print.

CHAPTER VI

References: Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (third edition); Mellone, art. 'Immortality' in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (specially for references to the literature of the subject).

(1) Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, pp. 67-8, 68-9.

(2) The school represented by Haeckel sometimes repudiate *materialism* because they hold to the ultimate reality of 'force' as well as of 'matter.' This is merely a verbal distinction, since on their own showing 'force' is only manifested as matter in motion under mechanical laws.

(3) Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, lect. v., 'The Bodily Basis of Mind.' Almost everything which Mr. Bosanquet says in this chapter of the relations of Mind and Matter might have been written by a completely consistent Materialist.

(4) Mellone, art. 'Immortality,' § 3, *b*.

(5) Second Book of Esdras (in Apocrypha), vii. 6-8.

(6) From Sermon by J. M. Lloyd Thomas, 'God in Humanity,' Nottingham, 1905.

(7) Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1624) in Ellis and Spedding's edition of the works, v. 359ff.

(8) Descartes, *Method* (1637), from Veitch's translation.

(9) Compare chapter iv., concluding paragraphs.

(10) von Hügel, *Eternal Life*, p. 314, 315.

(11) James, *Gifford Lectures*, p. 73.

(12) James, *The Will to Believe*, essay on 'Is Life worth living?'

(13) The philosophical demonstration here referred to constitutes an essential element in the Theory of Knowledge, and is based on an analysis and develop-

ment of Kant's fundamental positions; see, for instance, Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, concluding chapter.

CHAPTER VII

References: James, *The Will to Believe*; Royce, *William James and other Essays*; the same, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*; Schiller, *Humanism: Philosophical Essays*.

(1) We may note that evil tendencies sometimes *die*; they seem to be simply crowded out by other tendencies and die for lack of scope. Hence the profit of really good Reformatories; for example take a case of the thieving tendency: this might die if the subject were placed in a situation where his healthy and rational desires were all encouraged.

(2) The illustration is from Seeley's chapter, 'The Christian a Law to himself,' in *Ecce Homo*.

(3) *First Principles*, ch. v., § 31; popular edition, 1904, p. 80, 81. In the earlier editions of the book, the author wrote, 'the choice is rather between personality and something higher' (not 'something that may be higher').

(4) Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, ch. i., p. 26-28, ed. of 1889.

CHAPTER VIII

Royce, *The World and the Individual* (2 vols., 1900, 1901).

(1) Schiller, '*Activity and Substance*,' *Humanism*, ch. xii. Schiller makes Perfect Activity exclude *all*

change : but his argument only points to the exclusion of the particular kind of change referred to here.

(2) Schiller, *op. cit.* p. 215.

(3) Royce, *op. cit.* I. 403-4.

(4) *Ibid.* 409-10.

(5) The experience of 'progressive attainment' is illustrated even in the desire to win a game of skill. The healthy desire to win is not a desire for that particular result *per se*, in isolation (which might mean a desire to win by any means, fair or unfair). It is a desire for that result as the culmination of a process every step of which is a lawful contribution to it and is in fact part of it.

(6) Carpenter and Wicksteed, *op. cit.* p. 40ff.

(7) Royce, I. 421-2.

(8) *Contra Gentiles*, I. lxi.

(9) Royce, II. 440ff.; Münsterberg, *Eternal Life*.

(10) Mellone, art. 'Immortality,' § 3 (the 'teleological argument').

(11) Royce, II. 444.

(12) If it be said that all change as such necessarily involves gain or loss and therefore excess or defect, we may reply, firstly, that this is a proposition far from self-evident, and open to considerable discussion; and, secondly, that by developing the notion of *rhythmic change* to the ideal limit, we can conceive an Infinite Being as conscious of concurrent and successive series of changes whose totality involves no excess or defect.

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